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DISASTER RELIEF AND CIVIL DEFENSE

2200 NORTHEAST 24TH AVENUE
PORTLAND 12, OREGON

2 November 1956

Col Arthur M. Sheets, Director
Oregon State Civil Defense Agency
Room 12, State Office Building
Salem, Oregon

RECEIVED
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ORE. STATE CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY
STATE OFFICE BLDG.
SALEM, OREGON

Dear Col. Sheets:


Please find attached our project application T & E 5657-2 in the total amount of \$2,850.00 for purchase of one (1) offset duplicating machine and related accessories.

" This machine will be used solely for Civil Defense purposes and in the general Civil Defense indoctrination, training and public education program. It will be used for production of such things as training guides, equipment operations instructions and public information and education pamphlets which can not be produced in suitable form on available mimeograph-type equipment. The machine will not be used to produce material on subjects now in FCDA publications available on a gratis basis.

We have a very real need for equipment of this type. We feel it is in the interests of long range economy to have our own equipment. This machine will be permanently located in the Control Center where it would be available for immediate emergency printing of passes and other such items in event of a major disaster in which case print shops might be out of action due to physical damage or lack of electricity.

We are submitting this project under Chapter 7, Training and Education. It might well have been submitted under Chapter 11, Public Education and Information. We request approval under whichever Chapter is more appropriate. This item of equipment is needed for more effective implementation of both programs in Portland."

Yours truly,


Jack Lowe

JL:lb

FRED L. PETERSON
MAYOR

JACK LOWE
DIRECTOR



Advisory Board


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DISASTER RELIEF AND CIVIL DEFENSE

2200 NORTHEAST 24TH AVENUE

PORTLAND 12, OREGON

20 November 1956



Colonel Arthur M. Sheets, Director
Oregon State Civil Defense Agency Re: Portland T&E 5657-2
Room 12, State Office Building
Salem, Oregon

Dear Colonel Sheets:

This is in reply to your letter of 8 November which refers to our Application for funds for an offset duplicating machine. You request substantiation for our statement the new machine is required for items that cannot be produced in suitable form on mimeograph-type equipment.

Please find attached a few samples indicating the type of material we have had to have prepared in the past. Please note the final report on "Operation Green Light". This uses a combination of mimeograph and offset processes. The pages of written material are mimeographed and the pages containing photographs, maps or sketches are offset. This particular report, I am sure you will agree, would be much less effective without the use of offset reproduction. Another outstanding advantage of an offset machine is that typed or hand-lettered material can be reduced in size and still be easily readable. The Nurses' Procedures Manual, Information Bulletins 61, 70, and 74 and the Organizational Chart are examples of such reduction. This capability of reduction allows you to put on one sheet material which would require two sheets if mimeographed.

With our own machine, even greater use can be made of the unique capabilities of the offset process. We will, of course, still continue to use our mimeograph machine for the large volumes of routine duplicating of printed material. May I request the duplicate set of samples be forwarded to Region, and further request your favorable consideration of our Application.

Yours truly,

Jack Lowe
Jack Lowe

JL:pl

TERRY D. SCHRUNK
MAYOR
ORMOND R. BEAN
WILLIAM E. BOWES
MARK (BUCK) GRAYSON
STANLEY W. EARL
COMMISSIONERS



JACK LOWE
DIRECTOR
JAMES A. SCOTT
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR



ALpine 2 - 1411
TWX: PD 550

DISASTER RELIEF AND CIVIL DEFENSE

P.O. Box 9186
Portland 15, Oregon

12 September 1961

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Secretary McNamara:

I have your memorandum of 18 August and accept your request for advice, comments and suggestions. For many years I have felt that a truly effective total national defense program requires that civil defense function as a co-equal partner with the armed forces. I am hopeful the current reorganization will accomplish this and not result in civil defense becoming a step-child within DOD, receiving only lip service in support and appropriations. Also, I am disturbed when I see a professional civil defense career person such as Mr. Philip Batson of the Region 8 office leave federal service completely for what appears to be purely political considerations.

While there is a multitude of subjects I would like to discuss, I wish now to present the views of the City of Portland on those matters which we consider of paramount importance; shelter and evacuation, Conelrad, surplus property, training and interagency coordination.

1. Shelter and Evacuation

You point out your civil defense program gives first priority to the fallout shelter survey. We suggest first priority should be given to the establishment of national policy guidance, and technical and financial support to a shelter and evacuation program that would, within our capabilities, provide reasonable protection for our citizens in all areas of the country in accordance with the most probable threat in any particular area. Specifically;

a. In those areas described as likely target areas (45% of the total population) where it must be assumed the more probable threat is from the direct effects of a nuclear weapon, and where planning must be based on this assumption,

(1) Priority of effort on development of maximum capability (whatever it may be) for evacuation on a tactical alert. We are convinced engineering studies will show the potential capability for tactical evacuation to be much greater in most metropolitan areas than normally believed.

We also suggest in this respect that interstate highways now under construction or planned be modified where necessary to assure maximum availability of all traffic lanes for one-way movement away from likely target areas.

(2) Simultaneous development of plans for time-phased strategic evacuation by increment of all likely target areas. These plans should provide first for evacuation upon appropriate indication of worsening international relations, of non-working women, children (close all schools at elementary and secondary level), and aged and infirm, those non-essential to industry and commerce and those who have become non-essential due to evacuation of others (school teachers, grocery clerks and other service-type tradesmen). These plans should further provide for a second increment of evacuation upon further worsening of the international situation to include mostly workers but also all persons not essential to maintenance of public safety, and business and industry vital to defense activities or survival of the nation. The remaining third increment of persons required to maintain essential activities of the area should approximate 10 to 15% of the normal population. Certainly it would not exceed 25% for most areas. This group would be evacuated on a tactical alert, or go to blast-type shelters in accordance with local plans based on estimated target priority.

(3) Actual construction, beginning now, of blast-type shelters in likely target areas. These shelters should be constructed within a program comparable to the federal interstate highway program, costs being borne for the most part by the federal government but with some required financial participation by local government. These shelters should be community-type (200 persons per shelter), located in parks, playgrounds, school yards and beneath the streets in sufficient numbers as an initial goal, to provide blast shelter for the third strategic evacuation increment, but generally not to exceed 25% of the normal population. They should be built to at least 30 psi standards and be self-contained in all respects; power, water, food, sanitary facilities, medical services, with a capability to cool incoming air and filter it against CBR agents as well as provide supplementary oxygen if the oxygen content of outside air is reduced or depleted by conflagration or fire storms in the vicinity.

b. In those areas not designated as likely target areas (55% of total population) where it must be assumed the more probable threat is from fallout from nuclear strikes elsewhere, and where planning must be based on this assumption,

(1) Actual construction, beginning now, of fallout-type shelters. While many families will wish to construct their own fallout shelters, and should be permitted to do so, we recommend fallout shelters also be of the community type; constructed and equipped by local government with federal technical guidance and financial assistance, to assure standardization of degree of protection and further to assure sufficient extra fallout shelter spaces to accommodate evacuees coming from the more likely target areas. We do not believe a do-it-yourself shelter

program will ever provide the number of shelters required in this country. Nor do we believe the American people will accept a shelter program limited to fallout shelter only.

To summarize this item, we believe the overriding priority civil defense requirement on the federal government at this time is to establish now a national program which will be recognized by our citizens as providing a realistic and reasonable degree of protection for all our citizens whether they live in likely target areas or likely fallout areas. We feel it imperative this be done without further delay, particularly in the light of recent statements by the President and yourself which appear to indicate the writing off or abandonment of 75 million or so citizens living in or near likely target areas.

We refer to the President's address of 25 July in which, in reference to fallout shelters he stated "In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved--if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available." The implication here appears to be that the lives of those families in areas which are hit in a nuclear **blast** and fire can not be saved.

Everyone associated with civil defense is more than pleased by the recognition now given by the President that we must have a realistic civil defense capability if we are to have an effective total defense, yet those 80 million or so of our citizens, the likely target area residents comprising the great majority of our skilled workers, technical, industrial, commercial and professional people are beginning to wonder why they are expendable. We submit these citizens are a national human resource we cannot write off.

We also refer to your recent appearance before the Holifield Committee in which the Associated Press attributes to you the statement that no financially practicable program could save an estimated 50 million Americans who might be killed and some 20 million more who could be seriously injured by a massive hydrogen bomb attack. Are you really saying to the citizens of our likely target areas that this great nation cannot afford a program to provide them a reasonable degree of protection? Even if the program we recommend costs 50 billion dollars, but would save 50 million lives; this is only one thousand dollars per life. Surely the lives of those citizens who made this country the great nation it is today are of this much value.

We do not deny the oft-repeated statements of federal officials that "fallout shelter is the single course of action that will provide the greatest protection for the greatest number of people" or that "the simple addition of fallout shelters can save millions of lives in case of war", but our citizens are now beginning to realize the "greatest number" is actually maybe 55% as against 45% written off, and that the millions of lives saved will be from those living where the principle threat is only fallout and not from those in our major metropolitan areas. If by chance, as Mr. Yarmolinsky and others now hint, the fallout shelter program is only "the initial phase of a feasible Civil Defense effort" which

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will include full consideration for evacuation and blast-shelter where appropriate, then we request the citizens of this Nation be informed now of the total program and just what the total effort will be.

2. Conelrad

Conelrad, in the Portland area for certain and to the best of our knowledge throughout most of the country, is incapable, on a 24 hour per day seven day per week basis, of accomplishing its assigned mission. Our citizens, through a comprehensive and elaborate OCDM public information program are being led to believe that in event of a national emergency the radio stations will be on the air within minutes on Conelrad frequencies with official information and instructions. This could be true under certain ideal conditions, and of course the system works fairly well on national tests when special provisions for manpower and equipment are made, which conditions probably would not exist in event of a tactical alert without previous warning. We feel deficiencies in Conelrad are due to two principle causes;

a. Division of responsibility of total operations and programming which now exists between the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Air Force, the radio broadcast industry and civil defense agencies at local, state and national level.

b. Inequity of burden on some broadcasting stations because participation is "voluntary" and participating stations are then expected to provide considerable of their own funds in manpower and equipment.

I am sure you recognize that few things are more important, at least to the civilians of our country at the time of a sudden national emergency, than a capability for local officials to speak quickly by radio or television to the citizens and to provide authentic news and official information and instructions. With the added impetus now being given to installation of the NEAR system, the resultant requirements for an effective Conelrad operation, it is more imperative than ever that Conelrad be made workable on an around the clock basis.

We are not competent to say how Conelrad should be modified but we would suggest that responsibility be more well defined (preferably assigned to local civil defense authority), that participation be on a selective basis and that all necessary equipment and recurring expenses be a federal responsibility through loan or grant as is done, for example, in the RADEF and emergency hospital programs; or at total federal expense as in NAWAS.

We are sure an objective study of Conelrad (not by the FCC) will point out quite clearly the deficiency of the system as a device for rapid dissemination of public information and instructions in event of a national emergency.

3. Surplus Property

We have been told on several occasions by OCDM surplus property

officers that millions of dollars of federal surplus property becomes available every year for civil defense purposes, and that most anything not of a tactical nature we would see at a military installation could probably be obtained through the surplus program. If this be so generally, it certainly is not so in Oregon. We recognize many worthy organizations can make good use of surplus property. However, we do feel that surplus supplies and equipment, particularly that from the armed forces and originally procured as a defense requirement, should be made available first to civil defense agencies of local government, provided of course, it is not required by some other federal agency. In civil defense, the firing line is at the city and county level, where there also usually exists a very tight budget. We hope you can do something to improve this situation.

4. Training

OCDM has been conducting training courses at Battle Creek and the three training centers. These are generally good or excellent courses. Also a program for special training in mass fire control problems for senior fire officers has been initiated. We hope these programs, plus an expanded training film, program, will be continued. However, we feel there is a major deficiency at the national level in leadership and guidance in rescue training and operations. Since the closure of the Olney rescue training facility and the elimination of a rescue staff specialist at Battle Creek, there has been virtually no activity or help coming from the national level. Yet, in our opinion, the lack of adequate rescue capabilities throughout the country is a major deficiency in the total civil defense effort. Rescue operations will be a major requirement in any post-disaster situation. It is true many communities have assigned rescue operations to the fire services, but we feel this is unrealistic in that it does not recognize that the fire service in all likelihood will be fully involved in fire fighting and will have no uncommitted resources for rescue purposes, except possibly in direct conjunction with fire fighting. It is our belief a great deal needs to be done in further development of rescue equipment and techniques, large scale rescue operations procedures, rescue equipment stockpiles, and especially, in recruitment and training of volunteer rescue personnel. We recommend additional impetus to this program.

5. Interagency Coordination

We are sure you recognize we must assure that all resources and capabilities of all levels of government will be used in disaster operations to the highest attainable degree of efficiency. At the local operating level this requires continuous and close coordination between all city, county, state, and federal agencies which would be involved in local planning and operations. For several years we have been requesting persons be designated to report to our operations center in an emergency to serve as liaison between the City of Portland and federal agencies, but with little success.

We feel such liaison should be established at all major civil defense operation centers, but at this time specifically request your assistance in accomplishing this for our organization. We suggest three field grade

12 September 1961

army reserve officer of appropriate background be given mobilization designation assignments to the Portland Operations Center to serve as liaison between the city and the Oregon Sector Commander, X Corps. We further request three civilian employees of a non-military federal agency similarly be designated to serve as liaison for all non-military federal agencies. Three in each category are requested to assure likelihood of two reporting in an emergency for 24 hour operations.

While I do not classify myself as an expert on non-military matters, I have been associated with related activities virtually continuously since 1940 at which time I was in charge of the Fire College of the Portland Bureau of Fire and responsible for the training of the fire services of the Portland area in defense against HE, chemical agents and incendiaries. In 1942, as an officer in the Chemical Corps, I was operations officer and instructor at the War Department Civilian Protection School, Stanford University, training civilians as instructors in all phases of Civil Defense.

In 1943 I went overseas as a Fire Services Officer with the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

In 1944 I was transferred to England and assigned to the Air Defense Division of Supreme Headquarters. In this assignment my responsibility was staff planning and coordination for passive air defense measures throughout non-tactical areas of the allied zone. I also served as SHAEF liaison to British Civil Defense and among other things, coordinated our use of the British Civil Defense Staff College to train Allied Officers, and our use of British Civil Defense mobile columns in support of communications zone installations on the continent. Further, I assisted directly in the establishment of an operational civil defense organization in Brussels, Antwerp and Liege, the latter two while under flying bomb and long-range rocket attack. For these various activities I was awarded the Legion of Merit (as a Captain) on the basis of being "largely responsible for the exchange of British and United States practice, theories and training programs on Passive Air Defense which resulted in standardization of organization and methods used on the continent." I also received the Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palm. I returned to duty with the Portland Bureau of Fire in 1946.

Since 1950 I have been on special detail to the Mayor's office and assigned to civil defense activities. My assignment to civil defense was a direct result of a recommendation to our then mayor by Sir John Hodsell, who was Inspector-General of Civil Defense in Britain during World War II and who is now Senior Civil Defense Advisor to NATO. I believe I can safely say without contradiction that the civil defense program of the City of Portland is providing national leadership in many ways. I will give only two examples, both basic to effective survival capabilities. One is our continuity of government program initiated in 1954. After a study of our program, OCDM in 1958 established a national program for continuity of state and local government modeled in almost exact detail on the Portland program established four years previously. The other example is our emergency


12 September 1961

operations center, planning for which started in 1952 when local funds were made available, and which became operational in 1957. This operations center is the first adequate local civil defense center in the nation. It is still probably the most outstanding. A brochure with some pictures of the operation center is enclosed.

I have mentioned the preceding not for personal aggrandizement but so you will know our views and suggestions come from an organization with probably a better than average background of knowledge and experience in non-military defense and related activities. Incidentally, I am also a graduate of the advance course of the Chemical Corps School and also the Special Associate Course, Command and General Staff College, plus refresher courses at both schools. I believe in Civil Defense. I know it works because I have seen effective civil defense operations save lives in cities under attack.

This has become a long letter, and quite likely too lengthy for a man as busy as you to read. I do hope who ever consolidates the replies to your memorandum to state and local Directors will, in his briefing to you, make you aware of our views, which incidentally I know are shared by many other target area civil defense Directors throughout the Nation. I fervently hope this letter doesn't fall into the hands of and become buried by one of the old guard of OCDM, some of whom, judging by their past inaction, must have no real desire to develop an effective and realistic national civil defense program. Our people are confused and apprehensive. A great need exists for inspired and dedicated leadership which will convert their confusion and apprehension to a national determination to survive no matter what the threat. I pray you, under the guidance of our President, and assisted by Mr. Pittman, will provide this leadership.

Most sincerely yours,



Jack Lowe

JL:met

Enc.

Note to Those Interested in a Realistic Civil Defense Program:

If you are in accord with our views on the immediate need for an effective shelter-evacuation program, please so inform Secretary McNamara and Governor Rockefeller.



J.L.