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Statement of Multnomah County District Attorney George  
Van Hoomissen before the Portland City Council on Monday,  
December 30, 1968.

You have invited my comments regarding the proposal for legal services for the model cities program. Except for a few inaccuracies and presumptions, e.g., § 1.102 (2) C, I have no objection to any of the proposals affecting the administration of criminal justice. My only criticism of the proposal arises from what is unstated rather than what is stated.

I begin on the premise that a program which merely provides free lawyers fails in depth of understanding of and innovative response to problems of the model cities area. The proposal ought to be judged by the degree in which it transcends the resources already available to the people of the area. While I suspect that the drafters conceived the proposal imaginatively, that imagination is not explicit in the proposal as written.

The most immediate concern of my office is effective representation of indigents in criminal cases. Every defendant appearing to answer a charge of crime in Municipal Court, District Court or Circuit Court, whether an ordinance, a misdemeanor or felony proceeding, is advised by the court that a lawyer will be appointed if

he cannot afford one. Appointed counsel typically perform at a rate of zeal and competence comparable to that of retained defense counsel. Counsel appointed in felony cases have long been compensated by Multnomah County. Effective January 1, 1968, appointed counsel will be paid at a rate of \$100 per day of trial and more in extraordinary circumstances plus reasonable fees for investigation, expert witnesses and other costs of defense. See ORS 135.330. Thus some of the predicates of the proposal are in error.

The proposal, as written, purports to do little more than duplicate the present system of appointment. If the program is to be of value, it must go further and attack the problems which remain vexing even though compensated counsel are presently provided. It must provide services which are not provided by the traditional lawyer-client relationship which begins and ends at the courthouse door.

I would therefore suggest that the proposal as to the criminal defense function be amended in at least two particulars:

1. Pre-Trial Release. The immediate availability of counsel will do much to assure that eligible persons are released as soon as possible so as to continue their employment and family role. It takes a period of days after arrest for the mechanics of request and appointment of counsel, visitation of a prisoner by busy counsel, and first appearance before the court.

A model cities lawyer will not obtain lower bail for a client than an appointed lawyer, as implied by the proposal.

A model cities lawyer's advantage, however, is that he can act immediately. Indeed, he could frequently obtain the pre-trial release of a deserving client before an appointed lawyer was even aware of his appointment.

If an attorney from the model city program is available immediately after a phone call made at the time of arrest, data relevant to reduction of bail or release on recognizance could be presented to the court the following morning and eligible defendants could be returned to their families and employment without unnecessary delay.

2. Social Services. The program offers an unparalleled opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of comprehensive social-legal services which are unavailable in the traditional lawyer-client relationship. The personnel list of the proposal includes a social worker and an assistant social worker, but nowhere is there expressed a reason for their existence. I suggest, at a minimum, the following:

A. Social workers could produce speedy work-ups of information relevant to a prisoner's eligibility for pre-trial release for presentation to the Court on the morning following arrest, e.g., his family situation, employment, length of residence, character references, roots in the community. Too often indigents remain unnecessarily incarcerated simply because the judge has no accurate account of his situation.

B. In the event of conviction (and my office achieves

convictions in some 95% of its circuit court prosecutions), social workers would be of great value in arranging work, living situations and supervision to present to the sentencing court as an alternative to incarceration. Too frequently a person is sentenced to imprisonment for lack of a viable alternative.

C. The tremendous case loads presently borne by state probation officers make it impossible for them to satisfactorily perform follow-up functions. The result is an unacceptable recidivism and probation-violation rate. Social workers attached to the model cities legal office should provide such follow-up social services as are necessary to counsel and assist probationers who are sincerely trying to "go straight" through periods of stress due to family or work situations and the difficulties encountered due to the stigma of a criminal conviction. They should be free to develop such programs as may promise success.

I see the need for such social-legal services as sufficiently worthy as to sacrifice, if necessary, any one or more of the six lawyers or five investigators for the addition of positions for social workers.

Also of importance to my office is the provision of counsel in domestic relations cases. These cases are of three basic varieties: 1) divorce and custody; 2) termination of parental rights; and 3) juvenile delinquency. In the first class, divorce and custody,

I agree with the need for counsel for the marginally indigent as proposed.

In the latter two types of proceedings, counsel are provided to the indigent by law. Parents and children are advised of their right to counsel and compensated lawyers are appointed by the Court if requested. The proposal's assertion under § 1.101 (4) D that the adversary process does not pertain in juvenile court and its implication that equity would be achieved if counsel were appointed are simply incorrect. In re Gault, 387 US 1, 87 S Ct 1428, 18 L ed 2d 527 (1967).

Therefore the only advantage to a model cities legal office in juvenile delinquency and termination proceedings would be the integration of social services with legal representation, yet this factor is not stated in the proposal. It should be!

The other area of direct concern for this office is the proposal of a quasi-ombudsman function which I whole-heartedly endorse. The lawyer-like articulation of community grievances and constructive proposals for remedies, based upon thorough research, investigation and compilation, would be of immense value to this office as well as other official agencies. I regret, however, that the proposal relegates that function to secondary priority. § 1.106. Since it deals with the problems of the community as a whole, it could be argued that the social effect would be of more general benefit than the representation of isolated individuals. Furthermore, in greater degree than any other aspect of the proposal, it is not duplicative of other programs. Therefore, it should be

accorded primary priority in my judgment.

The provisions for civil representation are outside the scope of activity of the District Attorney's Office and I therefore make no comment about them.

Therefore, while I have no objection to what is proposed, I suggest that the proposal be enhanced along the lines described above so as to more effectively demonstrate what a comprehensive program of legal services could do to raise the quality of living for its client-community.

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SEP 30 1968

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MAYOR	WTR
ASST	J

Phone (202) 755-6990

MAYOR'S OFFICE

FOR RELEASE:  
After 9:30 a.m., Friday  
September 27, 1968

Remarks

by H. Ralph Taylor

Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations  
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development  
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials  
Pick-Nicollet Hotel  
Minneapolis, Minnesota  
September 27, 1968

SUMMARY

THE PRINCIPLE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IS NO LONGER DEBATABLE. Programs are no longer acceptable when packaged and delivered by professionals. Talk of control is an important part of the rhetoric of self-affirmation in minority communities and must be understood as such. The success of Model Cities will be determined by the way people work together, not the rhetoric that often tears them apart. Citizen participation works best when city and citizens negotiate a sharing of power that allows them to move beyond rhetoric to joint planning of programs and delivery of programs responsive to needs.

The objective of the Model Cities program is to help develop the capacity to function in and use the system. Technical assistance to residents is an indispensable tool. If citizen participation is to work there must be agreement on objectives and there can be no agreement if the objective of the neighborhood is to create and control a separate enclave apart from the wider community.

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The frustration quotient related to citizen participation is very high -- higher in some cities than in others, but high in all.

This is a statement that all of you will agree with.

Nonetheless, I do not believe that there is any point in discussing whether there should be citizen participation. The fundamental principle that citizens have a right to participate in and influence the development of plans that will affect their lives is no longer debatable. The social revolution under way throughout much of the world has made this so.

But, recognition of the principle does not mean that the practice will be or is effective.

And this is our problem. It is easy for citizen participation to be an effective barrier to action, just another layer of red tape, another means of immobilizing ourselves.

Professionals who work in this arena see unmet needs on all sides. We feel that we can put together programs that will meet these needs. We are frustrated by having to deal with (what some consider) the chaotic, undisciplined, unstructured, quarrelsome reality that is the world of the poor, particularly the black and the Spanish-speaking poor.

It would be so much easier if they would accept programs mounted by professionals to solve their problems.



But, programs, whether stale, ineffective and irrelevant or new and full of promise are no longer acceptable when packaged and delivered.

This is the reality of today. And I believe it to be healthy. The process of growth from apathy and alienation to participation and a full role in a larger society is necessarily difficult. We must recognize and understand this for the black, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American communities because these are problem areas.

Recognition, however, is useful only if it leads to understanding and, policy based on understanding. I want to talk briefly about three issues which bear on policy:

- (1) Control
- (2) Technical assistance
- (3) The larger world.

Control is a word that permeates the rhetoric of the minority community and is rarely, if ever, heard in the white community. There are those who say that when you have it, you don't have to talk about it.

People in minority ghettos are going to continue to talk about control, in the model cities program and elsewhere. This talk of control is an important part of the rhetoric of self-affirmation and must be understood as such.

But beneath the rhetoric, there can be no exclusive control by citizens, or by any single citizen group. The work that has to be done can only be accomplished by various public and private forces working together. In the Model Cities program, the responsibility for marshalling the public and private forces through political leadership, is placed on the Chief Executive of local government.

Where citizen participation is seen and used as a vehicle for creating a separate enclave, the program and the city are in trouble. Apartheid, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not a legitimate objective of the Model Cities program. Perhaps it would be in a Wallace Administration--but not under Secretary Weaver or this Assistant Secretary.

Citizen participation works best when, despite the rhetoric of control, citizens and city government negotiate a sharing of power that permits the people of the neighborhood to participate effectively in determining the use of the resources that affect the quality of life in that neighborhood.

In this partnership, the city is clearly the dominant partner and that is as it should be in the Model Cities Program. But this does not mean the partners should not negotiate out rights and obligations that clarify their respective roles. I stress partnership because that relationship is vastly different from paternalism--where the recipient is not a partner but a "subservient."

Neighborhood influence over the decision making apparatus in areas of concentrated minority residence is going to grow. In some communities, action may not be acceptable until the dominant minority is in apparent control of at least part of the structure.

There is nothing new, startling, or frightening, about this. It is clearly consistent with the historical pattern by which other minorities have moved into the main stream. Today this situation is complicated because there are those who see all social programs as pacification efforts; those who see the destruction of the present social structure as an essential prerequisite to progress. Such people are determined to prove their point by negative opposition to all proposals, particularly those they cannot dominate, or use to achieve their objectives.

I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of the people in minority communities have not given up on the system. The CBS national poll recently documented this.

The challenge, then, is to build two-way communication with forces in the minority community, which retain some hope and faith in the system, while at the same time keeping channels open for participation by those who are bitter, suspicious, cynical, and even hostile. But one cannot let the effort to maintain communications with the hostile and negative minority prevent forward motion for the benefit of the community.

This is a very difficult and sensitive area, with great suspicion and hostility on all sides. City governments must be sincere in their willingness to share power. Insincerity will help polarize the community. They cannot reach the moderate middle ground unless city and residents together develop a relationship that the community will accept as valid and honest. The old captive "engineering of consent" kind of participation is no longer acceptable.

I draw three implications from the above:

--power must be shared in reality, not just on paper.

--the purpose of the power sharing must be positive--to identify and meet real needs, and to develop the capacity to function effectively in a society where coalitions, not absolutes, control.

--success will be determined by the way people work together, not the rhetoric that often tears them apart.

I am convinced that a structure that has legitimacy and is accepted by substantial portions of the community is essential. Without a structure, every sub-group makes its own demands, and chaos is the inevitable result.

White community leaders, particularly business leaders, tend to respond to demands of the sub-groups without a full understanding of power relationships in the neighborhood. The result has been in some cities, to build up those who negotiate by escalation of demand and threat.

Negotiation by threat does not develop the competence to function effectively in a coalition society. It only exacerbates the backlash reaction that threatens the very real progress that is being made.

The neighborhood structure must have the assistance it needs to bargain and negotiate effectively. This does not mean that it must do the planning, or that it must have a duplicate planning staff and capability.

It does mean making available technical assistance and expertise that the neighborhood can trust. With this assistance they can analyze, criticize, and suggest alternatives to be explored and developed, and judge whether the exploration of those alternatives has been honest and thorough.

The objective of the Model Cities program is to help develop the capacity to function in and use the system. Technical assistance is an indispensable tool. And if it is to be accepted, it must be trusted. In many places, to be trusted it must be under the direction and control of the community.

That is why we are moving to encourage the concept of Independent Technical Assistance--making available to the residents, under their control, resources to provide technical assistance and expertise they trust.

Citizen participation can be an effective means of blocking progress. That is easy, particularly when the apparent spokesmen for the minority community are divided and contentious.

It is more difficult for citizens and their government to develop a working partnership that will move from rhetoric to joint planning, to delivery of programs responsive to needs, and to changes in existing systems and institutions to make them more responsive.

This will not happen of itself. It will require a structure, a great sensitivity on the part of the majority community, technical assistance to help develop capacity and overcome mistrust, and a desire by the minority community to move into the wider system.

A community which sees its objective as control, as an end in itself, turns away from coalition and the learning process.

I believe that this would be a fatal error. It would focus on the equivalent of cottage industries on the threshold of the computer age. And it would give the enemies of integration the rationale and philosophy for their own special brand of apartheid.

But, we cannot expect any minority community to take the larger view unless it has reason to believe that there is hope in that larger view.

If we are to ask the minority community to face out to the wider community, as well as in, to meet its own immediate needs, that wider community must be willing to be responsive.

No black or minority community can self-determine itself into the larger society. If we ask minority communities not to turn in on themselves and become separated, we imply that integration remains the national goal.

The Johnson Administration has made great strides in enlarging the opportunities of all Americans--black and white--for education, job training, health, and housing. The recently enacted 1968 Housing Bill which authorizes the first step of a program to build six million units of low and moderate income housing in the next ten years is the most significant piece of housing legislation ever passed. But to accomplish our goals, we need tools--manpower and money. Let me be very specific:

We can't at the same time inveigh against black separatism and make a mockery of the open housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 by denying all funds for its administration.

We cannot in good conscience and simple decency continue to talk one way and act another.

As we recognize and accept this in the operations of the larger society, we'll be able to move forward more effectively to resolve the most difficult problem we all face today--that of involving the citizen in a constructive process that will lead to positive accomplishment, and significant improvement in the quality of urban life for us all.

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RECEIVED  
JUN 5 1968

MAYOR'S OFFICE

Phone (202) 382-4433

FOR RELEASE AFTER:  
3:00 P.M., Saturday,  
June 1, 1968

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MAYOR	MS
EXEC. ASST. TT	AM
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COMM. ASST.	X
ADM. SEC.	

"FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF MODEL CITIES"

Address by Robert C. Weaver, Secretary  
Department of Housing and Urban Development  
"Project Y" Public Forum  
HemisFair '68  
San Antonio, Texas  
June 1, 1968

SUMMARY

THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM IS THE ESSENTIAL NEXT STOP WHICH MUST BE TAKEN TO GIVE A DECENT LIFE TO THE POOR IN OUR CITIES AND TO RESTORE URBANITY TO URBAN LIFE. This is a major effort. It will test our ability to coordinate and bring to bear whole packages of programs on selected slum areas. As such it can establish patterns which will lead to vast new efforts in the future. We cannot ignore the implications of future violence if these things do not come about.

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I am here today to talk about cities. This is nothing new. It seems that almost everybody is talking about cities these days. And even if that weren't so, we would still be very aware of their existence. In the first place, almost three out of four Americans now live in urban places.

But there is the added factor that the things that have happened in and around cities have brought them urgently to our attention. And even more important the things that have happened to city people have brought our urban population not only urgently, but sometimes brutally to our attention.

I do not think I need do more than mention the words that make headlines to exemplify what I mean by that: Violence, crime, riots, strikes, civil disobedience -- and I could go on and on. They are all harsh words, words that stir the emotions.

The fact that the city is many other things -- the center of commerce and culture and education and entertainment -- these things are taken for granted. The problems that beset our cities and bedevil the people who live there, however, are uppermost in the minds of most Americans today.

I am not here to conduct a clinic on the whole range of city problems. We know that cities are overcrowded. We know that public transportation is insufficient in many cities. We know that traffic is too heavy and parking often impossible.

We know that many business districts are worn out, and that some industry, people, and stores have fled to the suburbs. We know that we have serious problems of bad housing. We know that there is crime.

Not every city has all these problems, of course, and they are important in varying degrees depending on the city we are talking about. But by and large those are the problems common to most cities, not only in America, but in every advanced and developing country in the world.

President Johnson talked about this mix of problems and amenities in a Message to the Congress in January of 1966.

"We know that cities can stimulate the best in man, and aggravate the worst," he said. "We know the convenience of city life, and its paralysis. We know its promise, and its dark foreboding."

And at that time he asked the Congress to institute an urban improvement effort that would be large in scope, and more comprehensive and concentrated than any that had gone before.

In November of that year, Congress enacted the proposal which we have come to call the Model Cities Program.

I was asked here today to speak about that program.

It may seem strange that I am to concentrate on one program. After all the Federal Government has been doing many things over

many years to help the people of our cities and the cities themselves -- public and private housing support, urban renewal, planning, welfare, health and education, transportation, and many other things.

But these programs, effective and useful in themselves, also created their own sets of problems. As they multiplied, they were often isolated from one another -- scattered, fragmented, piecemeal -- and so they dissipated their strength. They duplicated and overlapped, and sometimes one program cancelled out the effectiveness of another.

We came to feel that what we needed was a comprehensive effort which would embrace whole categories of problems.

There was an obvious place to center such a comprehensive effort -- the urban slum. This is the open wound of the city. It is where the serious social and physical problems of a city are concentrated. These places are not only a disgrace to a wealthy and productive Nation, however. In a strictly practical sense, they are a terrific drain on the economy. There is despair among the people, and a sense of outrage that is being manifested in violence. And there is the waste of human potential, a practical matter that makes itself felt in high local taxes and loss of consumer dollars.

So for very good reasons -- both of conscience and practical economics -- slums must go. And the people who inhabit them must be brought into the full participation in a generally affluent society.

The Model Cities Program is an effort of the Federal Government to assist a selection of local communities, large and small, across the Nation to develop and carry out massive, coordinated attacks upon the fundamental problems of major blighted residential neighborhoods. In other words, upon slums.

This means that there must be major rebuilding and rehabilitation of housing and buildings. It means that streets and schools and such things as sewer systems must be made adequate. It means that services to the people of the blighted area must be improved -- police protection and garbage collection and transportation.

But there must also be intensive social rehabilitation. The feeling of isolation and alienation that infects whole large ethnic groups must be ended. This means, for Texas, both Mexican-Americans and Negroes. But it also applies to the poor who have white skins, the there are more of them than there are non-whites in the poverty scale. As we know, poverty does not draw the color line in its incidence.

The Model Cities Program was structured to attack this whole range of physical and social problems in areas selected by the cities themselves. That is an important element of the whole program -- the city must apply to the Federal Government, defining the neighborhood or the neighborhoods it wants involved. It must

survey the needs of the area, and establish a dialogue with its citizens so that their involvement is assured.

The legislation establishing this program calls for neighborhood involvement in the program, as well as citywide participation.

We started this demonstration effort by calling for applications from any American city which thought it had serious problems and which was willing to attack those problems. We have selected 75 cities to receive grants to plan their programs, and that process is now underway. Each of these cities, ranging in size from New York to Winooski, Vermont, has its own unique problems, but they also have many problems in common.

San Antonio is one of the Model Cities. It has selected its project area, which is known as the West Side. This is the area which has the highest concentration of blight and substandard housing. It has the worst problems of unemployment and bad health. It is a pocket of poverty.

About 12 percent of the population can be found in the selected area, about 94,000 people. More than 50 percent of the families have less than \$3,000 income. In comparison, the figure is about 28 percent for the whole city.

There is a high unemployment rate, almost nine percent as opposed to about 5 percent in the city as a whole. Almost 40 percent of the housing is substandard. Over 31 percent of the

infant deaths are there. And one of the most shocking figures of all -- 83.2 percent of the people over 25 years of age have less than an eighth grade education.

How does this compare with the national picture?

This is what the assessments were of the Model Cities as a group:

-- Three out of ten homes are substandard, which is three times the proportion for all urban areas.

-- One out of three families has an income under \$3,000 a year, which is twice the proportion for all urban areas.

-- Among all of those over 25 years of age, one in three had less than an eighth grade education, and that is a third higher than the average for all urban areas.

-- Among those in the labor force, one in ten was unemployed, and that is two-and-a-half times higher than in the entire labor force.

So it is clear that these are the neighborhoods with the poorest housing, the lowest incomes, the least adequate education, and the highest unemployment.

What, then, will the Model Cities Program do to solve these very difficult and urgent problems?

The main strategy of the Model Cities approach lies in coupling two important elements at the local level: The requirements -- or goals -- side and the delivery side.

With regard to requirements, the local government decides which programs are needed to go into the model city neighborhood. The planning process which each city is going through now is intended to provide the necessary analysis of needs, with particular emphasis on how each relates to the other. In other words, they must develop comprehensive, coordinated neighborhood programs, and they must obtain widespread participation of neighborhood residents in program planning and execution.

For this to happen, Federal programs cannot by-pass the city government, and there must be assurance that independent local agencies will not work separately, or at cross purposes with each other. Local activities, though funded from different sources, must be responsive to an overall strategy for solving the neighborhood's basic problems.

Local general purpose government has overall and final responsibility for direction of the program. In order to meet this responsibility the Mayor or city council must have an administrative agency, usually called a City Demonstration Agency (CDA), charged with responsibility for pulling together the various interests that must cooperate to make the program successful -- residents of the neighborhood, relevant public officials in the fields of education, welfare, housing, health, etc., and representatives of private interests such as civic and religious groups, business, organized labor, civil rights, etc.

Appointed or elected representatives of these interest groups usually make up a Model Cities Board or Committee responsible for drafting proposals and making firm recommendations to the City Demonstration Agency and the local governing body regarding the model cities plan.

On the delivery side, the idea is for the Federal Government, the states, and the local administration to tie together their programs into packages that relate to one another, so that they can be implemented more effectively.

For the Federal agencies, this means going to an interagency review table with the purpose of committing program funds and sharing jointly the decisions to allocate them. In all cases, these decisions will be based on the city's own comprehensive plan for action. If this is not done, the cities will have no encouragement to do business other than in the old way. The Model Cities Program will become just another grant-in-aid program.

What this means in the way of Federal program assistance can be illustrated by mentioning just a few of those available from my own Department of Housing and Urban Development. This means such programs as public housing, rent supplement housing, housing for the elderly and a number of other housing programs. It means urban renewal programs. It means programs to build



neighborhood centers, and establish parks and playgrounds. Other Federal Departments and agencies will concentrate education and welfare and job training programs in the neighborhoods.

You can get some idea of the range of Federal programs involved by the Government agencies which reviewed the applications for planning grants. In addition to my own Department of Housing and Urban Development they were the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, Justice, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

I would stress that the leadership role of local government is a crucial one. And I would be less than frank with you, if I didn't add that it is also politically the most explosive. The issues here are those of power and control. Old established political power centers are going to be disturbed and in some cases old administrative structures will be changed. This process is going on now in the 75 Model Cities throughout the country as well as in the Federal Government.

We cannot help but realize, however, and this also has become clear to us in these early months of the program, that even during the planning phase, many interesting and constructive things have taken place in the Model Cities.

In order to coordinate the attack on the Model Cities area, city governments have brought together -- often for the first

time -- all the many agencies and departments that make up city government. A new order of cooperation and coordination of city programs has come about in some cases. These are bonus benefits, and they are not inconsiderable.

The city, therefore, makes its own plans and devises its own solutions.

But there is another aspect to this program. We realize that we know too little about how to solve the problems of our city people, and so we have asked the cities themselves to devise new solutions. Under a special financing formula, we will give the Model Cities block grants of sufficient size to embark on entirely new, and often revolutionary programs of their own. We do not earmark these funds. Communities are urged to use these funds to test, develop and carry out new ideas that are experimental and otherwise could not have been tried.

We have already gathered together a few examples of what some of these ideas are.

One city proposes to train Model Neighborhood residents in what could and should become a new trade, that is in the rehabilitation of sturdy but rundown housing.

Incidentally, there is a clear mandate in the Model Cities legislation that these local efforts produce as many jobs as possible for the people living in the neighborhoods. This will

mean training programs, opportunities for union membership, and the rebuilding of their neighborhoods as one of the means by which people get into the mainstream. Discussions with leaders of the Building Trades Unions indicate that they are beginning to recognize that there is a challenge here for achieving equal opportunity in employment, and it is a challenge that must be met.

Another city proposes to set aside its building codes in order to test new ways to cut the cost of building and rehabilitating housing. Still another city proposes to start a training academy to develop community leaders, managers and administrators.

We hope and expect that a good many new ideas will be tested, and that the results will be useful to others, both in successes that can be repeated, and mistakes that can be avoided. We are not telling cities what they must do. In effect, we are giving them means to find out what they are capable of doing.

As I have mentioned, citizen participation in this program is required by the legislation. And this is at one time the most difficult and most satisfying elements of the program.

There is no mandate laid down to the communities as to how they go about selecting these groups. In fact, the variety of methods whereby communities have gone about this process is in itself an example of the uniqueness of the program.

But there is a pattern. Most cities hold elections in the neighborhoods, and so we have the most traditional of our democratic institutions being brought right down into the homes and blocks and neighborhoods. And they are not voting for a President or a mayor -- some distant figure -- but for their own, and this may well prove to be the most valuable early result of the program in the neighborhood itself. This is how participation starts, and the sense of alienation begins to wither away.

A recent election in the Des Moines Model City neighborhood is an excellent example of how a whole city got involved. The city government decided to set up a 22-person City Demonstration Agency. Eight of the members were appointed by the City Council, to fulfill the requirement that the Agency must have citywide participation.

The other fourteen were elected from the neighborhood. Nominating petitions were circulated by the prospective candidates and their friends, again an honorable and traditional method in our democracy. Technical assistance in running the election was volunteered by the League of Women Voters, and by both the Democratic and Republican national committeemen. The telephone company furnished telephones for a get-out-the-vote drive. The business community gave each candidate a cash contribution for campaign material. On election day, the mayor led a get-out-the-vote parade through the neighborhood. The turnout was high -- almost one-quarter of the residents 18 years and over.

It seems to me that this is a tremendously important kind of thing. Model Cities is turning out to be a vehicle to bring about new relationships between citizens and city officials. This seems to be happening to varying degrees throughout the program.

These citizens will be involved in the planning process, not in the abstract, but in the actual planning. This is also essential. Residents are going to be involved. You can't stop this. And the degree to which residents feel they are involved will in most cases determine the degree of success of the program.

You can see by this that the role of local government is crucial. It is crucial in how well it is able to communicate with the citizens of the Model City neighborhood. That is obvious. If the people in local government are apathetic to the objectives of this program, the Department will have no choice but to cancel the Model Cities designation and funds. A passive and lethargic local government cannot develop and carry out an action plan that meets statutory requirements.

x                      x                      x

I hope this talk has given you some idea of the program. When I was asked to speak here today, it seemed to me that it would be difficult in the short period we had to go very deeply into a program which is at one time as complicated and as important as the Model Cities program.

But on second thought, it occurred to me that we had better be able to do so. This program is, to my mind, the essential next step that must be taken to solve our most urgent urban problems.

It is, in fact, a pioneering effort which will for the first time attack the whole galaxy of human and physical problems in whole large residential neighborhoods in a coordinated way. As such it will, if successful, act as an incubator for new ideas and pave the way for a whole new concept of restoring decency and urbanity to city life.

That sounds like a large promise. It is. It sounds as though it will be a difficult promise to keep. It will be. But I think the warning of our urban situation is clear and explicit: giant efforts must be made and large promises must be kept if we are to live decently in American cities.

The bitter fact of today is that the bitter fruit of violence in our cities is a human failure, a failure of America to realize and correct the inequities of life for many of our citizens and of the deficiencies of our cities. But if it is a human failure, then it is within our power to correct those deficiencies and to bring about a major change in the lives of our most needy citizens. We cannot dodge that responsibility, nor can we ignore the implications if we do not do so.

The Model Cities Program is not a modest effort, either in its investment or its potential. We conceive it as the basis for a broad, national investment in urban reconstruction -- in which the Model Cities Program is the first and necessary exploration of how such a broader investment can be wisely made.

It seems very fitting to me that this city which is almost 250 years old should be involved in this new and vastly innovative program. HemisFair itself is an example of this blending process -- attention to tradition, but looking forward to the future. The same spirit and energy which went into this exposition can now be channeled into the Model Cities effort. If that comes about, you cannot fail.

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Ira C. Keller  
*Chairman*

A. V. Fonder  
*Secretary*

Harold Halvorsen  
Vincent Raschio  
Edward H. Look

## PORTLAND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

2000 S. W. FIRST AVENUE • PORTLAND, OREGON 97201 • 228-4036

July 18, 1968

John B. Kenward  
*Executive Director*

RECEIVED  
JUL 19 1968

MAYOR'S OFFICE

MAYOR	
CO.	
ASSI.	
ADM.	
SEC.	

Honorable Terry D. Schrunk  
Mayor  
City Hall  
1220 S. W. 5th Avenue  
Portland, Oregon 97204

Dear Mayor:

Thought you might like to have a copy of the attached two speeches relative to Model Cities and citizen participation.

Yours very truly,

John B. Kenward  
Executive Director

JBK:kb  
Encls.

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*Model Cities  
file*

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RECEIVED  
JUN 19 1968

MAYOR'S OFFICE

MAYOR	
EXEC. ASST. II	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EXEC. ASST. I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
COMM. ASST.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TO BE RELEASED AFTER:  
2:00 p.m., Thursday  
June 13, 1968

## MODEL CITIES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Remarks of

H. Ralph Taylor

Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations

U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

United States Conference of Mayors

Palmer House, June 13, 1968

Chicago, Ill.

### SUMMARY

THE NATURE OF MODEL CITIES PLANNING MAKES ARGUMENTS FOR CONTROL--WHETHER BY CITY HALL AND PROFESSIONAL PLANNING AGENCIES OR NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS--EQUALLY FRUITLESS. Model Cities planning relates to all aspects of life--to the economic and social as well as physical. It therefore must involve the people of the neighborhood, all levels of government and all private agencies who have resources to bring to the solution of these problems. It is not merely an exercise to slice up available Federal funds.

Responsibility for Model Cities planning is focused on the chief executive of the city, because it is a process of creating an institution that will pull together the many pieces of a community--a political process in the highest sense of that term. It will take real political leadership to bring into concerted action the independent agencies that have historically gone their own way. The Model Cities process can help the mayor and the neighborhood people build an institution where shared responsibility serves as a bridge between the neighborhood and city government and the wider community.

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I could recite the usual statistics of the number of applications received, of cities under contract and the rosy future of the Model Cities program.

But I'm not going that route today.

This audience is entitled to, and will benefit from a frank and honest discussion of the workings of the program. We in Washington have no monopoly on wisdom and operational know-how; I know we can profit by listening. I want to hear your experiences and share your insight.

The two interrelated aspects of the program that I will focus on are citizen participation and the planning process. Both involve a series of separate, but yet related problems. The success or failure of the Model Cities program will hinge on our joint ability to solve these problems. Much more than the Model Cities program is at stake. In my judgment the real issue is the structure of the fiscal relationship between city and Federal Government, and the capacity of cities to evolve new institutions that will solve today's urban problems.

What does the law say about citizen participation? Section 103 defines a comprehensive city demonstration program to include... "widespread citizen participation in the program..." In the very next clause the law requires "...maximum opportunities for employing residents of the area in all phases of the program and enlarged opportunities for work and training."

Our statute requires widespread citizen participation, but not "maximum" citizen participation in the context that those who demand

absolute resident control of the program use that term. We fund city governments, not neighborhood corporations or organizations. We hold the city responsible as the contracting party, regardless of what the city chooses to do by sub-contract or local policy.

Our City Demonstration Agency (CDA) Letter #3, on citizen participation, is entirely consistent with this basic policy position. Our performance standards are designed to assure that the residents of the target neighborhood have an affirmative opportunity to participate effectively in solving the physical and social problems of their community. We carefully refrained from setting out any model or required organizational pattern. We did what locals have said for years to the Feds: "Tell us the standards we have to meet, but give us complete discretion as to how we'll meet them."

By and large, we think the citizen participation process is working in this program. We have people and organizations now working with the city governmental structure that have never been involved before. The people who live in the neighborhoods are being heard. They are getting the opportunity with professional help they trust to plan with the city for their neighborhoods and their own futures.

This is not only good--it is absolutely necessary to civic peace. The era of "planning for" is over--especially since "planning for" too often meant no planning--or a failure to understand the hard reality of conditions and the implications of discrimination in housing, jobs, education and basic city services.

We must be blunt and direct with each other--the problems are too big and too important to be glossed over with politeness.

In many cities, the minority community, be it black, Puerto Rican or Mexican American, distrusts city hall. It is important that we look closely and analytically at the history and character of that relationship; to try to understand the reasons for the distrust. Unless we do, and act to remove the basic causes, there can be no effective communication, no resolution of basic issues.

The vocal elements of the minority community want control for two basic reasons:

- (1) They believe that without control they will get the short end of the stick in terms of benefits and flow of funds.
- (2) Control means jobs and patronage and power for those in charge.

There is no element of moral judgment here, but rather a statement of cold fact. This is the way it is. If we understand it, we can deal with it. And we have to deal with it in a way that does not make the program an instrument for the aggrandizement of those who make the most noise, but do not necessarily have the most community support.

The cities in this program have approached these problems in different ways --as they should. We will get experimentation. We will have failures as well as successes. We have to accept both success and failure as essential elements of the planning experience that we are all part of, in this period of rapid change.

The fight over control and the fragmentation of the community are not caused by this program. They are the products of history, with its heritage of suspicion and conflicting ambitions.

I suggest that Mayors today have to understand the social dynamics of their cities in a way that their predecessors never had to. Without this understanding of the social forces rooted in past and present history, without this understanding of the motivation of individuals and of groups, Mayors will not be able to provide the skillful and sensitive leadership the crisis of our cities demands.

It is no answer to suggest that there is no identifiable leadership, that the ghetto is too divided for City Hall to work with. It is no answer to say that the Model Cities program is creating or contributing to "the bedlam of community action" in Bayard Rustin's phrase, by our requirement that there be a citizen structure that can and will relate to the city.

If the institutions that make for effective and workable relationships between city hall and neighborhood do not already exist, then "they must be created." We cannot--like the ostrich which buries its head in the sand--leave the planning entirely to city hall professionals as if this were 1958 instead of 1968.

I agree that workable institutions cannot be created around the abstraction of planning as we have known it in the past. It takes flesh and blood and action to breathe life into what otherwise can be an exercise in form rather than substance.

I suggest that many of the problems we face stem from a failure to understand the substance of the Model Cities planning process. The essential nature of Model Cities planning makes arguments for control by city hall and planning agency professionals or demands for planning control by the community equally fruitless.

The key fact about the Model Cities planning process is that it is not merely an exercise to slice up the available supplementary funds. If it were so, there would be no justification for the program. Cities with this limited understanding of the program are not likely to be funded.

The Model Cities planning process is as broad as the responsibility of government for the welfare of its people and the quality of their lives. It relates to all aspects of life--to the economic and social as well as the physical. The problems are such that the full range of resources is necessary for their solution, including private as well as public, business and industry and labor and the banks, the service clubs and the community organizations. All levels of government must be involved: State and county and independent agencies as well as city and Federal.

They must all be involved because the object is to analyze the problem and its causes and, based upon that analysis, develop a strategy that will provide the concentration and coordination of effort that will lead to a solution.

Costly experience has taught us that the social, physical and economic problems of people and their neighborhood are inter-related, that the problems cannot be solved separate from each other.

This means that on the public side the problem-solving teams must include the board of education along with the independent renewal or housing authority, the welfare department whether it be a city, county or state operation, the public works department, the police department and literally every agency or department whose activities relate to people and the way they live. Such involvement is a golden opportunity to the managers of these agencies to inject their programs and organizations with relevance, immediacy and meaning to the lives of the people they seek to serve.

The planning process looks at the full range of institutions and services. It should bring into the open, in full view of all, the facts and the needs and aspirations of the community. People of the neighborhood must be part of this process through the citizen participation structure. They serve on the policy boards or advisory committees and the planning task forces. They share in the job of identifying the problems, getting the facts and developing the strategy.

We have simplified the material we want from cities. We want a problem analysis, a strategy plan, a one-year action program and a five-year forecast. We are not asking for project-level detail after the first year, nor

do we even call the 5-year element a "plan" but rather a forecast. We do want to make certain that the various activities relate to each other and to a strategy to achieve a set of objectives that, when accomplished, promise to yield the "substantial impact" required by the law as a condition of funding. We think this is the minimum that we can require and still meet the statutory requirements. It views planning, in the words of my favored definition: "Planning is simply the application of intelligence to problems of continuity and change."

Both the law and our policy convictions lead us to hold that the responsibility for this planning process must remain with local government. This responsibility remains even though a city may, as some cities have, delegate final control over elements or even the entire planning process to the neighborhood structure. I seriously question whether a planning process controlled by the neighborhood will put together a plan that coordinates the energies and programs of the diversity of private and public groups necessary to meet program objectives. Despite these qualms, we have given planning funds to cities that are experimenting with citizen control. We did this on the principle that this is an experimental program, that we do not know all of the answers and that we learn from both successes and failures.

Our description of the planning process raises the difficult question of how one gets institutional change in such independent institutions as school boards, county welfare or health agencies, or trade unions.



It is naive to assume that the rhetoric of Model Cities coordination will institute change. Or that it can be accomplished by neighborhood control over the Model Cities planning process.

There is an ultimate rationale for the contract with the city, and the focusing of responsibility on the chief executive. It is that the process of creating an institution that will pull together the many pieces of a community is a political process in the highest sense of that term. It will take real political leadership to bring into concerted action the independent entities that have historically gone their own way.

The people of the neighborhood have to play a real role in this process. Technical assistance is designed to further their competence and give them the sense of confidence and power they need to negotiate as equals. We see technical assistance to neighborhood people as a part of a planning process that will culminate in an agreed-upon program of action--not as a way of helping the neighborhood fight city hall or the enemy establishment.

This planning process is quite different from the planning process of "projectitis"--carving up the city's share of the \$200,000,000 in Model Cities supplementary funds for a series of unconnected projects--each, perhaps, perfectly adequate, but unrelated to an overall strategy or to the existing flow of funds and services. Under the law we cannot approve a plan that is a series of projects to be carried out with Model City supplementary funds. We cannot approve a proposal to expend supplementary

funds now, before there is an approved document containing a problem analysis, a strategy statement of goals and objectives, a one-year action program and a 5-year forecast.

I do not propose an artificial separation between planning and action. We can, and should have action now at several levels.

First, there are and should be projects under way, funded from various sources. Many Model City areas have Labor Department Concentrated Employment Programs. There is housing under way --under FHA or Housing Assistance Administration programs. By the end of June the small parks program will have provided several million dollars for neighborhood parks in Model Cities.

The key is that these action programs and the Model Cities planning process must relate to each other, so that the neighborhood people believe that the action projects meet their needs and are part of the evolving strategy to solve the problem.

Another very important way of getting action now is to look closely at existing programs and the way they are run.

Even though redirection of existing institutions doesn't require new appropriations or new legislation, I recognize its difficulty. I have been in and around cities long enough to know the inertia that has built up, the really tremendous pressure against change in the traditional ways of regarding problems, delivering services and dealing with people. Not every mayor is in control of the bureaucracy of his city.

Much of the resentment in the ghettos is focused on problems with existing institutions, whether welfare, the school system, housing and renewal agencies, or the police department. Some of the resentment is due to mutual misunderstandings and mistrust; some of it stems from the attitudes and practices of people. The National Commission on Civil Disorders headed by Governor Kerner discussed the trend to depersonalize government and isolate it from the individual, and concluded that "Red tape and administrative complexity have filled the vacuum created by the centralization of local government."

I cannot improve upon the blunt challenge that the Kerner Commission put to local government:

"We believe, however, that there are measures which can and should be taken now; that they can be put to work without great cost and without delay; that they can be built upon in the future and that they will effectively reduce the level of grievance and tension as well as improve the responsiveness of local government to the needs of ghetto residents."

The Model Cities process can help the Mayor and the neighborhood people build an institution where shared responsibility serves as a bridge between the neighborhood and city government and the wider community. Institution-building requires strong mayoral support; without it, the existing

program structures of local government will not relate their ongoing and projected activities to the Model Cities process, particularly its citizen participation element. Unless they do so, planning is form rather than substance. And cities and neighborhoods will engage in fruitless discussion and controversy over abstract concepts of "power" and "control."

We recognize and expect that this process will lead to changes on the local level. We recognize, too, that change in the way the Federal grant-in-aid system operates is equally essential.

I worked for eight years at the local level. I know that the Federal Government cannot expect cities to plan with the people of their neighborhoods, to take the political and social risks that are implicit in the Model Cities program without changes in the present system of dispensing Federal grants.

In the Model Cities planning process cities need from the Federal agencies with urban programs the kind of technical assistance that will lead to:

- A better understanding of what programs are now affecting the model neighborhood and its residents and how existing or new programs can be used flexibly and creatively to meet local needs.
- Assistance in relating needs to available funding.

This will require a system of allocations and earmarkings so that cities will know, before they file applications, that funds are available, or that because of funding restrictions, the focus of immediate effort should shift.

The objective has to be to avoid raising expectations that cannot be met.

We need:

- More flexible processing and administration to make it possible to reflect neighborhood needs rather than bureaucratic tradition and to encourage and assist "piggy-backing" of programs and projects.
- A policy under which projects or programs that significantly affect the model neighborhood area will not be approved unless they first have been routed through the CDA and its citizen-participation process, and have been approved by the chief executive of the city (or county).

This last point is essential. Few cities know today how much or even what Federal aid comes into them. This is because some Federal programs come to the city government, some to independent agencies or boards, and some with and some without city government approval! Some grants come directly from the Federal Government; others come through the State.

We must route all programs affecting the model neighborhood area through a central point --the office of the Mayor --and require that they be related to the overall strategy for the neighborhood as determined by a process that includes the residents of the neighborhood. Unless we do this, there is no substance to one of the basic concepts of the Model Cities program: concentration and coordination of resources according to a plan developed locally with the participation of neighborhood residents.

-more-

All the Federal reform in the world won't achieve anything without a corresponding pulling together on the local level.

Since over 80 grant programs funnel through the states, and since some states have state-funded programs that are potentially very useful, HEW and HUD are now trying to involve state governments in the process described above. Some states will cooperate. Those that do will find that we will work with them in the Model Cities program.

We need state leadership that will look hard at the issues that can be solved only at the state level--such as the tangle of jurisdictions that is the crazy-quilt pattern of government in all but two of over 230 metropolitan areas. The hard problems of the central city cannot be solved while escape to suburbia is easy for industry and for those who can afford it.

Every pressure is being exerted on Congress today to route Federal grant programs through the States. The suspicion and opposition of cities to this effort is based on the historic discrepancy between state actions and state rhetoric.

If city and state work together effectively in the Model Cities program, perhaps we may see a start on the reduction of the level of mutual suspicion and animosity between levels of government. I hope so, but I am not naive enough to believe it will happen without agreement on priorities and taking positive steps to help solve major problems.

I want to make three final points about problems at the local level.

First, we cannot assume that conflict can be avoided. Power distribution and resource allocation are basic issues over which people must and will differ.

The key point is that, we must understand, accept and welcome conflict that is resolved around a table instead of in the streets. Negotiation, no matter how heated, is healthy when it results in give and take, and a sense of involvement in the decisions that affect the way people live. We must have the ability to see behind the harsh rhetoric. We must have the patience and firmness to keep the dialogue going, and the capacity to be responsive, so that people will have faith in the institutions of their government.

Second, we must look closely at the structure of local government. I am distressed at the obsolescence and weakness that I see, and saddened by the frustration that many Mayors have expressed to me. They have encountered the hard fact that their governmental structure is simply not responsive to, or adequate for the kind of job it must do.

I suggest that in this area, the business community can make a valuable contribution by applying its management talents to the analysis of local governmental structure and powers and to the development of the community support needed for charter reform. Both the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Committee for Economic Development have recognized the inconsistency between the weakness and fragmentation of local government, and their desire to solve problems at the local level.

We must recognize that the office of Mayor is changing from primarily a political job to a top-level political-managerial job. Managing a city is a big business today. Budgets and staffs are large. City governments are traditionally closest to the people. The job requires both managerial competence and political responsiveness. We cannot expect Mayors to be both effective political leaders and efficient managers unless we are willing to give them the staff tools and the administrative structure demanded by the full dimensions of today's responsibilities. We cannot expect jet-engine performance from a Mayor who is restricted to a Model-T.

Finally, we need no reminder of the fact that we live in an era of turmoil and change. We can respond to change as does the turtle, withdrawing into the shell of the known or the familiar. Or we can face up to the challenge creatively. The future rests with the political and community leadership that is not afraid to encourage the creation of new institutions to meet current needs.

One such institution could be the neighborhood corporation.

I suggest that we have a responsibility to encourage new institutions, while at the same time looking hard at what is proposed, to be certain we are not creating a Frankenstein that will produce new and more difficult problems.

I believe that there is a need for community-based organizations that will serve residents in many ways--in the planning, in the carrying out of programs--as vehicles to develop the competence of the neighborhood. These can and should be given every encouragement.



However, I have great qualms about neighborhood corporations when they are given "exclusive turf," either geographic or functional. They must relate to a larger entity, must recognize that they have a legitimate role to play, but that they are not the entire game.

The rhetoric and even operations of some neighborhood corporations that are now under way fail to recognize the relationship with government that is the alternative to further destructive fragmentation of local government.

In part this stems from an ideological and antipathy to local government; in part it relates to the unresponsiveness of local government to the aspirations of people who both want and need a "piece of the action."

We are in danger of setting up a series of sub-communities on racial or class lines, unless we learn to create institutions that relate people to each other and to their government by giving them a voice and meeting their needs and aspirations.

This is the paramount challenge that faces government today at all levels. The essence of responsible political leadership in this year of stress and turmoil is the development of institutions to serve the people, and give them the sense and the reality of participation in a political and economic system that is responsive to their needs and to their dreams.

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MODEL CITIES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS  
Remarks of  
H. Ralph Taylor  
Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations  
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development  
United States Conference of Mayors  
Palmer House, June 13, 1968  
Chicago, Ill.

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Responsibility for Model Cities planning is focused on the chief executive of the city, because it is a process of creating an institution that will pull together the many pieces of a community--a political process in the highest sense of that term. It will take real political leadership to bring into concerted action the independent agencies that have historically gone their own way. The Model Cities process can help the mayor and the neighborhood people build an institution where shared responsibility serves as a bridge between the neighborhood and city government and the wider community.

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- (1) They believe that without control they will get the short end of the stick in terms of benefits and flow of funds.
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The people of the neighborhood have to play a real role in this process. Technical assistance is designed to further their competence and give them the sense of confidence and power they need to negotiate as equals. We see technical assistance to neighborhood people as a part of a planning process that will culminate in an agreed-upon program of action--not as a way of helping the neighborhood fight city hall or the enemy establishment.

This planning process is quite different from the planning process of "projectitis"--carving up the city's share of the \$200,000,000 in Model Cities supplementary funds for a series of unconnected projects--each, perhaps, perfectly adequate, but unrelated to an overall strategy or to the existing flow of funds and services. Under the law we cannot approve a plan that is a series of projects to be carried out with Model City supplementary funds. We cannot approve a proposal to expend supplementary funds now, before there is an approved document containing a problem analysis, a strategy statement of goals and objectives, a one-year action program and a 5-year forecast.

I do not propose an artificial separation between planning and action. We can, and should have action now at several levels.

First, there are and should be projects under way, funded from various sources. Many Model City areas have Labor Department Concentrated Employment Programs. There is housing under way--under FHA or Housing Assistance Administration programs. By the end of June the small parks program will have provided several million dollars for neighborhood parks in Model Cities.

The key is that these action programs and the Model Cities planning process must relate to each other, so that the neighborhood people believe that the action projects meet their needs and are part of the evolving strategy to solve the problem.

Another very important way of getting action now is to look closely at existing programs and the way they are run.

Even though redirection of existing institutions doesn't require new appropriations or new legislation, I recognize its difficulty. I have been

in and around cities long enough to know the inertia that has built up, the really tremendous pressure against change in the traditional ways of regarding problems, delivering services and dealing with people. Not every mayor is in control of the bureaucracy of his city.

Much of the resentment in the ghettos is focused on problems with existing institutions, whether welfare, the school system, housing and renewal agencies, or the police department. Some of the resentment is due to mutual misunderstandings and mistrust; some of it stems from the attitudes and practices of people. The National Commission on Civil Disorders headed by Governor Kerner discussed the trend to depersonalize government and isolate it from the individual, and concluded that "Red tape and administrative complexity have filled the vacuum created by the centralization of local government."

I cannot improve upon the blunt challenge that the Kerner Commission put to local government:

"We believe, however, that there are measures which can and should be taken now; that they can be put to work without great cost and without delay; that they can be built upon in the future and that they will effectively reduce the level of grievance and tension as well as improve the responsiveness of local government to the needs of ghetto residents."

The Model Cities process can help the Mayor and the neighborhood people build an institution where shared responsibility serves as a bridge between the neighborhood and city government and the wider community. Institution-building requires strong mayoral support; without it, the existing program structures of local government will not relate their ongoing and projected activities to the Model Cities process, particularly its citizen participation element. Unless they do so, planning is form rather than substance. And cities and neighborhoods will engage in fruitless discussion and controversy over abstract concepts of "power" and "control."

We recognize and expect that this process will lead to changes on the local level. We recognize, too, that change in the way the Federal grant-in-aid system operates is equally essential.

I worked for eight years at the local level. I know that the Federal Government cannot expect cities to plan with the people of their neighborhoods, to take the political and social risks that are implicit in the Model Cities program without changes in the present system of dispensing Federal grants.

In the Model Cities planning process cities need from the Federal agencies with urban programs the kind of technical assistance that will lead to:

-A better understanding of what programs are now affecting the model neighborhood and its residents and how existing or new programs can be used flexibly and creatively to meet local needs.

-Assistance in relating needs to available funding.

This will require a system of allocations and earmarkings so that cities will know, before they file applications, that funds are available, or that because of funding restrictions, the focus of immediate effort should shift. The objective has to be to avoid raising expectations that cannot be met.

We need:

- More flexible processing and administration to make it possible to reflect neighborhood needs rather than bureaucratic tradition and to encourage and assist 'piggy-backing' of programs and projects.

- A policy under which projects or programs that significantly affect the model neighborhood area will not be approved unless they first have been routed through the CDA and its citizen-participation process, and have been approved by the chief executive of the city (or county).

This last point is essential. Few cities know today how much or even what Federal aid comes into them. This is because some Federal programs come to the city government, some to independent agencies or boards, and some with and some without city government approval! Some grants come directly from the Federal Government; others come through the State.

We must route all programs affecting the model neighborhood area through a central point--the office of the Mayor--and require that they be related to the overall strategy for the neighborhood as determined by a process that includes the residents of the neighborhood. Unless we do this, there is no substance to one of the basic concepts of the Model Cities program: concentration and coordination of resources according to a plan developed locally with the participation of neighborhood residents. All the Federal reform in the world won't achieve anything without a corresponding pulling together on the local level.

Since over 80 grant programs funnel through the states, and since some states have state-funded programs that are potentially very useful, HEW and HUD are now trying to involve state governments in the process described above. Some states will cooperate. Those that do will find that we will work with them in the Model Cities program.

We need state leadership that will look hard at the issues that can be solved only at the state level--such as the tangle of jurisdictions that is the crazy-quilt pattern of government in all but two of over 230 metropolitan areas. The hard problems of the central city cannot be solved while escape to suburbia is easy for industry and for those who can afford it.

Every pressure is being exerted on Congress today to route Federal grant programs through the States. The suspicion and opposition of cities to this effort is based on the historic discrepancy between state actions and state rhetoric.



If city and state work together effectively in the Model Cities program, perhaps we may see a start on the reduction of the level of mutual suspicion and animosity between levels of government. I hope so, but I am not naive enough to believe it will happen without agreement on priorities and taking positive steps to help solve major problems.

I want to make three final points about problems at the local level.

First, we cannot assume that conflict can be avoided. Power distribution and resource allocation are basic issues over which people must and will differ.

The key point is that, we must understand, accept and welcome conflict that is resolved around a table instead of in the streets. Negotiation, no matter how heated, is healthy when it results in give and take, and a sense of involvement in the decisions that affect the way people live. We must have the ability to see behind the harsh rhetoric. We must have the patience and firmness to keep the dialogue going, and the capacity to be responsive, so that people will have faith in the institutions of their government.

Second, we must look closely at the structure of local government. I am distressed at the obsolescence and weakness that I see, and saddened by the frustration that many Mayors have expressed to me. They have encountered the hard fact that their governmental structure is simply not responsive to, or adequate for the kind of job it must do.

I suggest that in this area, the business community can make a valuable contribution by applying its management talents to the analysis of local governmental structure and powers and to the development of the community support needed for charter reform. Both the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Committee for Economic Development have recognized the inconsistency between the weakness and fragmentation of local government, and their desire to solve problems at the local level.

We must recognize that the office of Mayor is changing from primarily a political job to a top-level political-managerial job. Managing a city is a big business today. Budgets and staffs are large. City governments are traditionally closest to the people. The job requires both managerial competence and political responsiveness. We cannot expect Mayors to be both effective political leaders and efficient managers unless we are willing to give them the staff tools and the administrative structure demanded by the full dimensions of today's responsibilities. We cannot expect jet-engine performance from a Mayor who is restricted to a Model-T.

Finally, we need no reminder of the fact that we live in an era of turmoil and change. We can respond to change as does the turtle, withdrawing into the shell of the known or the familiar. Or we can face up to the challenge creatively. The future rests with the political and community leadership that is not afraid to encourage the creation of new institutions to meet current needs.

One such institution could be the neighborhood corporation.

I suggest that we have a responsibility to encourage new institutions, while at the same time looking hard at what is proposed, to be certain we are not creating a Frankenstein that will produce new and more difficult problems.

I believe that there is a need for community-based organizations that will serve residents in many ways--in the planning, in the carrying out of programs--as vehicles to develop the competence of the neighborhood. These can and should be given every encouragement.

However, I have great qualms about neighborhood corporations when they are given "exclusive turf," either geographic or functional. They must relate to a larger entity, must recognize that they have a legitimate role to play, but that they are not the entire game.

The rhetoric and even operations of some neighborhood corporations that are now under way fail to recognize the relationship with government that is the alternative to further destructive fragmentation of local government.

In part this stems from an ideological and antipathy to local government; in part it relates to the unresponsiveness of local government to the aspirations of people who both want and need a "piece of the action."

We are in danger of setting up a series of sub-communities on racial or class lines, unless we learn to create institutions that relate people to each other and to their government by giving them a voice and meeting their needs and aspirations.

This is the paramount challenge that faces government today at all levels. The essence of responsible political leadership in this year of stress and turmoil is the development of institutions to serve the people, and give them the sense and the reality of participation in a political and economic system that is responsive to their needs and to their dreams.

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Speech of Roger Starr, New York City  
to Southeast Regional Council, NAHRO  
June 17, 1968

"STAND FIRM AND DON'T MAKE PROMISES"

On a street not far from my office there is a watchmaker's shop with an electric sign over the door. This sign simply gives the current time down to the nearest tenth of a second. The column of figures which records the tenth of a second is naturally in constant motion. I am fascinated to stand on the sidewalk and watch time go by before me, turning the future into the present and the present into the past. In the flick of an eyelid 'now' has moved as far beyond my power to affect it as the acts of Julius Caesar or the thunderings of the great dinosaurs. I was thinking of this clock as I prepared these remarks because I am so conscious -- as perhaps we all are -- of the rapid flight of instants, making one's remarks apparently irrelevant even as the breath of air passes our lips. I think of all the speakers who wrote speeches about the government's position in Vietnam on Saturday, March 30, and of what they had to do with those speeches on Monday, April 1st, after President Johnson had made his announcement. Anything written about the problems of urban universities before the violence in Paris became largely irrelevant one day later; any statement about President De Gaulle made before ten million Frenchmen went on strike certainly would have had to be changed drastically in the aftermath of that unimagined event.

So what I am going to say to you today is said in almost a deliberate search for timelessness. Perhaps it will strike you as a snarling sermon. I am talking to you about the responsibilities of public officials at a time of serious changes in the role which large

sections of the public seem to want to assign to its officials. I am trying to find what we in the housing and redevelopment field, concerned day to day with the problems of constructing and managing residential properties owned by The People, can do to continue to exercise our responsibilities adequately in the face of challenge.

Public housing has been under challenge since its earliest days. Unpopularity is not new to us. For years we were attacked by conservative friends who believed that we were radicalizing America, bringing socialistic ownership to that most private of sancta, the home. We relied in great part for our support on those progressive-minded friends who supported public housing because it was a step on the way to assuming general responsibility for the welfare of underpaid and exploited proletarians. If our attackers seemed to us always unfair, our defenders seemed somewhat embarrassing. In our own view, we were providing good homes for American families not because they were proletarian nor because we were trying to radicalize America, whatever that may mean, but because no one else was providing good homes for these people.

In the last few years the criticism has changed drastically. We are certainly no more popular with the people who see in us a threat to private ownership of rental property or private land holding; but our progressive-minded friends have become instead our most virulent and disturbing critics. Where we were once regarded as friends of the proletarians -- and I still have not learned what that means -- we are now attacked as the enemies of people. A liberal-minded national legislator recently described public housing with scorn as: "a ghetto within a ghetto"; Professor John D. Rosenberg of Columbia University, writing

in the New Leader, a bi-weekly magazine of news and opinion representing the anti-communist left, recently reviewed a book by Lewis Mumford and described our work in these words: "The slum comes down, the sterile slab goes up, and along with it rise crimes of violence committed for irrational motives against unknown neighbors." That is the end of the quote. I am on my own when I ask you whether you knew that you were responsible for an increase in crime by providing fireproof dwellings with interior plumbing.

Our progressive-minded friends attack us today because we are imposing solutions on the community, planning for people, instead of with people, failing to provide imaginative solutions instead of the same old stereotyped cookie cutter devices. Perhaps as a New Yorker I bear a special share of the blame for these unreasonable criticisms that have too often been made by people who have seen only New York City public housing, and most probably seen it only from the outside. Certainly no one who has seen the public housing developments of Alexandria, Honolulu, San Antonio and a host of others could continue to make the same assertion about the simple physical state of facts in public housing developments. That we have failures on occasion, I admit; but they should not completely obscure our successes. Shakespeare, I would remind you, wrote some very bad plays.

I shrug off our failings and shortcomings at this moment because of my sense that the failings have not impelled the attack on us and our work. The attack on us today is part of the attack on the whole pace and tempo and quality of American life and of its institutions. We are being attacked as much for our successes as for our failures. And if I from New York may

perhaps be oversensitive to this attack, some of our college students having perhaps grown longer beards and thrown bigger cobblestones than your college students, let me remind you that New York is not generically different from the rest of the United States. We suffer merely from first disease, being that overgrown child in the classroom whose lower resistance makes him susceptible first to chickenpox. I suggest that all the rest of the kids in the class will get chickenpox before long, and perhaps much quicker than you think. The fact is that all institutions are under attack. This means not only governmental institutions, not only housing institutions, but also the institutions of the private world, educational institutions, health institutions, and of course all the institutions of economic production, sale and distribution. We whose lives are entwined with human institutions are being told today that institutions crush and kill the human spirit; that they are out of control and must be destroyed; that they are inhuman; that they are unnecessary. I heard an earnest man with a beard say on a television debate, the institutions in this here country, America, are not interested in making life better for people, they are only interested in their own survival. Why he picked out American institutions for this particular criticism, I do not know. Nor can I reconcile this specific criticism of American institutions, and bring them all down in order to live more humanely. If all institutions are deadly, the special faults of American institutions cannot be quite so important as if all other institutions were good. Logical inconsistencies aside, our speaker was talking for a large and growing number of quite respectable people who have absorbed much of this thinking and who believe that institutional solutions to human problems are in their deepest nature anti-human.

We are all of us going through something of a painful reappraisal of our world and our part in it. We are worried and made uneasy by the accusation that institutions are intrinsically self-defeating, because our life work is bound up in institutions. We are interested in providing good housing for our fellow citizens. If there were no institutions to determine land tenure and fabricate housing components, there would be no housing. If there were no institutions of ownership and management, housing would not exist. Without rules and procedures, these institutions would not fulfill their missions. We know that rules and procedures are reserved to government. Yet we are disturbed by these criticisms of government that leave us wondering if they may not contain a serious measure of truth. We wonder if it is true that we have been too much concerned with structural values, as our critics tell us, and too little concerned with human values. I have come all the way here -- no hardship, let me assure you -- to add my own suggestion. I urge you - stand firm, and don't make promises.

Let us take up the promises first. As servants of the public we would be either more than human or less than human if we did not from time to time succumb to a desire to be loved, or if that is altogether impossible, at least admired by our employers. This manifests itself most strikingly in an urge to promise the public what we know the public wants to hear. In the enthusiasm of the welcome with which our words are greeted, we sometimes make the mistake of believing ourselves. I would suggest that one of the promises that comes most readily to our lips is that public housing will cure social problems. The main trouble with this promise is that while we mean one thing by it, our listeners take it to mean something quite different.

When we promise our constituents that public housing will make a con-

tribution to social health, we are thinking of those families whose problems are wholly or almost wholly, housing problems. We are thinking of stable and sedate old people whose greatest difficulty is that their income forces them to live in inadequate shelter and to spend for it a major part or all of their disposable cash. Or we are thinking of the dedicated and devoted and serious mother -- whether or not there is a husband in the family -- who is striving desperately to keep her house in order and to maintain a mixture of discipline and love in which to bring up her children, but who is so busy struggling with a recalcitrant stove, a leaky roof, a muddy floor, an infestation of rats or unruly neighbors that she cannot quite get in control of her motherly duties. For both of these types of troubled families, we know that housing can provide immeasurable improvement in the social attitudes of the adults as well as the children.

Unfortunately our listeners take us to mean that better housing will solve the problems of alcoholism; that it will convert an irregular work history into stability and high motivation. Our listeners believe us to have promised them that by the construction of good housing they will conquer the delinquency of those juveniles who come from homes which are emotionally as well as physically disorderly. Our auditors hear us as having said that the destructive vandalism of reckless and undisciplined people will vanish magically when they are confronted with the smooth plaster of a new room. In many cases, the new building is an irresistible target for the vandal; it stimulates him as an empty stretch of canvas is said to stimulate Picasso. In many cases moving people with acute social pathology into a new housing development seems to emphasize rather than to reduce their deviant behavior. Suddenly we recognize that in their case the slovenly surroundings of an old building concealed more deviant behavior than it stimulated.



We must be careful not to promise more than we can perform in the field of social behavior. We require extreme care in the phrasing of our public utterances if we are not to cause misunderstanding which will rise later to haunt us.

A second promise which we find ourselves repeatedly making is the promise to plan with people rather than for people. Here again I think we mean one thing by this promise while our auditors mean something rather different. What do we mean by planning with people?

We mean that we are clearly and obviously benign, loving, kindly and well-motivated people. Our door is always open to the public. We encourage, we welcome, indeed we fawn over, those members of the public who wish to find their way to our offices. We extract from their hesitant untutored lips their own views of what they would like in public housing and redevelopment projects. We painstakingly discuss with them the realities and limitations of the power at our disposal. We explain the intricacies of federal and local legislation. Our visitors -- the people with whom we are planning then understand the limited area of free choice open to us. They and we then agree on what should be done in those limited areas of free choice, and having exchanged tokens of friendship and smoked a pipe of peace, our visitors leave walking head erect into the sunset. That's what we think we have promised, but our audience heard something different.

By planning with people rather than for people our audience thinks it has extracted a wholly different promise from us. Our listeners think that we have agreed to sit down with them around a conference table in which everyone present shall have an equal vote. We will ask them what they want.

They will tell us. When we begin to tell them why we cannot deliver what it is they want, a resolution will be offered criticizing us for our adherence to bureaucratic and unimaginative rules. The motion will carry by an overwhelming margin. We, the officials, will thereupon apologize for the errors of our ways and proceed immediately to tell the Congress of the United States and the Department of Housing & Urban Development that it must change its rules forthwith so that we can execute the will of the people. Within a few days a favorable response issues from the national capitol or Mt. Sinai as the case may be. Flushed with our new power, we will then execute precisely the program that those we have planned with wanted in the first place.

Although I will be accused of some degree of exaggeration, these two pictures do reflect some of the difference in interpretation placed on the commitment to plan with people, rather than for people. The contrast between what we think we have said and what our listeners think they have heard suggests the familiar old cartoon of the happy and prosperous merchant who announces that he sells only for cash, in contrast to his emaciated and threadbare brother who announces to the world that he sold on credit. Our listeners imagine us swelled with power and pride like the cash seller; we know ourselves to be as skinny as the credit merchant.

Planning with people has become the daily password of the democratic way of life. We repeat it enthusiastically, afraid that the night watchman won't admit us to our offices without it. Yet we mean only that we will execute our powers under the law with attention to what people say they want. Our listeners assume that we have made a commitment to do everything that everyone of them may want -- never mind the fact that two

of them may want irreconcilable demands.

I suggest that the process of planning attentively is in fact a democratic process. If we expect to carry it forward, we must elucidate its nature. We cannot on the one hand extract from our listeners their enthusiastic acceptance of our promise, and then later on complain when we receive a bill for the inevitable disappointment.

A third promise that we find ourselves making is the promise that our programs will be controlled by the community. We will involve the community in our work, we will listen to what the community will be pleased by our work. Again we are under great pressure to make this promise, and we make it in good faith. Unfortunately we mean to promise something quite different from what our listeners mean to hear.

We tell ourselves that we are insistent upon what has been called a meaningful dialogue between ourselves and the community. We mean by this that we do not expect to have to listen to or take heed of any demands made on the government which are clearly and intrinsically outrageous. For us a meaningful dialogue is a dialogue in which people say serious things that are reasonably consistent with the habits of American government and the Constitutional powers which we exercise. When we mention the community, willy nilly we imagine it to have a certain form or structure. We think of organizations which in some way or other can be taken to be representative, meaning that although they are not elected by the residents of a particular area they are nevertheless so characteristic of the area that they can be taken as expressive of what the residents in that area desire. Perhaps we go so far as to delude ourselves into the belief that the organizations, old or new, which speak to us in the name of the

community, are able to make a binding commitment in the name of the community which they represent. Perhaps we recognize that on many issues there are elements of controversy within a particular area and so we may come to believe that certain community organizations are more representative than other community organizations or that real life inhabitants of a community will acknowledge that they represent only partially the sentiments of the people living in a specific locality.

Certainly in our remarks about the community we are making a fundamental assumption about the rationality of private citizens who have no particular responsibility for collecting taxes or operating within the limitations of law. I would like to point out that we have more than two choices in attempting to define the rationality of groups of citizens and their approach to problems. In other words, we need not assume that groups of citizens will be either wholly rational or wholly irrational. The point of view of a group of citizens may lie somewhere in between these two polar extremes. In their view of the undesirability of a housing project in their area, citizens may be quite rational in describing the reasons for their objections. They may be wholly irrational or irresponsible in suggesting alternatives. When we suggest that we will bow to the community will, we are thinking of the community primarily in its rational aspect, even though most of us would shamefacedly deny we are doing so. We consider ourselves tolerant of human error, and as men and women we may indeed be tolerant. As officials we cannot accept dictation that urges on us actions which we are legally not empowered to take.

But our community listeners accept no such limitations, spoken or assumed. They believe that when we say that the community controls, we

mean just that. They have no identity problem when it comes to pointing out who speaks for the community. Each interested person knows beyond fear of contradiction that the community is himself. He speaks for the community, and he knows this because he knows it.

When we promise our constituents that the community will control our plans we have made them a promise to which we cannot adhere. I suggest that these three promises -- that we will achieve good social planning; that we will plan with people not for them; and that the community will control our developments are promises doomed to disappointment and that in the disappointment our own concepts of housing and redevelopment will be imperilled, and so too will the processes of representative government.

Nevertheless, the impulses that lead us to over-promising what we cannot deliver are real impulses. To foreswear them is easy; to live up to our good resolutions is not. And merely to resist making promises which we will not keep doesn't meet the challenge facing us. In part, the challenge to our institutions that produces our imprudent promises reflects some of our own shortcomings. It is not enough for us not to promise. We must also learn to stand firm.

Until this point I have discussed mainly our standing firm in explaining to members of the public that we cannot always achieve what they would like us to achieve. But we must stand firm also in demanding from the Federal government and even from our local elected public officials support for the kind of programs which we have found to be effective. Too often we have been satisfied to endorse programs which we ourselves know were ineffectual. Too often we have failed to stand firm against our own weaknesses,

failed to be courageous on those occasions where courage was called for, failed to be discriminating in distinguishing between the essence of what we are trying to achieve, and the specific rules and regulations which may sometimes prevent us from reaching the very goal they are intended to insure.

We are living in a period in which careful intellectual discussion is selling at a considerable discount. The shrill cry of immorality is being raised to preclude intelligent discussion. We are told by the young that because we have not ourselves been perfect, we have lost the right to criticize even the grossest misdemeanors. I suggest that these are all issues on which we must stand firm. We must provide for reasonable self-criticism without indulging in an emotional orgy of self-immolation. We must be prepared to build on the American experience without decrying the whole of that experience because it has not yet produced a perfect state. We must be prepared to treasure our own achievements -- to withstand the attacks of those who want the pleasure of attacking to take precedence over the painful understanding of where indeed they intend to go after the attack is over. These are the issues on which we must stand firm. I suggest the challenge to all of us is more exciting now than it has ever been before.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE, BOX 36303, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102

JUL 5 1968

MAYOR'S OFFICE

MAYOR	<i>[Signature]</i>
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Office of Regional Administrator  
REGION IV

8 JUL 1968

Mr. Paul Schulze  
CDA Coordinator  
5329 N. E. Union Avenue, Room 210  
Portland, Oregon 97211

Dear Paul:

This is to follow up on our telephone conversation of several days ago for some technical assistance for the development of a service center in the Model Cities neighborhood.

This particular effort has been especially rewarding because it brought several Federal agencies together to consider the best approach for the Portland Model Cities Program. Your initial request to Paul Johnson, the HEW representative for the Model Cities Program in Portland, was relayed to the San Francisco HEW Regional Office. Dick Goff, the Technical Assistance Coordinator of the office, initiated inter-departmental consideration of your request since several Federal agencies could provide consultative assistance for service center administration and service center programs.

From all this, which is not as involved or complicated as it may sound here, Mike Kenney of OEO, Dick Goff of HEW, John Martin of the Model Cities staff in HUD, and myself, concluded that services from a single agency would be less involved and could provide more direct and continuing assistance for you. We have asked Ray Auker, Community Services Specialist of the Regional OEO operations, to provide this service. Ray is a former service center administrator, and his current duties continue in the field of service center administration. I trust that he will shortly make arrangements with you to visit Portland.

Copies of this letter are being sent to all those named in it to indicate appreciation for the interagency cooperation received in this effort.

Sincerely yours,

Original Signed by

Tad T. Masaoka  
Federal Agency Liaison  
Specialist

copy to:  
Honorable Terry D. Schunk  
Mayor of Portland

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# HUD NEWS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING  
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20410

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Phone (202) 755-6990

TO BE RELEASED AFTER:

6:00 P.M., Friday

November 22, 1968

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MAYOR'S OFFICE

MAYOR	<i>[Signature]</i>
EXEC. ASST.	<i>[Signature]</i>
ENCL. ASST.	<i>[Signature]</i>
COMM. ASST.	
ADM. SEC.	

Remarks by

H. Ralph Taylor

Assistant Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations  
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development  
National Model Cities Workshop of City Demonstration Agency Directors  
Sheraton-Park Hotel  
Washington, D. C.  
Friday, November 22, 1968



I am always pleased by the opportunity to talk with City Demonstration Agency (CDA) Directors. Over the past year, you in the cities and we in Washington, have learned a great deal about the meaning of the Model Cities program. Tonight, I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on the challenges and issues that Model Cities faces at this point in its history.

Two elements are essential for the Model Cities program to work:

- 1) Local political leadership to obtain the cooperation of the institutions serving the model neighborhood; and
- 2) A new outreach pattern of Federal and State technical assistance that will identify the programs and resources which can be used as part of the local strategy to meet local problems and achieve local objectives.

Both are essential for success in the Model Cities program.

Without these two elements, the Model Cities process will become project oriented and merely focus on carving up supplemental grant funds. With both, the process focuses on fitting together resources and making the flow of funds from all sources more relevant according to an overall strategy. With both, the neighborhood can feel that it does have real access to, and influence on the elements that affect the quality of its life. With a real sense of influence the neighborhood is more likely to focus on working within the system to achieve change, rather than demanding control over Model Cities supplemental funds because they lack faith in their ability to influence any other funds or institutions.

The local Model Cities planning process rests on two key assumptions:

(1) The Mayor or chief executive will exercise leadership to help pull together those elements in the community whose activities relate to the model neighborhood, specifically including the elements over which he does not exercise control.

(2) The relationship between local government and the residents of the neighborhood permits a sharing of power to assure involving citizens in the planning and carrying out of programs that affect their lives. No effective plan can be produced through confrontation alone. Although the partnership principle recognizes the current inevitability of tension and rhetoric, it is based on the existence of a joint desire to solve problems.

Assuming these basic conditions, the Model Cities planning calls for problem analysis, goal setting, and developing a strategy which is essentially determining priorities for major efforts. Most cities in the program are either in or completing this phase.

At this point in the program, the city-citizen structure should be identifying resources presently going into the neighborhood from all sources, and beginning to judge the relevance of these resources to the problems of the neighborhood and to their system of priorities as they are now administered. In so doing the Model City structure of

city and citizens should be working with the agencies and institutions that control these resources.

In any city the basic threat to this program lies in whether the major emphasis will be on involving the existing institutional structure to develop new or improved answers to problems, or on by-passing the existing institutions and attempting to develop duplicate or alternative systems. The latter option can be selected because of the desire for neighborhood "control" of all institutions or because major institutions are unable or unwilling to respond effectively to needs.

Whatever the reason, the separate systems approach cannot work. Resources are not now, and are not likely to be available to fund separately duplicates of existing major sub-systems, like health, education, employment services and public safety.

The role of the Mayor, or the elected political leadership of the community, is crucial. Elected officials must take the leadership in building the bridges between inner city residents and public institutions that should be responsive to their needs.

We should make no mistake about the need for changing existing institutions through this program. I agree with a statement made recently by James M. Gavin, Chairman of Arthur D. Little Corporation, "New conditions, new needs, newly conscious and articulate groups, call for new kinds of responses and responsiveness from institutions that make society run..."

Comparing the situation to the private market place he went on to say that our institutions have often evolved their own set of demands which frequently dictate the needs of people rather than respond to them. Citizen involvement in planning programs that affect their lives is a market reaction to the question of whether needs are really being met.

Without political leadership to help educate the wider community, to bring pressure to eliminate rigidities and make institutions more responsive, the trend toward militant separatism will increase. The resulting polarization of both communities is likely to make the development of a successful Model Cities program impossible.

In this program, cities that turn planning over to neighborhoods exclusively, cannot develop a successful program. Where planning is done by the neighborhood without the involvement and cooperation of existing public and private institutions and participation from city and State government, neither the necessary resources nor desirable changes in existing institutions will be forthcoming.

Although the Model Cities program is described as an opportunity for the neighborhood to plan its own future, there is a danger that a program planned exclusively by residents will not be sufficiently tied to local government to get city council approval.

There must be a relationship between neighborhood and the larger city that will lead to a mutual understanding of problems, an agreement on strategy, and a series of finite steps to both redirect existing resources and develop new projects and activities.

This relationship between city and neighborhood will not happen unless the Chief Executive, (the Mayor) or the City Manager, and the elected officials of the community, understand the program, support it, and exercise their influence to get the participation and cooperation of the wider community.

It is essential that no one read this statement as any change in the policy that citizens must be involved in both planning and carrying out the Model City program. No change is intended.

We expect the people of the neighborhood to be involved deeply in all phases of the program, and to benefit from the employment and training created by it.

We expect that some, perhaps many, of the activities will be carried out by neighborhood-based organizations, either alone or in association with others.

Planning and continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of programs and activities should involve neighborhood residents as well as professionals, and should reflect neighborhood priorities, needs and aspirations.

We recognize that neighborhood priorities and institutional resistance to change will often conflict. Some cities are experiencing this conflict today, particularly in the planning for community-school and police-community relations, and in proposals for drastic change in the welfare system.

The most difficult area now seems to be the matter of police-community relations. Both the police system and the community feel threatened and both respond rigidly. There is an urgent need for two-way communications. Plans for changes in the police system developed by bright young men without participation of the police or of political leadership will be singularly ineffective.

The Model Cities planning process is getting the issues out in the open, for the public airing and discussion that is a prerequisite to solution. We are not disturbed that issues which have been developing for decades cannot be resolved immediately in a 12-month planning period. This is normal. We are concerned, however, that the dialogue between the neighborhood and the larger community continue. As planning and program execution proceed simultaneously, the people of the neighborhood should feel that they are being listened to.

Neighborhood residents must also see progress in areas of priority concern. Jobs, housing, health--these are areas where forward motion is both essential and possible. Education is another area for progress if one avoids terms like "community control" and focuses on changes in attitude, degree of parent involvement and quality and relevance of curriculum.

The Model City program must demonstrate progress towards meeting needs, if it is to retain any credibility in the neighborhood. Continued planning with people requires tangible results in institutional change

or beneficial program activity. The alternative is a cynical attack on planning as a substitute for action.

Where can the progress occur? What are the resources?

We have already mentioned one key possibility that does not require new funding--change and redirection of existing resources and patterns of behavior to make them reflect neighborhood needs and hopes.

Although an important way of demonstrating responsiveness, change in existing systems is no substitute for the new resources needed to meet urgent needs.

This brings me to the second item that I consider essential to the success of the Model City program:

A new outreach pattern of Federal and State technical assistance that will identify the programs available for use as part of the local strategy to meet problems and achieve objectives.

In several previous speeches I've covered the four specific changes we have tried to achieve: regional generalists, a system of resource allocation to regional offices, priority and flexibility in processing, and the channeling of Federal grants through the CDA-Chief Executive.

We have made more progress than was predicted, but we have not yet succeeded completely.

We have made no real progress with respect to the general problem of the States--the problem of grant-in-aid programs now operated through the States rather than directly to local government. There is an urgent need for improving executive management capability in the office of the Governor, and for a State commitment to use funds flexibly and boldly to solve basic urban problems. As yet there is little evidence of that commitment in most States.

Our success in making changes in the Federal delivery system has varied between Departments. Understandably, cooperation within all elements of HUD and the support from Secretary Robert C. Weaver is excellent. Since I am still hoping and still fighting, I will not at this point detail the problems, successes and failures, we have had with other Departments. Let me make this point:

The present Federal grant-in-aid system is too complex and too rigid. It reflects the happenstance of history and the pressures of special interest groups. Federal design and local operation of categorical programs do not provide the flexibility and the certainty of funding needed to solve local problems.

A major change in the system is needed so that program design and operation can be local. Techniques have to be developed to assure that broad national priorities are not avoided or slighted by local design and operation. Since major Federal and State financial support are essential, we must develop ways of allocating resources responsive



both to a local planning process and to broad national priorities.

I believe that consolidation of the many narrow grant-in-aid programs into broad flexible problem-area funding tools is the answer. This consolidation should be combined with performance requirements for local planning as a basis of resource allocation and for involving citizens in the relationship with government.

I must add that grant consolidation or other reform of the federal delivery system is no substitute for adequacy of funding resources.

I am certain that I have been stating what each of you have distilled from your own experience to date. The lessons are obvious. And the time is close to midnight.

One final comment:

One of the very personal pleasures I have derived from this experience is the sense of gratification I have felt because of the quality of the people in this program. The approximately 40 professionals in the HUD Washington Model Cities staff, and the 70 professionals in the regional offices are capable, dedicated and hard working.

And on the local level this program has attracted quality people, many new to government, with an intensity of concern and a commitment to make our system work better and more effectively--truly a bright light in the storm around us.

You are on the frontier, often caught between the frustrations of the neighborhood and the slowness to change of the existing systems. I think you have the toughest job in government anywhere--and the capacity to make it work.

I salute you, and thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

# # #

FOR RELEASE:  
AFTER 12 Noon  
Tuesday, November 22, 1966  
RECEIVED  
DEC 19 1966

"FEDERAL-LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM"

Remarks by H. Ralph Taylor  
Assistant Secretary for Demonstrations and Intergovernmental Relations  
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development  
at the 9th Annual Workshop on Urban Renewal  
Sponsored by  
the National Association of Housing and Urban Redevelopment Officials  
Park Plaza Hotel  
New Haven, Connecticut  
November 22, 1966  
MAYOR'S OFFICE

MAYOR	
EXEC. ASST. II	
EXEC. ASST. I	
COMM. ASST.	
ADM. SEC.	

This is a most appropriate time, place, and audience for a discussion on the model cities program. New Haven is, as many of you know, my home town. It is also the city that developed so much of the experimental planning and programming in renewal and anti-poverty activities that have now become national programs. And here in New Haven we have this gathering of you renewal and housing officials who will soon become so vitally involved in demonstration neighborhoods in model cities.

From my conversations with some of you, I know that a lot of questions have arisen in your minds. We can't answer them all here today, of course, but I would like to take this opportunity to outline some of the development of the model cities idea, what we will be expecting from participating cities, and the role of the local renewal and housing agencies in a demonstration program.

Since I am still fresh from the Harvard-Yale football game of last Saturday, permit me to adopt the vernacular. In many respects we are in a new ball game - you, the renewal and housing people in the localities, and we, the "Feds" in Washington, whether we work for HUD or any of the other agencies involved with the city

In fact, we are in a new ball park altogether. The dimensions of our problems, the horizons of our activities, and the scope of our authority have been so greatly enlarged in recent years that many of the programs of the past are too confining today.

This is not to say, however, that the past is irrelevant. Far from it. Many programs developed with yesterday's techniques in response to yesterday's needs have accomplished a great deal. In fact, the model cities legislation of today is a natural evolution from these programs.

The Federal Government has been concerned with the problem of the city and its people for well over 30 years. The now historic programs such as public housing, unemployment insurance, and social security, date back to the late thirties. In the 1940's and 1950's programs were expanded and strengthened, culminating in the Great Society legislation of the 1960's. There are now on the books nearly 200 grant-in-aid programs enacted by the Congress, each focusing on one aspect or another of the city, its physical structure, and the services and facilities available to its people.

As the renewal and public housing programs developed, and the surge of highway construction reached the cities, there began to be an understanding of the need for coordination of the physical elements of the city. New Haven was a pioneer in this area. Under the leadership of Mayor Richard Lee and Edward Logue, the position of development administrator was created <sup>in 1955,</sup> /to pull planning into the mainstream of the decision-making process.

This movement has spread increasingly, and is becoming the administrative pattern. It is recognition of the fact that what happens in a city is the end product of a multitude of decisions that can be related to each other only through deliberate action at some central point in the local governing structure.

The next step in the administrative pattern is the recognition that, if the city is to make policy sense, social planning decisions have to be interrelated with each other and with the patterns of decisions in physical development.

We in the Department of Housing and Urban Development are pleased by the growing movement to develop local institutions and organizational patterns designed to solve the problems of today and tomorrow. The patterns designed for yesterday's problems will yield yesterday's solutions -- and yesterday's solutions will not be good enough for this society, with its tremendous resources and undeniable aspirations for a better life.

In New York City the recent reports by Sviridoff and Logue recommended a reorganization of the fragmented departments of that city into a more coherent, manageable instrument. In their reports, incidentally, both men have drawn heavily upon their New Haven experiences.

And as physical renewal and housing were being brought together under one direction, they inevitably began to make contact with programs of social content, also. This was a natural evolution, for the efficient upgrading of housing and whole neighborhoods cannot proceed without a serious consideration of the problems of the people involved - employment, education, health, and recreation.

Thus it was that such programs as the Community Action Program evolved logically from renewal experiences in many cities. In the cities

where physical improvement has moved most speedily you will also find vigorous CAP's as well as other elements of the war on poverty, a close coordination between the improvement of the physical and social.

Again, one must point to New Haven as being in the forefront of this realization of the necessity for a unified drive upon the causes and results of poverty.

It is this kind of attack that we are seeking in the model cities program. The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act as passed by Congress is rooted in the conviction that the way to attack the urban problem is to attack it in all of its dimensions on a coordinated, concentrated, focused basis, applying to the problem all of the legislative tools made available by the Congress. But beyond that, it also calls for an unprecedented local commitment and effort.

This requires the cooperation of all Federal agencies to make available to local communities the full range of Federal program aids, related to the breadth and scope of the problems, rather than on the historic fractionated separate program basis. It requires, too, in the analysis of the problems, and the preparation of programs and their execution, the full involvement of the agencies, institutions, and elements within the community. For their support is vital to accomplishment of the goals.

The fragmentation of effort must end in the community, as well as in the Federal Government, and in this process, State and county governments must cooperate.

The essence of the model cities program is a total attack upon a neighborhood -- a single area in which the city finds a high concentration

of its hard-core problems -- ill health, poor education, bad housing, inadequate recreation facilities, and unemployment, to name the major deficiencies.

The key to the demonstration approach to be used by the city is innovation. I cannot stress this word too strongly. An enlarged renewal program or a packaging or rearrangement of old programs will not do the job we contemplate. The program is intended to be a search for new paths to the local solution for local problems. We shall expect the cities to look upon the demonstration program as an opportunity to experiment, to attempt the new and different, to become a laboratory for testing and refining ideas and methods for improving the quality of urban living. We must search out new ways of reaching the despairing, alienated slum dweller, new approaches to make the administration of cities more efficient, effective, and socially responsive; new methods of using modern technology to develop better housing at less cost.

The financing of the program is not as complicated as it may appear. Let us assume that a city proposes in its demonstration program an array of Federally-assisted programs that involve \$20 million in non-Federal contributions. These might include some neighborhood parks, tot lots, and green areas, an urban renewal project, a health services program, a neighborhood center, an adult education program, a manpower and job training program -- whatever the city thinks it would take to accomplish a significant improvement in the neighborhood and the quality of the lives of its people.

In this hypothetical case, the \$20 million in local share of these programs will generate, under the financing formula, supplemental funds of 80 percent of this amount, or \$16 million. Now the great new thrust in this program lies in the fact that these supplemental funds do not have to be "earmarked" for any one specific project or activity. They may be used for any project or activity included as part of the demonstration program. A city may, for example, want to use this money for stepped up garbage collection, a police-community relations program, or supplemental health services, or experiments in housing rehabilitation and ownership patterns or -- well, I could go on and on, and so could you.

In the hypothetical case I have just cited, the Federal share of the total program might -- if we take a two-to-one ratio such as the one in urban renewal and neighborhood centers -- come to \$40 million. Add that to the \$20 million of local contributions and the \$16 million in the 80 percent supplemental funds, and you have a total of \$76 million -- with only \$16 million coming from the model cities appropriation.

The philosophy behind this approach to the urban problem is well expressed in the requirements for the submission of a planning application to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for participation in the model cities program.

We will be asking of the local community three essentially very simple tasks -- but very complex and probing in thier simplicity.

First, we are asking the community to analyze its problem. We are not interested in a recital of the statistics of the pathology of the urban area, although for the record these statistics are useful. We



are interested in the community's analysis of how and why the pathology developed. We are concerned with making sure that the community understands not only the existing deficiency, but also the why, the how, and the when.

In addition, we want the community to understand the relationship between the problems of the neighborhood to the city as a whole, and to the metropolitan area.

Analysis of the problem forms the basis for the second task -- setting of goal and program approaches. The objective is not to identify the specific project or projects to be carried out in each area, nor is it to set a timetable; it is to set the goal of accomplishments that the community wants to achieve by the end of the program period. Having set the goal the community should identify the program approaches to be used. This need not require identification of the specific project elements to be used, but rather an understanding of the types of programs that will be needed to accomplish the goals in a specific time period.

The third element of the application is a description of the administrative structure of the community.

The form of the administrative structure which will supervise and execute the demonstration program will, of course, be determined by the city. Whatever that structure may be, the performance standards it must be able to meet are:

1. It must be politically responsible. By this I mean that recognizes the responsibility, the importance, and the authority of the governing body of the community.

2. It must be able to work effectively with other elements of the community; to coordinate local plans or, where it lacks legal power to coordinate, have assurance of a working relationship that guarantees coordination.

We want to be sure that the key question that will have to be answered is whether this process of self examination, of goal-setting, of communication between the various elements and forces within the city, will get underway a process of change in the level and depth of local understanding. For a community to participate in this demonstration program there must be a meaningful dialogue between the structured elements of the community that are going to be developing and carrying out parts of the plan, and between them and the people in the neighborhood or their representatives.

We will want to know whether it will result in a new relationship between the various systems of services and facilities within every city to each other. We want to be sure that the system of delivery of educational services, for example, will be related to the systems of delivery of health services, housing services and facilities, and social work services.

The community must understand that these services interrelate, each to the other, that they support each other, and that it is only by understanding the relationship between them that a community can attack the totality of the conditions that have been responsible for slumism, the totality of human and physical problems within the target community.

The Federal role in this program is to set the national goals and purposes, and the criteria for eligibility; to lend technical and financial assistance, and guidance where necessary.

Our Feds must recognize that the urban problem cannot be solved by the programs of any one department, including HUD. We have to modernize and change our own administrative patterns to make it easier for the local community to pull together, at the point of action, the combination of federal tools that will best meet its needs.

I am happy to report that the dialogue between the department and agencies concerned with the city is well under way. There will be problems, I am sure, because bureaucracy, whether federal, State, local, or even private industry, is slow to change.

But the dialogue has started. Top leadership in the various departments recognize the urgency of the need, and the President has given his strong support to the process of working together. I am sure that you will provide and sustain whatever pressure may be necessary to help work out a Federal program for your city.

For the local role is the key role. Here is the role of planned development between the various elements of the community, including the substantive involvement of the community to be affected by the plan. Planning, administration, innovation, scale -- these are the challenges.

These are challenges to the structure and organization of your cities as well as to the agencies that you represent. The key agency in a model city will be the City Demonstration Agency. This will be the

agency that will run the program, that will be administratively responsible to the city government...and especially responsible to the people in the model neighborhood area.

As I stated earlier, the cda should have enough power and authority to ensure coordinated administration of the model neighborhood program. This means authority to resolve conflicting plans, goals, programs, priorities, and time schedules among the various local agencies contributing to the model neighborhood program.

It means authority to allocate resources. It means authority to conceptualize and carry through the special portions of the model neighborhood program that are non-Federally-assisted.

Because of this overview authority, the cda should not (as a general rule) assume operational functions and duties for individual projects and activities that are part of the local city-wide program. The ability to achieve a broad and balanced program that pulls together all of the administrative resources to deal with social, physical, and economic problems may be impaired if the cda is a single function operating agency.

The cda must be free to work out agreements with all agencies in the city, including such pervasive agencies as the community action agency. In this way it can make sure that functions reinforce, rather than duplicate, each other.

The duties and functions of an lpa or lha in a model neighborhood program are clear. Certainly the present authority to operate renewal and housing programs is unimpaired. Yet you must be prepared to go far beyond your present scope and conceptions.

Renewal and housing are vital components of the model cities program. The provision of housing for lower income families is a matter of highest priority.

We will be looking to you for the new ideas and technology, for new kinds of relationships with other agencies that are in the same model neighborhood program. We expect to find new activities, ones that will make your present renewal and housing efforts more productive and meaningful.

We will insist that model neighborhood programs include such operating agencies as yours in policy-making, and not only in our specific programs. We want you to experiment, to consider new administrative structures, for example, for rendering a more comprehensive and personalized service in the model neighborhood.

This is the intent of Congress as well as of the HUD.

There never has been a Federal program of this scope, magnitude, and opportunity. Every city has a vast subterranean stream of creativity that has never been tapped. Under the model cities program it can be tapped and channeled into areas of greatest usefulness for improving the quality of urban life.

If I have dwelled for a rather long time on administrative relationships in the new model cities program, it is because I know how deeply interested you are. However, we must always keep in mind that the model cities program is designed to open up opportunities for the constructive involvement of residents of the target neighborhood. As William Lee Miller of New Haven has stated in his recent book -

"The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society." - "Nobody should be categorially shut out. Everyone should have a chance at the start... We have said that society, through its agencies, including government, shall take it upon itself to overcome opportunity-denying circumstances."

This means that neighborhood residents must be given a chance to participate constructively and meaningfully in the rebuilding of their communities. For instance, they should benefit from any jobs that develop from new construction or rebuilding in the area, as well as new jobs in the neglected area of public service.

Involvement means opportunity to participate in planning and opportunity to participate in the benefits of the plan. This is the only way that neighborhoods can be restored with some relevance to the needs and aspirations of their cities.

The success of the entire program of model cities will depend on the results that are achieved among the people in the area; the human resources that are developed, the human needs and aspirations that are satisfied. Improvement of the physical environment is useless unless it affects the human spirit positively.

All of us - you in the local agencies, we in the Federal government, and those living in the model neighborhood areas - have our work cut out for us. But, as President Johnson said when he first proposed the model cities legislation less than a year ago:

"The price - cities of spacious beauty and lively promise, where men are truly free to determine how they will live - is too rich to be lost because the problems are complex.

"Let there be debate over means and priorities. Let there be experiment with a dozen approaches, or a hundred.

"But let there be commitment to that goal."

Competence, cooperation, commitment - these are the three "C's" of success in the model cities program. Given that, we can work out together the technique, train the manpower, and modernize the administrative patterns - federal, State, and local - in preparation for that day when we can rebuild our cities in a manner that will redeem its promises and recognize its duties for the attainment of the brotherhood of man.

Massachusetts

Boston (616,000)  
 Cambridge (104,000)  
 Lowell (87,000)  
 Springfield (166,000)

Michigan

Detroit (1,660,000)  
 Highland Park (36,000)

Minnesota

Duluth (104,000)  
 Minneapolis (465,000)

Missouri

Kansas City (530,000)  
 St. Louis (710,000)

New Hampshire

Manchester (90,000)

New Jersey

Hoboken (47,000)  
 Newark (395,000)  
 Trenton (107,000)

New Mexico

Albuquerque (242,000)

New York

Buffalo (505,000)  
 Central and East Harlem, New York City\*  
 South Bronx, New York City\* \*(8,080,000)  
 Central Brooklyn, New York City\*  
 Poughkeepsie (37,000)  
 Rochester (305,000)

North Carolina

Charlotte (230,000)

Ohio

Columbus (540,000)  
 Dayton (260,000)  
 Toledo (354,000)

Oklahoma

Tulsa (280,000)

Oregon

Portland (380,000)

Pennsylvania

Philadelphia (2,030,000)  
 Pittsburgh (560,000)  
 Reading - Berks County (95,000)  
 Wilkes Barre (59,000)

Puerto Rico

San Juan (580,000)

Rhode Island

Providence (190,000)

Tennessee

Nashville - Davidson County  
 (261,000)  
 Smithville - DeKalb County  
 (11,000)

Texas

Eagle Pass (14,000)  
 San Antonio (645,000)  
 Texarkana (32,000)  
 Waco (105,000)

Vermont

Winooski (8,000)

Virginia

Norfolk (322,000)

Washington

Seattle (565,000)



FOR RELEASE

After 11:00 a.m.  
Thursday  
November 16, 1967

CITIES SELECTED FOR MODEL CITY PLANNING GRANTS

(City populations based on 1965 estimates)

RECEIVED  
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MAYOR'S OFFICE

Alabama

Huntsville (127,000)

Arkansas

Texarkana (21,000)

California

Fresno (156,000)  
Oakland (378,000)  
Richmond (83,000)

Colorado

Denver (520,000)  
Trinidad (10,000)

Connecticut

Bridgeport (156,000)  
Hartford (158,000)  
New Haven (151,000)

District of Columbia

Washington, D.C. (802,000)

Florida

Dade County (1,064,000)  
Tampa (305,000)

Georgia

Atlanta (535,000)  
Gainesville (18,000)

Hawaii

Honolulu (611,000)

Illinois

Chicago (3,520,000)  
East St. Louis (82,000)

Indiana

Gary (179,000)

Iowa

Des Moines (216,000)

Kentucky

Pikeville (5,000)

Maine

Portland (72,000)

Maryland

Baltimore (925,000)

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ASST.	10
ADM.	10/17
SEC.	8

(Over)



# **HUD NEWS**

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING  
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20410**

Phone: 382-4433

Thursday  
November 16, 1967

**STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROBERT C. WEAVER  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
ANNOUNCING THE FIRST MODEL CITIES PLANNING GRANTS  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

This is a tremendously significant day for the people of America.

I asked you to come here this morning to announce the list of cities selected to receive the first round of planning grants under the Model Cities program.

I don't think I ever recall, during my years in government, an event in the field of urban affairs which has generated so much interest, so much anticipation -- and so much healthy involvement and competition, and so much promise for the future of our cities.

There were 193 applications filed for these planning grants. They came from communities of all sizes in all parts of the country. They came from communities with a wide diversity of problems. They came from communities determined and willing to do something about those problems.

Two factors emerged from these applications:

First, they comprise a searching and detailed pathology of the urban ills of America.

And, secondly, they brought forth greater ingenuity and imagination for the solution of those urban ills than ever had been seen before.

In the process, the self analysis and exchange of information and stimulation of thinking that took place in these communities has had an impact that will be of lasting benefit to us all.

Making a selection from among the 193 applications received by HUD was an extremely difficult and time consuming task.

The applications were reviewed not only by HUD, which is responsible for administering this program, but by an interagency review committee composed of representatives of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Labor; Agriculture; Commerce; and Justice; and the Office of Economic Opportunity. It, like the Model Cities Program itself, was truly an Administration-wide effort, cutting across the activities of many departments and agencies.

The purpose was clear: To select those neighborhoods, all across the country, where the concentration and coordination of Federally-assisted programs could have the maximum impact in solving urban problems.

The criteria by which the applications were judged were:

- \* Scope of the analysis of the problems involved.
- \* Innovative approaches.
- \* Capacity to carry out the program.
- \* Commitment of city government and private groups.
- \* Geography and population.

The cities which were chosen -- and, of course, the responsibility for the selection is mine -- will share in the \$11 million in planning funds which Congress has appropriated for the first round of applications. If they successfully complete the planning process, they will share also in the \$300 million which Congress has just appropriated for supplemental grants and extra urban renewal funds expressly earmarked for Model Cities. Unfortunately, they will not be able to share in an additional \$350 million which President Johnson had requested for this program -- but which Congress did not appropriate.

There is, however, another \$12 million in planning funds which has been appropriated for a second round of applications. We will soon be inviting applications for this second round.

It is our hope that many of the cities that applied for the first round, and were not selected for planning funds, will join other localities in applying for the second round. And we intend to work closely with those cities which were unsuccessful in helping them develop their applications.

Before giving you the list of cities, however, let me emphasize one more thing just as clearly as I can.

This program is part of the great vision which President Johnson has had for the future of the American city and those who live there. It is part of a dream -- or, if you will, a conviction -- that this country has the energy and the resources and the will to build decent communities where Americans can live in comfort and in dignity.

The pathway leading up to this announcement today has been a long one, and has involved the efforts of many people, but none more than the President himself.

Long ago -- even before the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development -- he set up a task force

charged with finding new approaches to building a decent urban life in America. Two of the men who were on that task force now serve with me in this department -- Under Secretary Robert Wood and Assistant Secretary Charles Haar.

One of the ideas they and the other distinguished Americans associated with them proposed, and which President Johnson made part of his program, is what has become the Model Cities program.

The President fought against tremendous odds to win the authority for this program from Congress and against even greater odds to win the funds for it.

The funds Congress finally made available were far short of what he asked and what is needed. But they were short because there were some who sit in Congress who could not or would not see what this program meant to the people of this country.

It is my hope that as the cities we announce today move ahead in their planning and as more and more of those who live in these communities become involved, that perhaps the members of Congress will understand this program a

little better and appreciate it a little more. Perhaps if they do, the story on next year's appropriations will be different.

For the Model Cities program to succeed, there must be full involvement of the skills, commitment, and resources of Federal, state, county, and city governments with neighborhood residents, private enterprise, organized labor, and community agencies and organizations of all types.

The neighborhoods that have been selected for the first round of the program represent every section of the country. They are in communities of all sizes. They have an incredible diversity and complexity of problems. They represent the hard core both of need and of opportunity in meeting our urban problems. They are on the cutting edge of American life. For in them we shall start now to transform blight and decay into health and hope.

In the target areas there are one million families, or over four million people. Nearly a third of the families have incomes of less than \$3,000 a year, and the vast majority earn less than the medium income level in the locality. A fourth live in substandard housing, and many more are overcrowded in deteriorating buildings. Unemployment is double



the national level and there is substantial under-employment. A third of the adults have less than an eighth-grade education. The infant mortality rate is double that for the nation as a whole.

These figures reflect some of the major social, economic, and physical ills which will be the concern of the Model Cities program. It is designed to develop and carry out a comprehensive, coordinated attack to deal with the human and physical needs of the target areas. Its purpose is not to patch up the community but to uncover and deal with the root causes of its deficiencies.

And herein lies the true significance of the Model Cities and the reason the program has been so identified. Not only is it a more concentrated and fundamental approach to the basic problems of our cities than has ever before been undertaken. But out of it should come models for dealing with these problems throughout urban America.

Our task now is to work closely with the cities on the specifics of their proposals in order that effective programs can be launched in each of the neighborhoods. This will be

given top priority and all of the other Departments and agencies concerned with urban problems will join with us as partners in this effort.

As soon as I have finished reading the names of the cities, printed lists will be available at either side of the room, and data sheets on each of the communities will be available on tables in the corridor outside.

I know that some of you will want to get the word back to your offices as soon as possible, so we will interrupt the proceedings for about five minutes so those who need to do so can leave. Then we will reconvene to answer your questions. With me to help in that are Under Secretary Wood, Assistant Secretary H. Ralph Taylor who is responsible for the administration of the Model Cities program, and the Director of the Model Cities Administration, Walter G. Farr.

One last word:

President Johnson during recent conversations with President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico discussed the possibilities of a joint program for rehabilitating an urban area that stretches across the borders of the two countries.

As a first step in implementing this proposal the Department of Housing and Urban Development is initiating conversations with Mayor J. C. Martin of Laredo, Texas, in an effort to assist him in qualifying the city for a Model Cities planning grant. It is hoped the authorities in Mexico will concurrently take action to initiate similar planning in Nuevo Laredo.