The Economics of Inclusionary Housing


Portland Planning and Sustainability Commission

Lorelei Juntunen October 11, 2016




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The Economics of Inclusionary Development





Average Market Rent vs. MFI



Overview of Sample IH Programs

Median Income Targeted (Rental)



Inclusionary Housing Policy Design


Less Flexible

More Flexible


Mandatory	or <	Voluntary
Higher setaside	30% to 5% ∢>	Lower setaside
Lower income target Longer rent restriction	0% to 120% <> Permanent to 10 years	Higher income target Shorter rent restriction
Jurisdiction wide All housing types	City to neighborhood <	Spatial calibration Specific housing types
No opt outs	or <>	Opt-outs In lieu or off site
No or ineffective incentives	Public sector \$ <>	Market responsive incentives

What Makes Development Happen?


Project Operating Pro Forma




Understanding the Economics of Development




Land Value - Highest and Best Use




Markets Vary Within a Region



The Impact of IH Without Incentives



Offsetting Financial Incentives



IZ Policy Offset – Incentive Comparison

4 over 1 Podium \$3.25 Market Rent







- Well-calibrated IH programs can result in mixed income buildings in areas where new development is occurring
- Poorly-calibrated IH programs create market disruptions and reduce development outcomes
- Flexible programs are better
 - Incentives
 - One size fits all vs. sub-market approach
 - Revisiting policy as market changes
 - Opt-out or fee-in-lieu

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