street roots
Jan. 22, 2010

columns

Tenant Rights Project and some West Coast coalition-building

Lew Church is an organizer for Portland's Tenant Rights Project and Coordinator of PSU Progressive Student Union, and can be reached at lewchurch@gmail.com or 503-222-2974.

BY LEW CHURCH
CONTRIBUTING COLUMNIST

As one of the organizers who was able to go on the Sisters of the Road/Street Roots four-van caravan to San Francisco in January to protest the Obama administration's insufficient funding for decent, affordable housing and protect poor people from "crimes of status," I was happy to see hundreds of protesters (including 40 of us from Portland) march in the rain down Market Street in San Francisco and present Nancy Pelosi's office a letter advocating for housing and human rights. "House keys not handcuffs" was a great slogan used on many of the protest signs on Market Street.

As an organizer in Portland, since September 2007, for Tenant Rights Project (supported by Portland State University Progressive Student Union), our campaign has focused on advocating for the rights of tenants and other poor people to have decent, habitable, safe housing. Tenant Rights Project was happy to endorse the Western Regional Advocacy Project's San Francisco march.

Here in Portland, Tenant Rights Project has met every week since early 2009. Our meetings are open to tenants interested in organizing against slumlord practices, including: persistent pest control problems (cockroaches, mice, bedbugs), crime (drugs, prostitution, violence and kickbacks which come in off the street into single-resident occupancy housing, frequently), and in the case of one landlord campaign – protesting a local, large, nonprofit landlord's practices which include board meetings that are closed to tenants, and where board minutes are secret (which is illegal).

Tenant Rights Project meets at 6 p.m. every Sunday in the Biltmore Hotel lobby, 310 NW Sixth, in Old Town. So far, Tenant Rights Project has held one picket in downtown Portland protesting landlord practices.

In the past, at Portland State, the Progressive Student Union and the Student Rent Strike Committee organized a six month rent strike against student housing (then run by a contracted-for landlord, not the university itself) which protested persistent pest control problems (cockroaches, silverfish, mice), frequent rent increases, harassment of tenants by managers, and lack of transparency and accountability to tenants. We picketed twice at the landlord's other businesses, and got the concessions of one abusive building manager being fired, and, eventually, the university taking over student housing directly (a much better solution).

As someone who used to do anti-poverty organizing on tenant rights and housing as a VISTA volunteer with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (Dr. King Jr.'s organization), in Macon, Ga., several years after Dr. King's assassination – I appreciated that the San Francisco pro-housing protest by WRAP focused on the one-year anniversary of President Obama's inauguration and on Dr. King's birthday, as well.

Many of us were hopeful when a liberal, Democrat senator (and the first African American) became elected president. However, as we have seen in the year since, Barack Obama's lofty rhetoric doesn't, ipso facto, translate into anti-poverty work or social justice on the ground, locally or globally.

Despite it's purported liberal or progressive image, when it comes to jobs, health care, the economy, schools, and things like tenant rights and housing for people, Oregon gives short shrift to economic justice. For example, Oregon's K-12 classroom size ratio is second worst in the country, second only to Arizona.

What is to be done? As groups like Sisters of the Road, Street Roots and WRAP join forces on the west coast, nationally, and even globally (Tenant Rights Project has been getting emails from a Squatters Movement in neoliberal South Africa despite there being a black-majority government in Pretoria for many years now) – we have a chance, as Robert F. Kennedy once said (quoting Aeschylus), "to make gentler the life of the world."

Dr. King Jr.'s last campaign in 1968 was the Poor People's March on Washington. In Portland, we need to start holding the City Council to a higher standard than the present "go along and get along," pro-capitalist "consensus," which seems pervasive between Commissioners Fritz, Fish, Saltzman, Leonard and Adams. In Salem, in Washington, D.C., and at the WTO (World Trade Organization) we need to start organizing in coalitions in order to put some teeth in all that "liberal" Obama rhetoric. Is Portland "the city that works" for yuppies, or the city that belongs to all of us?

Discipline of Address:

Bureaucracy, Consent, And Citizenship In The Making Of Tenants Within Portland's Non-Profit Public Housing Industry

---

A Thesis

Presented to

The Division of History and Social Sciences

Reed College

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Bachelor of Arts

Thomas Galloway Fenollosa

May 2010

Approved for the Division

(Anthropology)

Antina von Schnitzler

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to extend my deepest thanks to Antina von Schnitzler, whose guidance and humor in this project have been unfailing, and to the men of the Butte and Biltmore, who have ever so kindly welcomed me into their little piece of downtown Portland.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction **1**

1 The Genealogy of a Public **17**

One Hundred Years of the City: Portland and its planners through the twentieth century 19

The "Portland Way": Progressive discipline, popular engagement, and civic governmentality 38

In closure: Making ideology work 45

2 The Poverty of Diagnosis **49**

Portraying the homeless: discursive constructions of the poor in the mission to eliminate homeless(ness) 50

From takers to taxpayers: Central City Concern and the end of homelessness 60

In closure: The neoliberal subject 73

3 The Liminality of Address **75**

Unclean and Unsafe: Behind the façade of Central City Concern's Single-Room-Occupancy hotels 77

"Everybody is here to make things better": The craft of public consensus 83

"Central City Unconcerned": Neglect, accountability, and the right to truth in the Butte and Biltmore buildings 86

In closure: The flood 94

Conclusion **95**

Bibliography **99**

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I explore the relationships between the discursive practices of urban governance and planning and the management of the poor in affordable housing projects managed and operated by the non-profit organization Central City Concern. I will draw upon theories of discourse and ideology to articulate how ideologies of urban space, housing, and citizenship have matured within Portland's political context, and how those ideologies circulate through real and imagined publics, producing, refracting, and reifying the monopoly held over public space by Portland's "progressive" class. Urban planning is both a discursive and performative discipline, complicit in prescribing the ideological foundations of the city and inscribing those assertions into the city with concrete and steel. In recent decades, voluntary and non-profit sector service organizations, like Central City Concern, have assumed the mission of urban development where city government has been unable, and those organizations have had significant influence in defining the political and economic direction of civic ideology. I will analyze how the discursive practices employed by the City of Portland, governmental and nongovernmental service organizations, and citizen action groups have shifted understandings of the public and the private, urban citizenship, and political activism, and how those changing ideological perspectives have been experienced by tenants in public housing projects and members of the homeless community in Portland. I will suggest that the shift in providing those services to the poor, particularly affordable housing, from governmental to nongovernmental organizations has enabled new forms of managing and governing those communities, and that the discursive practices employed by Central City Concern attempt to conceal and permanently unsettle the homeless and public housing tenants, shift accountability for housing issues and concerns onto tenants themselves, and justify a neoliberal housing paradigm that internalizes structural economic inequalities within the subjectivities of poor people.

to the Big Pink House and its flotsam, near and far

INTRODUCTION

On December 9, 2009, Ed Blackburn was in attendance at the unveiling of the latest grant package of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, a $600 million apportionment for mental health services nationwide. Blackburn, the executive director of Portland's Central City Concern, would receive $8.95 million in stimulus funds for the construction and operation of a new mental health and homeless assistance facility in downtown Portland. President Barack Obama explained (Office of the Press Secretary 2009) that the awards were intended for "community health centers" already providing health care, and in many cases comprehensive health coverage, to "underserved communities" who "face the greatest barriers to accessing care"—in Portland, presumably, those communities primarily experiencing addiction, poverty, and houselessness. In addition to health care services, the program furnishes construction and health care provision jobs in the lagging economy.

Almost eight months earlier, on April 26 of the same year, Blackburn received honors bestowed by the Dalai Lama in San Francisco as one of forty-nine "unsung heroes of compassion." Blackburn was recognized for his efforts in drug and alcohol rehabilitation with Central City Concern, in particular as the director of the Hooper Detoxification Center, a support center that provides medical detoxification support and short-term substance withdrawal assistance and counseling (Friesen 2009).

And in the April 2 issue of the *Portland Mercury*, writer Jake Thomas reports that affordable housing tenants in the Butte and Biltmore Buildings, former single-room occupancy hotels located in Portland's Old Town and managed by Central City Concern, have been living with an infestation of bedbugs, cockroaches, lice, and other pests for months. At the time, residents in the Central City Concern-owned buildings had filed a complaint with Portland's Bureau of Development Services, and in addition to complaints about bedbugs—one tenant admits that "you'd rather live underneath the bridge" than with the bugs—grievances included complaints about general building safety and maintenance, and allegations of rampant drug use and dealing, prostitution, and violence within the buildings. "There are predators in this building," another Central City Concern tenant says of his building, the Biltmore Building (Thomas 2009).

Of course, here is the paradox: Ed Blackburn is at once a "hero of compassion" and a slumlord, an admired social service provider, and, to some, one who has all but neglected precisely that role as a service provider. Central City Concern is one of Portland, Oregon's

most reputable homelessness and poverty service provider, and is its largest non-profit affordable housing management organization. It has worked closely with city government for almost thirty years, and has been widely acclaimed for its "holistic" approach to urban decrepitude and blight. Central City Concern claims to have invented a new model of welfare services, one that combines the provision of basic needs such as housing with programming to address the problems of mental illness, drug addiction and dealing, broken families, and crime that plague homeless and poor populations in Portland.

This thesis will examine Central City Concern's work in the Portland area on a progressively narrowing course. I start from a regional and city-wide framework, embedding Central City Concern within both a historical and ideological trajectory of urban politics, city and land-use planning, and welfare government. Second, I will consider Central City Concern's anti-poverty work from a bureaucratic and institutional standpoint, analyzing how the techniques of addressing and ending urban poverty produce and reproduce understandings of homeless[1], migrant, or floating populations within the urban core, in particular with respect to Portland's ongoing, intragovernmental mission to end homelessness by the year 2015. Lastly, I will enter the buildings that Central City Concern maintains as affordable housing, the communities of transition that are designed to put people back on their feet. I will consider how the practices, motivations, and ideologies about addressing the issues of homelessness and poverty, inherited historically, bureaucratically, and textually, are enacted on the bodies of public housing tenants, how those tenants are shaped and reformulated as urban subjects, and how they situate themselves within an ideological public sphere.

"Development" and the Discursive Turn

The following chapters are fundamentally about development, about the ways governmental and nongovernmental organizations address issues of poverty and homelessness within the urban core for the purpose of making cities better for people. From a governmental perspective, urban ills such as vagrancy and poverty are the artifacts of

---

[1] For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the term "homeless" to refer to the *category* of people for whom Portland's 10-Year Plan To End Homelessness seeks to serve—"adults, youth, couples, and families with children" who are "living on the streets, either temporarily or for the long-term, for a variety of reasons" (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 1). The "homeless" is a constructed category—after all, following Feldman, the homeless, "though deprived of homes, dwell" (Feldman 2004, 146)—and for this thesis its descriptive capacity reflects more the anxieties of urban politics and practices of government than it does the hyper-specific and multitudinous experience of living on the streets. This thesis is fundamentally about the institutionalized social work, and so, in evaluating their practices, I will borrow their lexicon, at least provisionally.

underdevelopment, threats to a well-functioning polity, and as a result are the cause of considerable political anxiety. Methodologically, I will draw heavily from the theoretical work of James Ferguson, who, in his studies in Lesotho[2], has contributed immensely to the anthropology of development.

Admittedly, Ferguson's work focuses on the practices of humanitarian aid, structural adjustment, and the enabling of economic self-determination by international development organizations like the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in "undeveloped" Africa, little of which is particularly relevant to the present discussion in Portland. However, the production of ideas about "underdevelopment" that inhere in many of these programs is very much like that accomplished in the "development" work of Portland's social service sector. Planning and anti-poverty work in Portland, I will argue, often performs the same discursive work in producing the category of the "underdeveloped," the poor, the deviant, the pathological, as do the international organizations that Ferguson finds do the work of defining Lesotho as a Less Developed Country (LDC). While the materiality of Ferguson's ethnographic research may not be appropriate for the present study, the discursive techniques employed by Ferguson's "development" experts are the same processes of ideological construction employed by Portland's class of planning technicians, anti-poverty administrators, and social workers.

There exist two important theoretical frameworks for understanding development. The first consists of those who understand development work and its actors as "part of a great collective effort to fight poverty, raise standards of living, and promote one or another version of progress," who conceive of the development apparatus as a "tool at the disposal of the planner, who will need good advice on how to make the best use of it," and who presume that development agencies are "at least potentially a force for beneficial change" (Ferguson 1994, 9-10). Implicit within this discourse is a conception of "development" as a "process of transition or transformation toward a modern, capitalist, industrial economy" (Ferguson 1994, 15). Social workers, well-intentioned bureaucrats, and other actors within the development apparatus understand their work as the work of empowerment, bringing hope, prosperity, and solvency to those who have been historically, structurally, or otherwise refused the possibility of economic and political self-determination. This is the territory of

---

[2] In his investigation of nongovernmental development programs designed to incorporate Lesotho into the global "developed" milieu, Ferguson (1994) finds that the circulation of texts and discourses by the apparatuses charged with development fail to accomplish any sort of meaningful positive material transformation of Basotho society save the elaboration and expansion of the bureaucratic state and the development apparatus itself.

the humanitarian NGO, the food bank, or the urban planner, and is fundamentally reformist.

To a large extent, it is also the ideological terrain of Central City Concern's anti-poverty work. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations like Central City Concern comprise the institutional apparatus of social justice, the professional class of people and collectivities devoted to helping the poor help themselves out of misfortune. In the transformative and holistic approaches to homelessness that constitute what I will later call the "continuum of care" model of social work, the homeless and the poor are situated within the teleological progression that helps convert the poor into meaningful public participants, from "tax users" to "tax payers." Through the work of development actors, the underdeveloped are put back on the track to development, so that they can participate once again, or at last, in the practices of social life. Development, in this sense, is structurally corrective, rather than revolutionary, and is a kind of charity that may not provide the kinds of solutions that systemic problems like poverty require.

The second conceptual approach to development, on the other hand, is more critical, and decidedly Marxist: "If," Ferguson paraphrases, "capitalism is not a progressive force but a reactionary one in the Third World"—or any "underdeveloped" location—"not the cause of development but the obstacle to it, not the cure for poverty but the cause of it, then a capitalist-run development project is a fundamentally contradictory endeavor" (Ferguson 1994, 11). The development project, accordingly, constitutes the material and practical existence of ideology within state bureaucracy, ensuring the reproduction of class inequality and the reproduction of the relations of production. To a certain extent, this approach departs from historical formulation of "development" for a moral usage, in terms of "quality of life" and "standard of living," and "refers more to the reduction or amelioration of poverty and material want" (Ferguson 1994, 15). This critique of political economy unapologetically implicates organizations whose mission is to incorporate "the poor" into the existing class relations that constitute a vibrant capitalist market.

Under the auspices of this Marxist-Structuralist arc, critics of development agencies like Central City Concern would suggest that the practices of Central City Concern and its institutional colleagues cannot be understood as anything but the material practices of ideological domination, apparent or behind an obscuring smoke-screen, and that all subjective agency or discursive interchange ought to be evaluated in terms of the underlying politico-economic ideology of Portland's public sphere. Central City Concern, the homeless, the City Councilors—everyone within Portland's public field—are, in this sense, all bound to class inequality and structural reproduction through ideology, in this case a middle-class Progressive ideology, despite intention, consciousness, or deviance.

Of course, neither the liberal reform approach nor the Marxist-Structuralist approach provides much in the way of an adequate description of how the development practices of organizations like Central City Concern operate. At best, it remains that the former is unable to escape self-aggrandizing notions of charity nor can the latter withdraw from the damning, fundamentally othering relationship between center and periphery, and there remains no recourse for the fact that global and local inequalities are theoretically and practically unresolved. The first approach glosses the complex relations of power embedded in philanthropy, while the second eliminates all possibility for human agency or intention, and, to a certain extent, presumes that ideological control is complete, comprehensive, and without rupture.

However, what can be said about the two approaches is that they frame a field of development discourse, of how development projects and their practices can be talked about. Without rejecting, nor unassailably accepting, either, I follow Ferguson in shifting the question of development to thinking of "development"[3] as a discursive practice. Ferguson writes that the concept of "development" best references a "dominant problematic," an "interpretive grid," through which the "host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible and meaningful" (Ferguson 1994, xiii). Development institutions, he suggests, produce and reproduce their own discourses, constructing their subjects as "particular kind[s] of object[s] of knowledge," and, perhaps more importantly, generating a "structure of knowledge around th[ose] object[s]" (Ferguson 1994, xiv). Development discourse translates the field of social experience into a set of problems, a moralizing structure of knowledge, and identifies places of intervention on the basis of this knowledge. Ferguson explains,

> discourse is a practice, it is structured, and it has real effects which are much more profound than simply 'mystification.' The thoughts and actions of 'development' bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live; and what they do and do not do is a product not only of the interests of various nations, classes, or international agencies, but also, and at the same time, of a working out of this complex structure of knowledge. (Ferguson 1994, 18)

Discursive practices make ideological knowledges—however complete or fragmented—*work*. In Lesotho, Ferguson argues that the circulation of "development" discourse has done

---

[3] Ferguson (1994) refers to "development," rather than development, to distinguish and remind readers that "development" refers not just to a value—that is developed or undeveloped—but to a discursive and ideological field of knowledge and practices, an *assemblage* in Latour's words (1987), that accrues relevance and "obviousness" in its interactions with powerful actants. For the rest of this thesis, I will follow Ferguson in his selective use of quotation marks to indicate the discursively contingent aspects of development.

little to affect the material needs of the Basotho people, but it *has* subtly legitimized the expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power in the form of the development institution, which has deftly legitimized its own insertion into the management of social life. Similarly, the anti-poverty work of institutions like Central City Concern, the Housing Authority of Portland, City Council, and others have discursively excluded the poor from public membership in the practices of social work intended at empowerment. Much of that work has been performed under a progressive ideology that rhetorically appeals to a democratic politics of access, inclusion, and fairness. And while a critique of the philanthropic and charitable practices will become implicit in the course of the thesis, it is important to accept that the individuals that constitute institutions like Central City Concern, the Housing Authority of Portland, City Council, and others believe that they are doing the right thing—this thesis is less concerned with the moral evaluations of development programs, that is, the merits or problems associated with affordable housing programs, but rather how discourse around housing development programs *works,* what it *does.*

The theoretical thrust of this thesis will be a consummation of the ideology and social practice of anti-poverty work in Portland's downtown neighborhoods, a kind of *praxis* that accounts for both the powerful, ideological aspects of discursive circulation and the actual processes of subject-making that constitute, resist, reify, and shift the kinds of subjectivities that individuals and collectivities manifest. As Ferguson finds, "development" is not necessarily causative—it doesn't always work the way it is supposed to, nor does it always respond to deliberate intention—but it does have very significant consequences. Similarly, the well-intended work of Central City Concern and other organizations does not always *work* the way it is supposed to—that is, homelessness is nowhere near its "end," nor do their subjects always experience the kind of "transformation" that is intended—but that neither explains nor mystifies the fact that poverty and homelessness remain reified in the urban landscape, and that the mobilized bureaucratic, social service apparatus has been extended and elaborated. The circulation of planning discourse in Portland has achieved something different altogether. As I will argue, new conceptions of the public and private, urban inclusion and exclusion, citizen and refugee, have become inscribed, discursively and physically, into Portland's urban landscape, and have once more reified the poor as "matter out of place" (Douglas 1966, 44) within the city core.

Rarefaction and the "Public" Ideology

Giorgio Agamben suggests that the political stability of any polity resides in the formulation of an ideologically homogenous public sphere, and it is the project of any political system to accommodate social heterogeneity within political homogeneity

(Agamben 2000). The projection of what Michael Warner calls a "public," the "social totality" (Warner 2002, 49), is fundamental in this regard. Warner suggests that "the projection of a public is a new, creative, and distinctively modern mode of power" (Warner 2002, 77), one that is bound to prevailing discursive trajectories and is reified through the politico-juridical processes that serve to maintain that homogenous "fiction." Warner locates publics "only within the temporality of the circulation that gives [them] existence"(Warner 2002, 68), yet he conceals the very real spatial mapping of discourse across physical landscapes. Michel de Certeau makes a similar argument, suggesting that "strategies," what he understands as "calculation[s] (or manipulation[s]) of power relationships," arise "as soon as a subject"—for Warner, the discursively-bound "public"—"with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated." De Certeau continues that the discursive subject then "postulates a *place* that can be delineated as its *own* and serve as the base from which relations with an *exteriority* composed of targets and threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed". This "place," while surely a discursive idea, is made up of the roads and buildings and streetcar stations that constitute the physical landscape—and in the case of urban poverty—of the city. The projection of a public, and the resulting strategies that stem thereof, are naturalized over physical space. The "proper," what becomes naturalized through the discursive power of the public, de Certeau argues, "is *a triumph of place over time*...a mastery of time through the foundation of an autonomous space" (de Certeau 1984, 35-36). More than existing merely within the temporality of discourse, publics also exist within a spatial frame, a frame through which public and private activities are spatially organized and policed.

Foucault, similarly, theorizes the spaces of discursive circulation as socially differentiating. Discursive practices, Foucault asserts, are characterized by "a delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories" (Foucault 1977, 199). These kinds of fields of knowledge, in which discourses and ideologies are embedded, are fundamental in manufacturing individual subjectivities, which, as Foucault asserts, are substantial. "Societies of discourse," then, "function to preserve or produce discourses, but in order to make them circulate in a closed space, distributing them only according to strict rules, and without the holders being dispossessed by this distribution" (Foucault 1973, 62-63). The discursive practices involved in producing public knowledges are what Foucault categories as the "external procedures of rarefaction," those that put "power and desire at stake," which structure who has the authorized right to speak, what is acclaimed as cognitively reasonable and what is condemned as madness, and how social knowledges are

endowed with truthfulness and pursued as such (Foucault 1973, 52). The discursive elaboration of ideology—in our case, a politically progressive ideology—and the qualifications for authorized urban citizenship in Portland, exist within structured and authorized ideological fields that limit which people can say what things, and successful discursive practice requires stable foundations of authority. Public ideologies and authorized discursive practices, moreover, frame normalcy and deviance in Portland's urban setting, structuring the "whole framework of knowledge through which we decipher...speech, and of the whole network of institutions," legitimate or condemnable, "which permit someone...to listen to it" (Foucault 1973, 53). As will be discussed in the second chapter, the work of shelters, transitional housing, and other programs to end homelessness are discursively framed by ideological knowledges of medicine, capital, and the polity, refuting the logic of alternative solutions to urban problems. These problems, rather, are incorporated into what Foucault calls the rational-liberal "will-to-truth" (Foucault 1973, 55), what effectively justifies planning and other "scientific" disciplines, unifying and authorizing techno-scientific solutions with the universal project of finding the right answers, with progressively more perceptive and exacting instruments and experts.

From early on, access to the public discourse about planning was inaccessible and prohibitive for all but Portland's elite, and through much of the twentieth century that discourse was the moral and cultural authority in balancing "good" and "bad" directions for the city's development. Planning experts like Charles Bennett, Robert Moses, and Harland Bartholomew invited to Portland for their advice gave legitimacy to a public program that was not yet a legitimate practice of government. As planning has matured, and ultimately become *the* recourse for civic visioning, its methods have achieved, to a certain extent, the repute of other scientific disciplines, incorporated within the arsenal of quantitative and technological fields already pursuing the will-to-truth. Foucault asserts that the first two procedures of rarefaction—that is, discursive "prohibition" and the "opposition between reason and madness"—are constantly "becoming more fragile and more uncertain, to the extent that they are now invaded by the will to truth," which, on the other hand, "grows stronger, deeper, and more implacable" (Foucault 1973, 56). Planning's assimilation within the implicit functions of government has similarly followed this ideological trajectory.

In Portland, progressive ideology has become synonymous with the iconic Portland citizen. As Carl Abbott[4] suggests, the individual that constitutes what he categorizes as

---

[4] Much of the historical narrative and some of the theoretical issues introduced in this chapter are drawn from the work of Carl Abbott (see Abbott 1983; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 2001; 2002), professor of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University in Portland, OR. Abbott has written extensively on topics including

"Progressive Portland," who follows what politicians, planners, and civic icons have long identified as the "Portland Way," is a fundamentally liberal, politically-moderate, middle-class kind of urban resident. "These folks," Abbott writes,

> are 'progressive' in pushing Portland into the national lead on many aspects of urban planning and development, doing things that other cities may imitate. Unifying issues are compact growth, environmental protection, good public schools, and the pleasures of a downtown that escaped modernist reworking. They are also Progressives—or neo-Progressives—in the historical meaning of a political movement aimed at combining democracy or efficiency. The economic base is an alliance of downtown business and real estate interests with professional and managerial support workers (e.g. college professors) to define and pursue a public interest through rational analysis...They trust government because the *are* government. (Abbott 2001, 80-81)

Odell writes that the values that undergird contemporary political ideologies in Portland are values that reveal an "underlying modernist assumption that there is a unitary public interest that can be identified" and is often fostered in the advocating of public service and the public interest over individual ambition, an accessible political culture, an established, efficient bureaucracy that regulates private actions in the name of the public good, a confidence in scientific rationality, and conservative understandings of preservation (Odell 2004, 72). As van Dijk articulates, ideologies are fundamentally "systems of ideas," the "axiomatic principles" of the "shared representations of social groups" (van Dijk 2006, 115). They are the "self-schema" that serve as the personal *and* social cognitive coherence of an *us*, with its membership devices ("who *are* we?"), actions ("what do we *do*?"), aims ("*why* do we do this"), norms and values ("what is good or bad?"), position ("what is our position in society, and how to we relate to other groups?"), and resources ("what is ours, and what do we want to have/keep at all costs?") (van Dijk 2001, 14). As a form of self-representation, the "Portland Way" has to this point become the institutional rubric for defining the norms, values, and membership of urban citizenship, whom government and policy is to serve and in what capacities, and whom the "public" references.

Urban planning and urban design has in Portland become part of the fabric of the "Portland Way." "In terms of cityscape and urban form," Abbott writes, "Portland has managed with some success to bring environmentalism and urbanism together in a coherent package of mutually supportive planning and development decisions," resulting in the formulation of a "metropolis that is stronger at its center than at its edges, whether we

---

contemporary American urban history, urban revitalization and development policy, and the relationships between urban growth and regional land-use. This chapter will feature research he has conducted on Portland's urban planning history and the development of progressive ideology under the rubrics of Portland's interpretation of modernist urban design.

measure that strength in political clout or the allocation of investment," and with a "political culture that treats land-use planning, with its restrictions on private actions, as a legitimate expression of the community interest" (Abbott 2001, 6). Modern public transportation systems, prescient land-use regulation, transparent political process, and the encouragement of popular involvement in the civic life of the city have all contributed to Portland's reputation as "a city that works,"[5] in its many senses.

While Portland is widely acknowledged today for its progressivism in civic planning and urban redevelopment, rightly or wrongly, that has not always been the case. Throughout the twentieth century, Portland planners were subject to a constantly shifting political climate, often dominated by conservative business interests that had little interest in populist civic philanthropy, and were frequently unable to escape political stagnation and discontinuity. Statewide land-use regulations formulated in the latter half of the century transformed the expectation of urban planning from an overt practice of business interests into a socially-accountable, politically liberal, and environmentally progressive code for development. This intervention was accompanied by the rise of nongovernmental participation in politics, by neighborhood organizations, other voluntary organizations, and the non-profit sector. Portland had long been a planned city, but the progressive intervention of the 1970s transformed how that planning would take place.

As well as producing ideological knowledges, planning as a discursive discipline similarly shapes practices that constitute individual subjectivity. Not all discourse is rendered equal, nor is it always honest in its representation of reality, but rather it is subject to shifting domains of authorial agency. Disciplinary authority defines a "theoretical horizon" that presumes ideological congruency. A discipline ought to be understood, Foucault explains, as a "domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments...a sort of anonymous system at the disposal of anyone who wants to or is able to use it, without their meaning or validity being linked to the one who happened to be their inventor" (Foucault 1973, 59). Disciplines are often paradigmatic instances of the institutionalization of practices engendering the will-to-truth, endowed with historically contingent authority that is not innocent of power or violence. Disciplines, furthermore, are "principle[s] of control over the production of discourse" that "fix limits for discourse by the action of an identity which takes the form of a permanent re-actuation of the rules" (Foucault 1973, 61). Urban planning has acquired, in Portland, this kind of disciplinary authority since planning became the privileged and

---

[5] The words "Portland, a city that works" are proudly displayed on the sides of all of Portland's public-works vehicles.

institutionalized recourse for dealing with urban concerns. As a protocol for envisioning the future of a city, for whom it will be, and what kinds of other practices will be legally, politically, or socially feasible, planning itself is a fundamentally discursive practice. "As an expression of these [progressive] values," Odell asserts, "the Portland Way promotes planning as the arbiter of the public interest, and New Urbanism as the planning 'science' that can accomplish the goals of a growth management regime" (Odell 2004, 193). Portland leaders, Odell elaborates, frame their work as political advocates about the understanding that it is the "particular people in a particular place going about their everyday activities and working together within a set of common values that creates, not only a sense of community, but the physical development of the city as well" (Odell 2004, 72). In a sense, urban design is both a prescriptive and a "performative" discursive practice that inscribes ideological values within the built environment of the city.

Technological politics, agencement, *and performative discourse*

"No idea is more provocative in controversies about technology and society," Langdon Winner writes, "than the notion that technical things have political qualities" (Winner 1986, 19). Winner's argument for a technological politics stems from his analysis of Robert Moses' thoroughfare design on Long Island in the mid-twentieth century. Winner asserts that "many of [Moses'] monumental structures of concrete and steel," in their implicit racism and classism, "embody a systematic social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among people that, after a time, became just part of the landscape" (Winner 1986, 23). Moses' bridges were built at a height to disallow public transportation to extend to the planner's beloved Jones Beach, revealing what Winner characterizes as "an ongoing social process in which scientific knowledge, technological invention, and corporate profit reinforce each other in deeply entrenched patterns, patterns that bear the unmistakable stamp of political and economic power" (Winner 1986, 27). Following Bernward Joerges' critique of what has become Winner's most eminent monograph, I wish to extend Winner's analysis from a matter social control and into the realm of technological and discursive performativity. Borrowing from actor-network theory, Joerges writes that "the power of things depends on how they are 'syntagmatically' networked with other things, in competition with paradigmatic counter-programmes of differently coupled actuants…it lies in their associations…the product of the way they are put together and distributed" (Joerges 1999, 414). Winner, Joerges argues, places the political agency of technological systems narrowly within either a discourse of control—"social order and disorder are presented as a result of intentional action"—or a counter-discourse of contingency—"social disorder and

order are not seen as the product of planful, intentional action, but as a result of a conjunction of consequences of action" (Joerges 1999, 422)—when he ought understand Moses's bridges, roads, and buildings and other built objects as "*phenomena* in the middle," or "boundary objects," that serve as "media of mediation, negotiation and translation between the reciprocal expectations and requirements of many people or organizations (and especially of those who represent them, who are authorized to speak for them)" (Joerges 1999, 424). "The power represented in built and other technical devices," Joerges concludes, "is not to be found in the *formal attributes of these things themselves*...[and] only their *authorization*, their legitimate representation, gives shape to the definitive effects that they may have" (Joerges 1999, 424).

As a technological system, the theory and practice of urban planning is unique, because it is both object and prescription at once. Urban planning has its professionals, its endowed authority, its rubrics and protocols, and its organizations and institutional knowledges. Yet, at the same time, planning is inherently discursive, forward-looking, and creative. Planning exists within an extant network of professional disciplines, while it is simultaneously a driving force in the arranging and distinguishing of other social networks far beyond the disciplinary field, and in no small part the defining of publics. Planning is both authorial and always already authorized, entangled in discourses stemming from early economic monopolization and political incumbency and entangling new politicized discourses about for whom public space is reserved and how citizenship is to be performed and acted. The sociophysical spaces of the city of Portland, the sidewalks, parks, plazas, bridges, buildings, the edifices of the city, are designed for a particular kind of resident. Overpasses are planned and built to facilitate commercial efficiency, not for places of residence, parks are for lunch breaks and not for drug use, sidewalks for public transit stops and not for panhandling. Indeed, Portland is unique in its celebration of urban design as a practice of building the city *for* people, with the replacement of car lanes with bike lanes, "grey infrastructure" with "living" buildings and "green streets," industrial expanses with parkland and wildlife corridors, as well as other recent city-sponsored programs to improve urban livability (City of Portland Bureau of Transportation 2010; Entrix 2009). The planners and urban developers that have earned Portland its international progressive reputation, precisely because of innovations like these, have also, deliberately or not, planned the city for the Portland progressive, at the exclusion of others. The infrastructural landscape of the city, as well as the written documents of planning, comprise a cultural text, "a metadiscursive notion, useful to participants in a culture as a way of creating an image of a durable shared culture immanent in or even undifferentiated from its ensemble of realized or even potential texts" (Silverstein and Urban 1996, 2). They are the concrete manifestations of shared

culture, whether voluntary or coerced, and constitute the terrain of the making of the public sphere.

In this sense, the planning discipline can be characterized by what Michel Callon terms an *agencement*, or *agencements*, "combinations of heterogenous elements that have been carefully adjusted to one another" and "endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their configuration." "This means there is nothing left outside of *agencements*," Callon suggests, "there is no need for further explanation, because the construction of its meaning is part of an *agencement*." Socio-technical *agencements*, like planning practices, Callon elaborates, "include the [prescriptions] pointing to [them], and it is because the former includes the latter that the *agencement* acts in line with the [prescriptions], just as the operating instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work" (Callon 2007, 320). *Agencements* are fundamentally performative, because they carry context within themselves and "To move a [prescription] from one spatio-temporal frame to another and for it to remain…capable of describing situations and providing affordances for them, the socio-technical *agencement* that 'goes with it' has to be transported as well…spread[ing] out and spread[ing] its world with it" (Callon 2007, 331), and opening new space for technical professionals, experts, and authorities to reify those worlds. The results of planning practices, then, are neither intentional nor obligatorily contingent on power and politics, but rather they are located in ideological worlds that are expansive and performative, subject *and* object to shifting authority, but nonetheless highly political. Planning discourses carry with them complete *agencements*, inscribing new meanings to existing contexts. I will argue that the anti-poverty work of organizations like Central City Concern discursively render deviance upon the bodies of the poor and homeless, and in the process recontextualize and justify their own practices to end homelessness.

The theoretical arc of the present study locates Portland's poor, homeless, pathological, or otherwise deviant population at odds with the ideological representations of Portland's public citizenry. The circulation of discursive practices by bureaucrats, social workers, politicians, and other social diagnosticians in their work as advocates for disenfranchised populations produces a public from which the very subjects of their attentions are excluded, reaffirming the political implications of "Portland Way" ideology and the stigmatization of social deviance. The performative capacities of urban planning and development are significant, because in the practices of designing the city, ideologies of the public sphere are discursively and physically inscribed on public space, creating public space at the expense of those who have been excluded from that very realm.

"Betwixt and Between": Liminal tenancy and ritual exclusion

Having provisionally theorized the relationship between public ideologies, political exclusion, and the discursive and performative practices of bureaucratic planning, we are left with the other half of the "development problematic." Discursive domination is multi-directional and intersubjective—that is to say, ideological knowledges exist insofar as they are enacted, inculcated, resisted, but performed in some capacity. The final theoretical argument I wish to make in this thesis is perhaps the most important. It is that regardless of the progressive and well-intentioned practices that have been employed by organizations like Central City Concern to ameliorate poverty, the poor as a category remain impoverished, excluded, and neglected, and those practices have discursively rendered an exclusionary public in which the poor have no place. Central City Concern's transitional housing programs, designed to fundamentally transform the lives of Portland's homeless, addicted, ravaged—or whatever pathology that can be identified—create "interstructural situation[s]" (Turner 1967, 93), where tenants are "betwixt and between" criminality and citizenship. This liminal space between underdevelopment and development is precisely the result of the kind of *work* that the discursive productions of the poor have performed. In necessitating a program for the incorporation of deviant subjects into the rank and file of acceptable public ideology, anti-poverty campaigns like those of Central City Concern have created spaces for new subject positions. Tenants in buildings managed by Central City Concern have not simply adopted ideological conformity—they have not been "transformed," to use Blackburn's recurring trope—but rather have become depoliticized in a different sense. Ferguson writes that "by reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of 'development' is the principle means through which the question of poverty is *de-politicized* in the world today" (Ferguson 1994, 256). Public housing projects like those managed by Central City Concern accommodate the political anxieties of the polity by depoliticizing and concealing deviance within institutional frameworks of care. Highly political questions, about the rights, citizenship, and legitimacy of the poor are discursively eclipsed, reframed into reformist teleologies, issues about which something can be *done*. At once, planning agencies have earned themselves a legitimate place, and systemic critiques of poverty and inequality have been tactfully elided. In discursively producing the poor as "becoming citizens," incomplete urban subjects, liminal tenants, the excluded are, in Barbara Cruikshank's words, "made to act" (Cruikshank 1999, 82) within domination. Produced as liminal subjects, public housing tenants are systematically refused the rights of full citizens and denied the services extended to other urban residents. As a result, tenants' claims for

protection, just treatment, and basic livability are mechanistically denied on the grounds that they do not constitute the public for whom those services are designed. It is not a matter of being heard—their concerns have been voiced innumerable times—but rather a matter of being included in the public sphere. I suggest that this is precisely the kind of discursive technique of government that, borrowing from Elizabeth Povinelli, the apparent "incommensurateness of liberal ideology and practice," the apparent disjunction between political progressivism and social exclusion and persecution, "is made to appear commensurate" (Povinelli 2001, 328).

A LOOK AHEAD

The ensuing chapters will trace a narrative of Portland's commitment to a livable city, beginning with the development of Portland's progressive establishment and following the institutionalization of a dominant political ideology through the disciplines of urban planning and poverty relief. The thesis will end in the single-room-occupancy hotels of downtown Portland, where the Portland variety of progressivism that has earned this city its reputation and the overt political exclusion of the poor are harmoniously manifest.

The first chapter is primarily historical. It will trace the development of a planning discourse through the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century in Portland, focusing on moments where planning practices have shifted, hardened, or been remade. Fundamental to the inquiry will be the question of the political agency of urban planning—that is, to what extent has urban planning functioned in defining the political ideologies of Portland, and in what ways. Drawing on theories of subjectivity, publics, and citizenship, it will be suggested that Portland's planning legacy has formatted a "Portland Way" that frames much of the political discourse of the city.

The second chapter will extend the first into a discussion about homelessness and urban poverty in Portland. The homeless, it is argued, defy notions of citizenship foundational to the "Portland Way," and as a result, are the subjects of extensive philanthropic and charitable programs. Portland's voluntary, non-profit sector has filled the void where federal and state welfare programs have been unable to provide services, and have adopted new ways of "ending homelessness." Central City Concern, one of Portland's more reputable service-providers, will be introduced to illuminate the nature of contemporary service provision, and the way homeless and poor subjects are incorporated into welfare programming.

The third, and final, chapter will draw from ethnographic research conducted during meetings conducted by tenants of Central City Concern affordable housing buildings. The purpose will be two-fold. First, it will tell the story of an oft-neglected and ignored group of

individuals fighting for basic livability. And second, it will characterize how these tenants fit into a larger bureaucratic apparatus that has little place for their concerns, or for systemic critiques of poverty, and will interrogate the discursive and non-discursive practices of government employed by Central Concern to reify the second-class status of public housing tenants.

1 THE GENEALOGY OF A PUBLIC

The year 2010 marks the thirtieth year since the last chapter in Portland's urban and land-use planning was written, codified, and shelved. Statewide legislation passed in the late-1970s and early-1980s requires municipalities throughout the state of Oregon to undergo a periodic review and to redraft planning programs every thirty years, reaffirming commitments to important governmental services like housing, urban development, economic growth, resource management, and civic involvement. In the fall of 2009, Portland City Council and the Bureau of Planning of Sustainability, along with a litany of other governmental and nongovernmental agencies, began in a series of citywide workshops the process of reinventing what is to be called the "Portland Plan," the latest version of Portland's comprehensive planning program. The process of revising Portland's urban planning programs had been initiated in the early summer of 2008, and had consisted of meetings with neighborhood organizations, a Leadership Summit in June, and two Community Summits later that month. In his introduction to the final workshop, held on December 15, 2009, in the University of Oregon building in Old Town, Mayor Sam Adams explained that these workshops are about "crowdsourcing" and about "groundtruthing"[6], "groundtruthing in the sense that we want your input about what we should be looking at, by the numbers, but also by non-, sort of, numeric, sort of, feedback, a sense of pulse of the city, and then crowdsourcing, which is idea generation, about what we should be doing, about the opportunities and challenges that we face as a city."[7] Preston Pulliam, president of Portland Community College, characterized the initial stages of the process as one of "visioning." It is about "creating a vision of long range," he says, "in terms of what would we want Portland to be twenty years from now...creating something that's, kind of, to take something that doesn't exist, or is invisible, and make it into something, to create something, and that's the exciting part of this."

These workshops constitute the fabric of Portland's commitment to civic involvement, how City Council and the governmental bureaus incorporate public opinion

---

[6] "Crowdsourcing" and "groundtruthing" are defined just as they are described by Mayor Adams. They comprise the contemporary political talk, the rhetoric, of civic engagement in politics.

[7] I attended the final workshop, held on December 15, 20098 at the University of Oregon building in Old Town, of the first of three planning phases of the Portland Plan. The three phases are designed to incorporate civic input at each step—that is, initial "visioning," area-specific brainstorming, and, finally, policy prescription—in the development of the Plan, which will serve as the definitive planning document for the next thirty years of the city. A video of the workshop can be found at http://www.portlandonline.com/portlandplan/index.cfm?c=51568& (accessed March 25, 2010).

into their work as political professionals. Andrew McGough of Worksystems, Inc.—one of the City of Portland's esteemed partners—proudly espouses that Portland is blessed with "a lot of really committed people and leader[s] that are interested in trying to do the right thing," and that occasions like these workshops are tremendous opportunities for "us in the business community, us in the non-profit sector, the government sector, to hear from the people about how we can do the right thing...and implement the great guidance that we're going to hear from you." Unlike earlier comprehensive plans that limited their scope to issues concerning infrastructure, the latest Portland Plan is holistic. "This effort, now," Adams indicates, "is about not only talking about infrastructure, like transportation and land-use, it's also, unlike 1980, about *people*." What this means is that planners are attempting an unprecedented level of collaboration, between the public and City Council, governmental and nongovernmental service providers, and the for-profit sector and the non-profit sector, marginalized communities and privileged communities. "There is no other city that we can find that has sought to do a strategic plan involving this level of complexity," Adams challenges, "but this is Portland, this is where we invent and reinvent good planning, so I'm convinced that we're up to this." This is Portland, a city well known nationally and internationally for its commitment to sustainability, prescient development, and innovative urban planning, and widely held as fronting a "revolution in the kind of ideas about how an American city might develop," how cities can become "good cities, that are pleasant, livable, and good for people" (Lay et al. 2009; Abbott 2001, 4; Abbott 1997, 12).

This first chapter will trace the genealogy of this reputation, focusing on the kinds of discursive techniques that have sculpted the way Portland's urban prescriptions have accompanied political ideologies of how urban space ought to function, how urban citizenship is manufactured and sustained, and how livability interacts with the economic imperatives of urban life. Over the course of Portland's twentieth century planning history, I wish to tell three interwoven, mutually-constituting narratives: first, how planning, in its various forms, became legitimate as *the* solution to providing necessary government services, ensuring an efficient business sector, supplying adequate housing, controlling urban blight, and guaranteeing a healthy city; second, how planning discourses ultimately defined a modernist-progressive public morality for Portland's sphere, separating competing claims to the city, and clarifying questions of urban membership and purpose; and third, how planning is actually performed and enacted, discursively and materially, through the functions of government, the private and voluntary sectors, engaged citizens, and other means. Implicit in these questions is the question, borrowing from Langdon Winner (1986), of whether ideological technologies like planning predominantly *affect* political context or *arise out* of existing political organization, and how power and authority is mediated through those

technologies. I will suggest that planning has indeed fabricated a particular kind of public realm that enables certain kinds of public action. It will be in contrast to this dominant form of citizenship that the following chapters will address issues of urban homelessness and the production of deviant bodies on the streets and within housing projects.

One Hundred Years of the City: Portland and its Planners through the Twentieth Century

That Portland was to be a deliberate, planned city was not always an inevitable fact. Urban development within the expanding city limits has been fragmented, often impulsive or reactionary, and far from the comprehensive strategy for which the city is now recognized. Portland's land-use and urban planning regimens have transformed throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, yet they have always relied upon the expertise of professional planners to guide the city through periods of growth and decline. Until the 1970s, urban planning in Portland was predominantly a practice of elite businessmen seeking to ensure economic stability and growth. The plazas, highways, and civic centers that successive planning documents prescribed were both the physical and symbolic edifices of economic power that reinscribed their roles as the leaders of the city, and, to a certain extent, legitimated precisely their own authority. As diagnosticians of urban problems, government leaders were likewise expected to provide adequate services for the urban population where they were otherwise lacking. Questions of poverty, housing, urban blight, parkland and spaces for recreation, development restrictions, and other city concerns were the tasks put to planners and powerful political bureaucrats. However, after Oregon ratified the land-use planning codes in the 1970s in response to unrestricted urban growth and development, neighborhood associations and other civic interest groups in Portland gained considerable legitimacy in planning for the city's future. This decentralizing shift in planning authority facilitated the rise in issue-specific nongovernmental organizations committed to providing important community-based services where the broad strokes of government were inadequate. Coupled with the nationwide withdrawal of federal welfare funding throughout the 1980s, much of the weight of service provision was ceded to a voluntary sector that worked closely, yet independently with city government. The rise in legitimacy of a pseudo-governmental bureaucratic structure devoted to urban planning and service provision fundamentally changed how the urban citizen could interact politically with a changing city. The decentralization of urban programming enabled a new form of governance in which citizens were both reformulated into active, involved, and political subjects, and were encouraged to self-manage through involvement with voluntary organizations committed to the city's future. Like Ferguson, I hope in this section to accomplish a kind of "genealogy of

'development"', and to interrogate how the dominant problematic of urban planning and development "work[s] in practice" and what kinds of effects it produces in the Portland social sphere (Ferguson 1994, xiv).

Turn of the Twentieth Century: the Lewis and Clark Exposition and the birth of a discipline

Urban planning first appeared in Portland as a viable practice in the years preparing for the centennial Lewis and Clark Exposition of 1905. From their first appearance in the national spotlight during the Exposition, Portland's promoters and civic icons have long appealed to the idea that Portland was to be the dominant metropolis of the American northwest. The Exposition was an important moment in reaffirming regional prominence, and as a result, it catalyzed, for the first time, a unified and collaborative commitment to urban planning amongst Portland's elite. The collective effort mustered by businessmen and political leaders in planning and carrying out the Exposition—which drew more than 1.5 million visitors over the course of its nearly five-month run—made political connections that would endure throughout the first part of the century, and planning for the city became an important project for the city's leaders. Abbott writes (Abbott 1983, 47) that "what brought this generation of civic leaders together on one project after another was the assumption that planning was properly organized by the substantial citizens of a city," and that there was to be "no clear distinction between public concerns and the interests of banks, landholders, utilities, and corporations." Affluent businessmen and their professional associates were understandably the primary drivers of urban planning and the physical growth of Portland throughout the first quarter-century of the 1900s, predominantly through private committees and semi-independent public commissions. "With minor variations," Abbott explains (Abbott 1983, 48), "their same role was apparent in the first steps towards a park system, the promotion of comprehensive urban design, the provision of harbor facilities, the response to the housing shortage of 1918, and the establishment of land-use planning and zoning as a municipal function," emphasizing the necessity of providing "opportunities for new profits without endangering old investments." It was here, in the years before and immediately after the Lewis and Clark Exposition, that the business sector acknowledged the possibilities of substantial urban planning, and where planning began to adopt a coherent economic foundation. As business leaders and politicians worked together on designing for a growing city, they became partners in a unified mission.

Growth and planning for a City Beautiful

In the years directly following the Exposition, Portland experienced a remarkable economic boom across nearly all sectors. Employment rates outpaced population growth well through the first decade of the twentieth century, and the sales of housing and construction permits, and consequently land values, soared, particularly in Portland's downtown west side districts. Those buildings that were built began to extend further in both the north and the south from Burnside Avenue, and they grew taller. Simultaneously, residential housing patterns changed, as Portland's growing Protestant middle-class purchased homes east of the Willamette River in greater and greater numbers, leaving close-in, downtown neighborhoods to the ethnically diverse[8] working-class and the palatial hills above to the city elites. By 1910, the population of the east side had grown fourfold, most of them single-family homeowners, and had easily surpassed census counts west of the river where divisions between the powerful elite of the city and the increasingly marginalized minority poor—downtown Portland was home to more than two-thirds of the entire city's black population and nearly all of its Asian-American population—were growing (Abbott 1983, 49-57).

Real estate growth, in addition to new business and transportation concerns in the already congested downtown area due to recent population growth, encouraged Portland's political elite within the business community to broach the issue of prescriptive urban planning. The dignified civic improvements forwarded by the City Beautiful Movement attracted Portland business leaders hoping to build on the blossoming cosmopolitan reputation they had earned in the organizing of the Lewis and Clark Exposition not ten years earlier, as did the potential to secure future investments in urban development and to guide the "geographical framework for private investment" (Abbott 1983, 59). Planning, for them, "would place no constraints on the development of private property, but a coherent city plan and the public investment that followed it would serve as persuasive suggestions to private developers" (Abbott 1983, 59).

Emerging nationally at the end of the nineteenth century, the City Beautiful Movement was itself a normative middle-class urban planning movement that was uninterested in changing the social fabric of cities but motivated to inspire civic virtue—in the poor, the uneducated, or the otherwise deviant—through urban cleanliness and an aesthetically pleasing built environment, synthesizing beauty and utility with notions of

---

[8] In the early 1900s, large populations of Chinese and Japanese immigrants settled just north of the downtown business district, and Italian, Jewish, Swedish, German, and Slavic communities formed scattered neighborhoods elsewhere throughout the inner Westside (Abbott 1983, 54).

environmentalism and civic evolution (Wilson 1989, 81-84, 95). Wilson writes that the essence and fervor of the movement was its forward-looking, imaginative "attempt to bridge the gap between desire and actuality" (Wilson 1989, 81) through motivated middle-class participatory politics in urban beautification—the city, Wilson suggests, was "the arena for the future" (Wilson 1989, 78-80). Initially fostered, though not necessarily sustained, by the work of John Olmsted[9]—who had visited Portland in 1903—City Beautiful rhetoric prescribed extensive, connected park systems, impressive neoclassical public buildings, civic cleanliness, and the enabling of commerce healthy for the city. The park system Olmsted recommended on his 1907 return to Portland, at the behest of city leaders, echoed much of that rhetoric (Abbott 1983, 60-61).

The City Beautiful Movement's closest approximant was, for Portland, the *Greater Portland Plan* drafted in 1912 by planner Edward Bennett, who had recently concluded work on the highly acclaimed *Plan of Chicago* (Abbott 1983, 62). Bennett's *Greater Portland Plan* located Portland's future in the context of reputable east coast cities like Boston, Philadelphia, and Savannah as well as older European cities that had undergone intentional planning under City Beautiful rubrics. Bennett understood the "organic city" as "not just a cluster of villages," but "wisely and economically builded" such that its "parts and activities" are "closely related and well defined" and "not conflicting"[10] (Portland City Planning Commission, Bennett, and Dana 1912, 5). The guiding principle of Bennett's plan was the need to design for a population of 2 million, and the *Plan* zealously espouses expansionist rhetoric appealing to Portland's projected growth and progress, and its inevitable subsuming of the suburbs.[11] Bennett writes that "not only is the city made a more desirable place in the present because of a plan, but generations to come will be immeasurably benefited and obligated to the public-spirited, well directed, energetically performed service of today" (Portland City Planning Commission, Bennett, and Dana 1912, 6). Bennett's plan gave

---

[9] John C. Olmsted and his brother Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., were the inheritors of their father's nationally recognized landscape architecture firm. The reputed Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., is perhaps the best known American landscape architect of the nineteenth century, and was among the first of American landscape architects to envision comprehensive park and boulevard systems for cities such as Boston, Chicago, and Buffalo. His firm also pioneered the practice employed by governments and city engineer's offices from then on of hiring outside planning consultants to solve urban problems. According to Wilson, the work of the Olmsted family was fundamental, though not necessarily commensurable, to the development of City Beautiful theory and practice (Wilson 1989, 10).

[10] This would ultimately preface what would become the theoretical framework for Park and Burgess of the Chicago school of urban sociology (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967).

[11] Bennett's plan followed many of Olmsted's recommendations, prescribing a radial-axial street layout for Portland's east side, a connected downtown parkway, neoclassical municipal buildings for civic offices and public services, and waterfront beautifications (Portland City Planning Commission, Bennett, and Dana 1912).

considerable weight to freight railroad and transportation interests, industries that were dominated by business elites, yet it held to a theoretical necessity of separating economic functions of the city to maximize efficiency. The "greatest commercial dominancy," Bennett maintained, "is secured through a combination of beauty and utility with the loss of nothing from either" (Portland City Planning Commission, Bennett, and Dana 1912, 36).

Despite the fact that it appeared at the moment of an economic downturn in 1914, and was ultimately doomed due to a lack of resources, Bennett's plan was easily approved in a city-wide referendum, and it set the stage for what would have been a "systematic coordination of capital spending" that "required the willingness on the part of all Portlanders to adapt the inevitable improvements necessarily made by the citizens or the municipality to the general scheme," and to consider both present and future needs of the city and its citizens (Abbott 1983, 66). Bennett and his advocates had successfully extended urban planning into the public purview, while retaining decision-making within the professional elite. The enduring relationships seeded in the planning of the Lewis and Clark Exposition the decade before served as the foundation for a new kind of urban politics in which the private and the public spheres worked together to prescribe the future of the city. Urban planning had become a legitimate use of public spending, well beyond what had before consisted exclusively of philanthropic donations from the affluent classes, and the planned, "organic city" became an ideal-type environment, one that would foster the best kind of virtue and citizenship. Urban planning would implicitly become a practice of defining the urban public, for whom urban space was to be designed, and for what kinds of activities. City Beautiful proponents like Bennett understood planning to be instrumental in the creation of the most functional city possible, a society of the future that broke with the haphazard polity of the present, urban philosophies that would reemerge again in the Modernist planning programs of the latter part of the century.

World War Two and the "City Practical"

By the latter half of the same decade in which Bennett presented his *Greater Portland Plan*, Portland's planning ethos had begun to reflect an enduring conflict nationwide between advocates of City Beautiful ideology and a burgeoning City Practical, a problem-oriented approach to city planning founded in quantitative civic engineering and metrics of efficiency. The outcome of Portland's version would become clear by the end of the First World War. As Wilson writes, the debate between the two planning disciplines "was less over two distinct approaches to planning—the aesthetic and the practical—and more about vocational and professional dominance, appeals to taxpayer's pocketbook, and bureaucratic control" (Wilson 1989, 3).

Portland's shipyards on the Willamette and Columbia Rivers surged to capacity during World War I, producing numerous sea-worthy boats for the war in Europe as well as a regional housing shortage that was making it difficult for industrial employers like Northwest Steel and Grant-Smith-Porter to maintain their workforce. In response to the housing crisis and concerns about sufficient wartime production promulgated by the Oregon State Council of Defense, planner Charles Cheney was hired to develop a comprehensive plan for the city that included public facilities, recreation, schools, and land development regulations (Abbott 1983, 72-76). Once again, Portland leaders drew from the national community of planning experts to design for their city. Cheney, with the help of the newly formed Housing Committee, proposed the construction of more than 2,000 cheap homes throughout the city to meet immediate housing needs for industry workers. Piecemeal, shoddy, and inadequate housing development allowed for the adoption in 1919 of what was already being conceived by business elites, a comprehensive, citywide zoning code designed to most effectively channel the shipbuilding boom's new residential growth. The establishment of an advisory Portland Planning Commission by mayor George Luis Baker, Cheney, and the City Council in the end of 1918 reflected the relatively recent phenomenon of institutionalizing urban planning as a solution for systematically dealing with urban growth (Abbott 1983, 78-79). It would not be the last time that a housing crisis spurred a planning imperative.

Cheney and the Planning Commission argued that urban zoning and control would stabilize and protect private property values and neighborhoods, prevent undue congestion of population, industry, and traffic, ensure better sanitary conditions and access to light and clean air, and to render possible great economies in infrastructure development, particularly street paving (Portland City Planning Commission 1919, 18). However, despite the backing of Mayor Baker and the business community, the Planning Commission's initial zoning plan[12] was met by bitter east side landowners concerned about infringements on their private property and investments. Abbott writes that while "voters had applauded the rhetoric of [Bennett's] *Greater Portland Plan*...it had lacked the tools for implementation." The "zoning and housing codes struck closer to home," on the other hand, because "the high level of home ownership that Portland boosters pointed to so proudly as an indicator of social stability also meant vigilant concern for the rights of private property" (Abbott 1983, 73-74,

---

[12] Cheney initially proposed a zoning code that would designate city lots as one of sixty-four permutations of type of land-use, building height, and area character, but was highly criticized on the grounds the creation of exclusive single-family areas—one of the Cheney's classifications—would inhibit potential profits to be earned in converting residential land to commercial use (Portland City Planning Commission 1919; Abbott 1983, 81-82).

87). The zoning code that ultimately prevailed after years of deliberation was weak, and did little to change the uneven development on Portland's east side. "Portland's first system of zoning," Abbott explains, "sanctioned and encouraged the existing division of land among economic functions and social classes." and "the use of only two residential zones and the uneven enforcement of the housing code were both intended to reinforce a distinction between newer and more spacious neighborhoods for the affluent and older, low-status neighborhoods with smaller houses and apartments" (Abbott 1983, 89-90). Second-class citizenship was delegated to predominantly poor, rented neighborhoods in North Portland and inner East Portland.[13]

Planning discourse underwent a fundamental shift in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Rhetoric of a City Practical espoused by Cheney and his contemporaries departed from the forward-looking, idealized, and socially comprehensive vision of their forbearers. Rather than prescribe a vision of the future, Cheney's Portland portfolio provided a "profile of the present," and provided the tools for his clients in the business sectors to accomplish their own goals, to provide for a public of laborers and not those of an imagined, politically conscious, and active public. Abbott explains that the differences between the two schools can be judged more in the strategies of implementation than in their content. "The creation of the Planning Commission and the adoption of zoning," Abbott writes, "showed that local government could influence growth patterns not only by its own investment but also by regulating private activity to the satisfaction of some citizens and the dismay of others." At the beginning of the decade, planning had been a practice of envisioning. By the end of the decade, those same individuals had acknowledged that planning was inevitably part of "the process of political bargaining and decisions" to get what they wanted (Abbott 1983, 91-92), generally at the defense of property and investment. The City Practical stripped urban planning of its innate creativity; it had become "strategic," (de Certeau 1984, 35), part of the practice of delimiting control over space, and, as in Cheney's zoning codes, exclusionary. The introduction of the automobile the following decade would only extend the disciplinary departure from the City Beautiful.

Traffic and Rule of Property

The rise of the automobile as the standard form of transportation in the 1920s and 1930s significantly altered understandings of the urban landscape, particularly for planners, as accessibility to urban centers and public services no longer consisted of access to streetcar

---

[13] These neighborhoods include Corbett, Sellwood, Sunnyside, Sabin, Albina, Woodlawn, Kenton, and St. Johns (Abbott 1983, 90).

lines and became less a matter of geographic proximity.[14] Increased traffic to downtown Portland was growing into an issue of congestion, and growth on the fringes of the city where property was cheaper was raising concerns about the extent of urban sprawl. As a result, the Planning Bureau of the City Club of Portland[15] claimed, in their 1921 report entitled *City Plan of the West Side Flat of Portland*, that "city planning's great function is to diagnose the traffic troubles and indicate the best means of correcting them" (City Planning Bureau of the City Club of Portland 1921, 10). In the years following the First World War, planning would become for the first time a practice of diagnosis and treatment, in which city problems could be identified by practiced technicians and assimilated appropriately. Implicit would become the assumption of the city as an economic unit, facilitated by necessary infrastructure development, and sustained by automotive commerce.

In their report, the City Club outlined the ideological framework of contemporary urban planning in a critique unusual for the elite civic organization. In response to the City Practical ideology inherited from the Cheney years, the report explained that Portland civic engineers and planners had problematically adopted "a custom of a circumscribed process having regard primarily to local circumstances and personal benefits, and only incidentally to the requirements of a large city as a basic motive of the city plan." As a result, the City Club argued, urban development had up to that point consisted of the indefinite "aggregation of a standardized minor unit"—"each joining another and having basic concern with property ownership bounds rather than regional requirements"—and too often a "slavish adherence to a system" to be followed "when reason and circumstance cried out for a variation to be made." The report continues:

> With time, an approximation of standards in dimensions was adopted for streets, blocks and lots, and so long as the local custom is regarded to the satisfaction of an official, who never may have seen the site and have no topographic information upon which to form a judgment of the plan's fitness, the customary procedure is to have the plan approved...applying with rigidity, standards that were often ill suited to the plan or site, and often without knowledge of either planning principles or proficiency in their use...[Attention in planning] was given only to private advantage to be gained by conforming to a plan

---

[14] It might be noted, on the other hand, that the automobile ameliorated classed access to downtown.

[15] City Club of Portland is a civic organization that seeks to "inform members and the community in public matters, and to arouse in them the realization of the obligations of citizenship." Historically, the Club has generally been made up of white, politically-reformist, and affluent men interested in cultivating civic virtue, character, and political training, and has worked closely with "high-purposed" organizations in the public and voluntary sectors to ensure a better Portland. In their weekly public, albeit ticketed, forums, citizen-based research reports, and other programs, City Club has sought to inform and engage its members and the greater Portland community in the civic affairs of the city. (http://www.pdxcityclub.org, accessed April 20, 2010).

> that may have little, if any, reference to the future city. (City Planning Bureau of the City Club of Portland 1921, 7-8)

In its recommendations for future planning, the City Club argued that city planning is at its very essence an "economic problem"—that is, how the greatest revenue can be earned from a particular piece of property and how to prevent depreciation. Essential to efficacious city planning, then, is to "offer a presentation of the essential facts bearing upon the existing plan" and "then to make such deductions as are warranted and thereupon, to define the problem and offer a plan for its solution" (City Planning Bureau of the City Club of Portland 1921, 12). That solution, then, is city planning's "great function," to design streets and infrastructure that understand traffic as "a moving mass intent upon passing" and the "effect of the people composing the mass upon the business conducted on the improved property abutting the passageways"—traffic, for the planner, has much to do with property valuation (City Planning Bureau of the City Club of Portland 1921, 18). The automobile expanded the imaginable horizons of the city, extending the scope of planning into a technological sphere that extended the scope of the City Practical. While property values were an important part of the zoning process, Cheney and the practitioners of the early City Practical were unable to recognize the important role of traffic, in people, automobiles, and commodities, in protecting and enhancing the economic interests of the city. The regional "requirements" of the city were necessarily infrastructural, required the expertise of civil engineers, and recognized civic actors in terms of economic potential. The materiality of planning, the highway interchanges, bridges, and street layouts, what Joerges would call the "boundary objects" of technological systems, are the sites upon which authority is asserted (Joerges 1999, 424). After the introduction of the automobile and the expansion of the city's purview, planning became the justification and the solution for the economic aspirations of the city, assigned by political elites like City Club and others.

Throughout the later 1920s, planning in Portland was conducted rather independently by the city public works department and under the agenda of Olaf Laurgaard, the city engineer. The city council felt little pressure from the disorganized Planning Commission, which had offered little in the way of new ideas for city development since the passing of the 1924 zoning codes (Abbott 1983, 97). City planning had become, discursively and politically, a matter of problem-solving, something best left to experts. In Foucault's rubrics (1973), the discipline had become "rarefied," delimited to within a particular professional discourse and horizon of truth. Abbott writes that "Portland planners reacted to the challenges of automobility by redefining their professional task," and "the working definition of their job changed from urban design to traffic engineering" (Abbott 1983, 95, 122). Earlier in the decade, the hiring of Cheney had been stimulated by a wartime housing

crisis and rising concern for workers' standards of living, despite that his legacy remains only in street planning and land-use zoning. By the 1930s, the Planning Commission had become accustomed to ignoring Portland's housing and social service advocates, and had "pinned its hopes on an expert who had consciously excluded social welfare from the purview of master planning" (Abbott 1983, 122). Altogether, planning was scattered and impulsive, and lacked the comprehensive vision that earlier planners had espoused. The City Club report contained neither the idealisms of Edward Bennett nor the overt selfishness of Charles Cheney. The underlying ideologies of urban planning prescriptions, rather, were becoming shrouded in the engineered practicality of infrastructure development.

Throughout the 1930s, the Planning Commission experienced a short resurgence under the leadership of Ormond Bean, who sought to mend ties and cooperate with neighborhood associations in down-zoning particular regions and creating needed low-rent housing. The passage of the New Deal's U.S. Housing Act of 1937 gave Portland the option of establishing a public housing authority to coordinate the development of public housing, but extensive campaigning by conservative city councilmembers—public housing was "unadulterated communism, they argued—and an overwhelming vote in November 1938 crushed any possibility of its creation, reifying, once again, the ideology of the City Practical (Abbott 1983, 116-117). Until the Second World War, the limited functions of urban planning were decided by a small business-dominated political sphere. After the abandonment of the City Beautiful aspirations held at the turn of the century, planning had become part and parcel of a political process designed to facilitate economic growth within the city, any claims to the city were fundamentally economic claims—moral expectations of civic virtue had all but vanished behind the new citizenship of capital within the city.

World War Two, Vanport, and the Crisis of Housing

As it did during the First World War, Portland experienced extraordinary growth during World War Two, in no small part due to the shipbuilding industries nestled upon the banks of the Willamette and the Columbia Rivers. Portland was the most important center for merchant shipping on the west coast, and it became an important Lend-Lease supply point for equipment shipments to the Soviet Union during the war. The shipbuilding and maritime boom meant for Portland during the early 1940s a significant population influx, particularly in young families and young single men arriving to work in the shipyards. Changing urban demographics placed new stresses upon public infrastructure and services, and it became apparent that existing schools, public transit, and available housing—public and private—were undeniably inadequate. Growth in 1941 alone equaled that of the previous decade, and in 1942 housing vacancy rates touched 0.5 percent. In response to the

wartime housing crisis, the Planning Commission spent the latter part of 1941 drafting plans for improved street access to the North Portland factories and shipyards, in addition to the siting of what would become Columbia Villa, Portland's first public housing project, consisting of more than four hundred permanent apartment units. By the end of the year, the City Council had created the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) to replace the Planning Commission as the foremost civic board on public housing, appealing to the war effort to convince political conservatives like the newly appointed public works commissioner William Bowes who had little patience for administrative "excess baggage" like public housing (Abbott 1983, 126-132).

As the war progressed, the housing shortage continued to intensify, and despite the Housing Authority's attempts to match population growth by constructing large housing developments and redeveloping vacant lots throughout the city, by mid-1942 the nearly 5,000 units under construction drew the attention of the concerned U.S. Maritime Commission and shipyard bosses. Perturbed that workers were once again leaving the region because of insufficient housing, Edgar Kaiser, partner in the dominant Kaiser maritime construction empire, met unbeknownst to the city council or the Planning Commission with the Maritime Commission to contract the construction of Vanport, what was to be the largest wartime public housing project in the United States.

Sited to the north of Columbia Boulevard and west of what is now Interstate Avenue, Vanport's 9,942 buildings housed nearly 10,000 people, in addition to comprehensive public services, and was the most ambitious public housing experiment to date. Managed and maintained by the Housing Authority and its executive director Harry Freeman,

> [Vanport] most closely resembled the corporation company town of an earlier era. Only now the town operator was HAP, in cooperation with the United States government. There was no mayor, council, court, or any other aspect of city government. There were no taxes, nor was there a single homeowner. Community business and civic organizations were sparse; HAP either furnished community services or contracted their operation out to others—as in the case of police protection, schools, and commercial facilities. So HAP ran a huge quasi-business-governmental operation with a potential income of almost four-and-one-third million dollars from apartment rentals and more from business rentals. (Maben 1987, 33)

As a short-term solution to a wartime housing crisis, Vanport introduced to Portland a new kind of "expanded governmental housing activity" (Maben 1987, 61).

The housing crisis of World War Two was for Portland an almost contradictory experiment in public housing. Vanport was enabled by a combination of the inaction of a crippling civic bureaucracy, the extrapolitical maneuvering of a very powerful industry elite,

and a wartime imperative backed with considerable money from Washington, D.C. Management of Vanport gave the Housing Authority considerable political power in the face of a city council that was ideologically opposed to using taxpayers' money on public housing projects. Abbott explains that not only did Vanport provide housing to more people than ever before in a public housing project, it also transformed the Housing Authority "from a planning agency to a real estate management organization" (Abbott 1983, 135). During the war, the Housing Authority consisted of "several patriotic, dedicated men of great financial and administrative ability" who, "coming from and representing private interests...operated at a time when federal government control was not so fully established" (Maben 1987, 61). These were the men that introduced ideologies of public welfare and state-sponsored housing to the public realm in Portland, and, perhaps unusually, from the private sector of wartime industry. The war gave public housing a moral authority that had not existed in Portland politics, and one that came not from the liberal housing lobby that had been intent upon preventing housing and zoning codes from solely representing the interests of real-estate developers during the 1930s, but from some of those very same real-estate developers.

Furthermore, the process for decision-making and the ultimate implementation of Vanport City is revealing. The Portland Planning Commission, it became painfully apparent, had little political power or agency, suffocated by conservative voices on the City Council and the newly formed Housing Authority. More importantly, businessmen like the Kaisers and other industrial and construction bosses demonstrated little hesitation in bypassing formal planning and civic institutions to accomplish their development goals—in response to criticisms of Vanport by the Chamber of Commerce in 1942, Housing Authority executive director Harry Freeman replied that "only site planning and ground layout were left to local architects and engineers" (Maben 1987, 6). Wartime housing was the first instance in Portland where private sector effectively supplanted governmental welfare programs. Affordable housing management was bureaucratized and contracted, and organizations like the Housing Authority were granted considerable political sovereignty and clout. Despite the fact that the political power achieved during the war receded in the post-War years, it is important that it was the private- and semi-public sectors that had intervened during a period of crisis where government was unable. The efficacy of nongovernmental organizations presaged the rise of a voluntary sector that would emerge in the latter half of the century. Abbott explains that Portland's wartime planning necessarily legitimated "quick and pragmatic action" on behalf of powerful city actors, and "just as the pressures of the political environment helped to create particular sorts of institutions, the institutions were themselves favorable to certain goals and concepts" (Abbott 1983, 142). Wartime planning reified what had become a logic internal to Portland's planning community, that practical

plans, drawn by reputable experts and executable through known civil engineering techniques, were the tailored prescription to particular urban *problems.*

The Postwar Years: The Portland Development Commission, the rise of the neighborhood, and a return to Downtown

In the years after the war and throughout the mid-century, the failure of bureaucratic planning structure was made clear in Portland, as was the reluctance of political and business elites to adopt meaningful, long-term social programs as part of the urban vision. The period was one of high political incongruity and turnover, and as a result, few development proposals made it past initial quarrelling between various civic commissions and city council, let alone to public referendum. Blame for the destruction of Vanport in May 1948 by massive flooding was deferred to the Army Corps of Engineers—"the housing authority feels terribly, terribly bad that lives possibly were lost," Housing Authority lawyer Lester Humphreys admitted, "but all you can do is depend on the advice of competent engineers" (Maben 1987, 125)—and the Housing Authority filed a demurrer of immunity, effectively ending all reparations lawsuits. Recommendations made by the Housing Authority and the Planning Commission in 1950 for the construction of 2,000 low-income housing units under the U.S. Housing Act of 1949 was defeated in a public referendum, and while some former Vanporters moved into other Housing Authority projects, many were left to find housing in a racially-segregated, competitive private sector, particularly blacks for whom public housing was even more of a rarity (Abbott 1983, 158; Tsalbins 2007, 71). After political disagreements led to the failure of two significant redevelopment projects forwarded by the Housing Authority in the early 1950s—the northwest "Vaughn Street redevelopment" and a 1,000-unit city-wide affordable housing proposal forwarded by HAP executive director Floyd Ratchford—the Housing Authority had lost all political influence it had managed to maintain after Vanport.

The newly elected mayor Terry Schrunk, concerned that the lack of downtown investment was encouraging outmigration to the suburbs, sought to boost urban development. Enlisting Planning Commission director Lloyd Keefe and John Kenward, Santa Barbara's planning director, Schrunk went to City Council in 1958 with plans to remove urban renewal programs from the Planning Commission to a new planning agency, and upon approval by a slight referendum, set to appointing the Portland Development Commission from leaders in Portland's business community, in particular Ira Keller of the Western Kraft Corporation (Abbott 1983, 160-172). Throughout the 1960s, the Portland Development Commission was the voice of urban planning, "pointedly ignoring other planning entities"—the Planning Commission, chairman Fred Rosenbaum lamented, "didn't

get the time of day" (Abbott 1983, 172). The Portland Development Commission eagerly adopted an urban renewal program not unlike that put forth in Portland by Robert Moses two decades earlier, crafting development plans that would promote a downtown commercial core, maintain downtown property values, and increase attractiveness for business investment by eliminating or cleaning up the transitional fringe neighborhoods in southwest Portland. Once again, traffic and access to low-cost land for developers were the preferred tactics to ensure the primacy of the central city. In May 1958, voters approved the Development Commission's South Auditorium project, and by 1961 83.5 acres housing more than 2,300 middle- and working-class individuals were cleared for the construction of new businesses and light industry, in addition to motels, warehouses and parking lots designed to serve downtown offices. By 1965, another 75 acres was appended to the initial South Auditorium, making room this time in part for the expansion of Portland State University (Abbott 1983, 213-214).

Planning ideology at the end of the 1960s understood city growth as a *natural* expansion from the urban core, with business and new development subsuming existing neighborhoods as they grew, that justified urban renewal on the fringes of urban areas and a kind of "trickle-down" housing policy. Proponents of projects like the South Auditorium and the failed Lair Hill redevelopment[16] sought to address issues of urban blight from their role as experts or diagnosticians, and unsympathetic to those occupying the transitional and blighted neighborhoods under question. In a report outlining their Community Renewal Program, the Planning Commission characterized urban blight as symptomatic, "the end product of a long, slow process of erosion" that can start with isolated problems, "a congested intersection, the construction of an undesirable building, a school becoming obsolete," or more systematic processes of the "the gradual aging of structures, the encroachment of a new land-use type, [or] the infiltration of auto traffic." Blight, the report explains, appears "unobtrusively and develops at a pace noticeable to only the most alert observer," the expert trained in diagnosis, and it is dynamic, spreading and worsening, "aggravat[ing] human misery," "caus[ing] eruption of social disorder," and "undermin[ing] an entire city's wealth, beauty and reason for being," until total clearance of an area may be "the only feasible solution." Living with blight, they argue, is no more sensible than living

---

[16] Lair Hill, a neighborhood just south of downtown Portland, was considered among the most blighted on Portland's west side, and was slated in 1970 by the Portland Development Commission for "clearance type urban renewal," to be redeveloped as elderly housing and apartments for Portland State University students. Residents of Lair Hill formed the Hill Park Association in opposition and delayed the project until the following year, at which point current Mayor Schrunk's term had expired and President Nixon's urban renewal funding was suspended, effectively eliminating the project (Abbott 1983, 184)

"with a toothache"; rather, the "problems must be solved," and unless new renewal efforts appear rapidly, "the best way to catch up with blight"—which far outpaced renewal work, they argue—"and then keep the blighting forces in check, is to accelerate urban renewal action" (Portland City Planning Commission 1967, 9-11). Discourses of blight circulated by the Portland Development Commission effectively characterize the city as an infected body, invaded by the pathogenic and epidemic ravages of urban degradation, and desperate of therapy. Planning Commission documents make little or no reference to residents of neighborhoods prescribed for urban renewal, nor are those residents included in the production of those prescriptions. In the case of the Albina Neighborhood Improvement Program on the east side, the Keller-Kenward-led Portland Development Commission ignored opinions of the predominantly black neighborhoods slated for removal and relocation and carried on with clearing and ultimate construction of Emanuel hospital (Abbott 1983, 188-189). Not unlike those displaced after Vanport's destruction, black residents in particular found it very difficult to assimilate into the private housing market or new Housing Authority projects under construction. Removal, demolition and relocation, for urban renewal advocates, were the absolutely necessary consequences of removing the problems of blight—removing blighted structures was, the report indicates, a "fundamental task of the renewal program" (Portland City Planning Commission 1967, 81)—and little in the reports indicates that relocated residents are not similarly indicated in diagnoses of blight. As a result, those residents are cast in planning literature as pathogenic to appropriate urban development, polluting "matter out of place" in Douglas' (1966) words. The Urban Renewal projects proposed by the Portland Development Commission were perhaps the most overt in Portland's recent history in their marginalization minority neighborhoods, and they were the first to pathologize minority populations from discipline of urban planning. This practice, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, still remains, though the institutional frameworks for its implementation have significantly changed.

The Portland Development Commission's renewal projects caused the eruption of neighborhood associations across the city, particularly in the stopover neighborhoods most implicated in renewal planning. The late-1960s and early 1970s saw the "emergence of active and often angry neighborhood organizations" that made local residents who expressed "very different values than those held by the staff and commissioners of central planning agencies," the "actors rather than the objects in neighborhood decisions," and they transformed both the resulting civic plans and the processes by which they were created (Abbott 1983, 190). Projects such as Southeast Uplift, Model Cities in northeast Portland, and programs of the Northwest District Association gave new agency to neighborhood organizers. In 1968, the Model Cities planning initiative, while receiving specific expertise

from the Development Commission, established a Citizen's Planning Board that had veto power made up of exclusively of neighborhood residents, and in December of that year the program drafted a *Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan* that severely incriminated the Multnomah County Public Welfare Commission, the public school board, and the Development Commission, among other city agencies, on accounts of racial discrimination. In northwest Portland, the Northwest District Association (NWDA)—originally created by the Development Commission to meet citizen input requirements—split with the PDC in 1969 in vehement opposition to the proposed development plan by the Good Samaritan Hospital. Arguing that City Council should not apply urban renewal policies without a comprehensive development plan for the area, the NWDA halted the hospital program, and by 1975 had drafted its own development plan and had reviewing authority for any new development that failed to meet its policy recommendations (Abbott 1983, 197-198). These and other neighborhood organizations and associations exhibited considerable power where it had not existed before, and were able to make claims to and participate in the circulation of discourses about urban development.

These changes would prove formative in the reorienting of urban policy during the 1970s, and would fundamentally change how civic engagement in politics was understood and accommodated. Urban planning in Portland had been, until the 1970s, a strategy enlisted almost exclusively by economic and civic elite to make Portland an efficient city that was tailored for growth. Through both world wars, industry required appropriate planning to accommodate population influxes, and because government planning agencies were generally mired in bureaucratic inefficacy, business generally defined how the city was to respond, often drawing upon the expertise of trained planning professionals. Civic input in planning measures was minimal, as were the moral appeals first displayed in the City Beautiful years of Charles Bennett—urban planning was planning for commerce, with "trickle-down" benefits for the rest of society. The proven legitimacy of organized citizens demonstrated in response to urban renewal programs upset the elite monopoly of urban planning decisions the discipline had enjoined since its beginnings. Coupled with the recent passage of land-use planning legislation in Salem, it was in this moment that a new progressivism was beginning to emerge in Portland, as did a new set of discursive tools with which to talk about the city.

Towards a "livable" city: Metro, the Urban Growth Boundary, and the making of the United States' greenest city

In his oft-quoted speech on land-use planning to the Oregon Legislature in January of 1973, governor Tom McCall passionately condemned the "grasping wastrels of the land"

that were compromising Oregon's environmental beauty through "chain-letter growth," and he decried the "shameless threat" to "our environment and our whole quality of life," the "unfettered despoiling of the land," the "sagebrush subdivisions, coastal condomania, and ravenous rampages of suburbia" that "threaten[ed] to mock Oregon's status as the environmental model for the nation" (McCall 1973). McCall's governorship, and to a certain extent Neil Goldschmidt's mayoralty in Portland, marked the beginning of a period with a new ideological and moral base for questions of metropolitan land-use planning. Faced with rampant land speculation in peri-urban areas, the widespread destruction of farmland and forested land, and the rapid privatization of natural areas, McCall's tenure as governor founded a new paradigm of land-use planning that "called Oregonians to renew their covenant with the land," and "invoked moral standards that should cause evildoers to feel *shame* for their actions" (Abbott 2002, 208). McCall's invocation of ethics, even biblical ethics, reintroduced what had long been absent from approaches to planning: a populist vision.

Senate Bill 100, McCall's strongest legacy, was signed into law in May 1973 and was the first statewide land-use planning legislation in the United States. Senate Bill 100 amended Senate Bill 10, enacted in 1969,[17] and established a Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) to oversee the local implementation of the law's prescriptions and to coordinate statewide land-use planning between urban and rural areas (Whitman et al. 2009). Politically, the bill was a firm departure from what had become the standard sprawling development practices of cities across the nation, including Portland and its rapidly growing urban area. The automobile had in Portland permitted the rapid growth of suburban areas at the metropolitan fringes, and as a result, the downtown region was undergoing significant economic decline. Renewal projects like those of the Portland Development Commission sought to revitalize the faltering urban core, but lucrative development opportunities in adjacent cities like Troutdale, Gresham, Sherwood, Tigard, Hillsboro, and Vancouver, Washington, drew potential investments and growth away from Portland. Senate Bill 100 would become, for Portland and for much of Oregon, the intervention that would transform this process of sprawl that has by now become ubiquitous with a growing American West into a fundamentally novel approach to urban growth. This

---

[17] Senate Bill 10, and its successor Senate Bill 100, required all cities and counties in Oregon to prepare comprehensive land-use plans and zoning guidelines in accordance with ten broad goals determined in the bill. These were expanded to nineteen by the recess of the 1978 legislative session, and included provisions for agricultural and forestry zoning, conservation of wild spaces, environmental quality standards, transportation and public infrastructure, energy conservation, coastal preservation, and civic involvement (Abbott 1994a, 209-303).

change would become most symbolic in Goal Fourteen of McCall's legislation, which mandated the creation of urban growth boundaries in larger metropolitan areas like Portland and its surrounding cities to regulate development and curb the destruction of agricultural and forested land. The bill argued that maintaining rural lands in close proximity to vibrant urban centers was essential to maintaining regional economic stability, protecting urban investments and rural livelihoods, and ensuring adequate environmental quality and beauty (Nelson 1994, 26; Macpherson and Hallock 1973).

Since the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) had formed in Portland during 1958 explicitly to make use of federal funding available under the Housing Act of 1954, Portland's political focus had already been shifting, albeit slowly, towards a more comprehensive regional coherence, seeking to include Clackamas and Washington Counties in planning considerations. Ultimately accomplishing little more than research, the Metropolitan Planning Commission served as a forum for regional leaders in business, planning, and politics to discuss the possibilities for regional coordination. It was, however, short-lived, and when in 1966 both the Federal Highway Administration and Department of Housing and Urban Development threatened to rescind federal grant money to the Commission unless at least ninety percent of metropolitan residents were represented in voluntary elections of public officials, a new Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG) that included areas of Columbia County and Clark County, Washington, emerged to replace it. Designated to "recognize policies and plans of member agencies [and] revise proposals to eliminate local objections," CRAG was also largely ineffective as a coordinating planning agency, despite increased federal funding, because it was unable to develop plans that overrode those of counties (Abbott 1983, 241-242). Initial regional attempts at collaboration were unable to effect significant change due to funding restrictions and the entrenched power of developers and civil engineers and planners unwilling to compromise their motives.

Senate Bill 100 and its amendments, on the contrary, introduced a new moment in which regional planning was not only encouraged, but required by law. The bill institutionalized the creation of the Portland-area Metropolitan Service District within a prescribed urban growth boundary, effectively bolstering the political legitimacy of CRAG in making regional decisions. The election of Portland Mayor Neil Goldschmidt in 1973 similarly marked the new political tone within Portland City Council. Goldschmidt, a former civil rights lawyer and community organizer with only sixteen months' experience in Portland politics, sought to eliminate the political boundaries that had suffocated the various civic planning bodies throughout the previous decade, establishing a Office of Planning and Development (OPD) that would serve as a coordinating umbrella organization for the

Development Commission, the Housing Authority, the Planning Commission, and the Bureau of Buildings. Goldschmidt also shifted the focus of city planning during his term from public investment in highways to investment in regional public transit, establishing in 1974 the Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District (Tri-Met). Concerns about urban air quality, lack of parking spaces, and the growth of the suburban areas concerned powerful economic actors and residents of Portland alike, and Goldschmidt's new planning emphasis on bringing regional growth, which had faltered during the postwar years, back to the urban core was well appreciated on both sides of the political spectrum (Abbott 1983, 257-263). Goldschmidt entered the Portland political sphere during an era of "urban crisis," in which the legitimacy of established methods of urban growth were both unpopular and ineffective at maintaining the city as a growing regional economic hub.

Under the Office of Planning and Development, ideological understandings of urban renewal shifted from controlling and fixing blight to recognition and preservation of older, unique neighborhoods like Lair Hill, which had been identified by the Development Commission for complete renovation (Abbott 1983, 185). Understandings of the urban blight as a kind of social infection had gone too far in their overt racism and elitism, and programs for addressing urban decline adopted the hue of a new kind of urban replacement—gradual gentrification. The historic preservation of old neighborhoods, particularly those in North Portland and between downtown and the west hills such as Corbett, Lair Hill, Goose Hollow, and Northwest, effectively displaced many ethnic and minority communities over the course of the following decades (Abbott 2001, 148; Coalition for a Livable Future 2007).

At the beginning of his second year in office, Goldschmidt created an Office of Neighborhood Associations in response to Goal Fourteen of Senate Bill 100 which required the establishment of an official process for civic involvement in planning, scripting the "right of opportunities for comment" and for public "notification of planning processes and development proposals" into the city code and effectively institutionalizing citizen input in planning procedures (Odell 2004, 67)—neighborhood associations had already gained significant influence in politics due to the Keller-Kenward urban renewal polices of the decade before. The Office of Neighborhood Associations was also to serve as a clearinghouse between concerned communities and City Council (Abbott 1983, 205), and it was meant to be instrumental in the manufacturing of a public political consensus that would reflect the concerns and demands of a politically active resident population.[18]

---

[18] Many neighborhood activists saw the establishment of the Office of Neighborhood involvement as a co-opting of what was a highly successful, confrontational, grassroots organizing movement (Abbott 1983, 205).

CRAG was finally merged in 1978 by referendum into a single Metropolitan Service District (Metro) endowed with expanded governmental power and constituted by directly elected officials from each metropolitan district, and support for the measure, rather unusually, came from both urban and suburban areas, urban areas expecting to gain increased regional influence and outer areas hoping for protections against zealous Portland politicians. Structural changes in the fundamental format of government and its jurisdiction transformed politics from what had been an elite caucus concerned with economic growth into a regionally accountable, significantly regulatory, and environmentally and socially conscious practice of democratic participation. Urban and land-use planning had facilitated a transformation in the ways government was expected to function, and its implicit progressivism and its claim to civic virtue discursively remade Portland as a city that planned for people, at least rhetorically, as well as for economic growth. Yet, while the structural changes brought on by the 1970s and onward changed the political climate, much of what characterized planning throughout the first part of the century still remains in practice.

THE "PORTLAND WAY": PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE, POPULAR ENGAGEMENT, AND CIVIC GOVERNMENTALITY

Abbott writes that "Portland is one of the few cities where the "'growth machine' business leadership of the 1950s made a graceful transition to participation in a more inclusive political system" (Abbott 2001, 142). It was out of the resulting "mobilization of the open-minded middle" that the political progressivism that constitutes Portland's contemporary political ideology emerged, a progressivism that maintained the social and structural fabric of opportunity, power, and citizenship within the city while transforming the discursive political practices that sustained them. Land-use planning after the 1970s was framed about a discourse of rational morality, in which the historically leftist concerns with environmentalism, regulation of growth, and political equality were recast into moralizing discourses about the cultivation of good citizenship and honorable ethics. Abbott explains that Portland, in particular, "frustrates market conservatives not only because they think the UGB [and other liberal, regulatory statues are] misguided and self-defeating, but because its regional planning advocates have more effectively staked the claim to virtue," and they have "captured the classic conservative value of civil community, arguing that the urban growth boundary promotes the virtues of moderation (carefully planned growth) in contrast to the

---

The ONA would later become the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, which will feature in the third chapter.

vice of greed, and the values of public interest against liberal individualism" (Abbott 2002, 231).

This sort of recontextualization, Holston argues, is the great feat of Modernist planning, in which "an imagined future is posited as the critical ground in terms of which to evaluate the present" (Holston 1989, 9). Modernist programs like that adopted by Portland over the following decades reframe issues of property rights, political freedom, and equality—many of the concerns held by opponents to Senate Bill 100—as rather the failure "to plan cities according to the requirements and consequences of the machine and [Capitalist] industrial production" (Holston 1989, 43), dehistoricizing the present for a new ideological future in which cities are planned with civic virtue in mind. As a result, because comprehensive land-use planning programs like those in Oregon are understood to be designed for "the benefit of mankind," the "cradle for a new society," state seizure of land, regulation of land-use, and bureaucratization of the political process are justified to that end (Holston 1989, 21). McCall's moral invocations are precisely kinds of statements that justify techniques such as urban growth boundaries as in the interest of the public will.

In this sense, progressivism laid claim to a public in limbo, in which the discursive authority of the powerful Portlanders that had to that point crafted the models of citizenship was weakened, and was forced to adapt to the new claims of an empowered and politicized resident population. Part of that process was reorienting the discipline of planning within a new political framework in which urban development and social programs could not be justified solely on the grounds of capital, and that any new program would need to be founded upon a public consensus. The progressive-Modernist turn, however, allowed for existing ideologies to be recontextualized within new political apparatuses. What this meant for Portland was a new form of governance, a bureaucratization of the public sphere that could appeal through legitimate channels to a politicized public while allowing government to continue functioning.

Abbott suggests that because "an ideological consensus about regional growth policy has therefore developed in parallel with the regional political coalition," Metro's bureaucratized commission form of governance in nested layers of representational democracy is well-situated to serve as mediator between elected officials and concerned citizens (Abbott 2002, 229), precisely *through* these planning practices of civic input. The planning process, systematized through expectations of civic participation, land-use preservation, and discursive loyalty to the Portland Way, serves as the "regulatory mechanism through which competing interests are mediated" (Odell 2004, 73) and as the site at which certain discourses of civic life are legitimized and others are discarded.

Economic development and urban development were, from very early on, part of the same political agenda, and general participation was until recently hardly an afterthought. Judith Kenny, in an analysis of Portland's 1976 *Comprehensive Plan,* argues that contemporary land-use planning has foundations in two preeminent strands of classic liberalism, a Lockean notion that the individual's natural rights are best protected by decentralizing power to local levels where governance is more responsive to the will of the people and a Benthamian-utilitarian understanding of the purpose of the state to respond to "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." She explains that while "the emphasis on popular planning reflects the more individualistic discourse deriving from classical liberalism...the emphasis on scientific management reflects the 'public good' discourse within contemporary liberal ideology." Planning protocols, she explains, can be understood as the means to find the "win-win situation" in which conflict is eliminated "through the technical skills of the professional planner and the guidance of an active citizenry," of course implying that "goals are uniform among members of a community and that there are no contradictions between goals." Following Kenny, the bureaucratization of civic input through organizations like the Office of Neighborhood Associations and the growing numbers of registered, politically-moderate public-sector organizations suffice for a new projection of the public, mediating the voice of Portland's citizens into an institutionally meaningful capacity that government planners can make use of and can do something about with already existing techniques. Implicitly, as Walker and Greenburg follow, liberal ideology "'tends, even when serious problems have been identified, to maintain a faith in the possibility of expert repair of all maladjustments *within* the existing social order'...[and] does not so much question the capitalist social order as suggest rational social management as a means of obtaining more equitable 'positive freedom' for society's members" (Kenny 1992, 180-181). This new liberal progressivism allowed Portlanders, especially those accustomed to power and influence, to be both "community minded and 'good' without being revolutionary," especially in a predominantly conservative and moralistic state like Oregon (Abbott 1994b, 210). According to Holston, it is a fundamentally Modernist belief that "radical social change can and indeed must occur without a social revolution," and it is precisely through the built and planned form that it can happen (Holston 1989, 56-57).

The discipline itself of urban planning, unlike the destabilized public authority of its elite practitioners, was during the 1970s reaffirmed as the site of urban prescription. Senate Bill 100 institutionalized urban planning as *the* discipline for visioning the future of Oregon's cities and counties, Portland included. Before 1973, Knaap explains, "local governments could choose to plan and could plan to pursue any locally chosen land-use goal," but after 1973 "local governments *had to* plan, and do so in accordance with specific *state* land-use

goals and guidelines." Discourses on municipal land-use and local governance fundamentally shifted, requiring state agencies and interest groups to work towards adequate planning where before they had concerned themselves only with regulation and control (Knaap 1994, 12).[19] And in this process, conceptions and visions for city purpose, citizenship, and publics became institutionalized into the process, subtly politicizing that process.

The joint maturity of a land-use planning regime steeped in classic liberal ideology, in addition to the new role of sanctioned community organizations under changing expectations of civic involvement in Portland public policy, produced a public discourse that not only institutionalized and accommodated civic participation to fit existing bureaucratic machinery, but also implicitly circulated a particular conception of the public. Odell explains that "Metro's policies and practices of citizen participation are embedded within a set of instrumentally rational and bureaucratic procedures that were developed to meet the mandates of statewide land-use planning resolutions" (Odell 2004, 197). Furthermore, in the daily interactions with government bureaucracy, in City Council meetings, public policy workshops, planning input discussions, and neighborhood association summits, discourses of the public are reified, as are the very tenets of citizenship—ways of belonging to that public. The crafting of a particular, privileged, and expected form of public citizenship allows for a theory of governmentality, in which the rational actors that civic discourse and ideology enable are self-regulating and state-endorsing, even in conflict.

Due to the diversity of interests within Oregon's political sphere, civic progressivism has by no means been comprehensive, despite its inherence in mandated planning doctrine. Knaap explains that Oregon's legislature was politically relatively weak through the 1990s, and political interest groups representing utilities, health and medical organizations, education, financial institutions, the building and construction industry, other business, and local governments have commanded considerable political power (Knaap 1994, 8). Senate Bill 100 emerged from the 1973 legislative session after considerable political compromise, containing no prescriptive rules for governing the land-use review process, lacking state permitting authority and regional land-use councils, and left, for the most part, land-use policy to be determined by the LCDC. As a result, Knaap explains, "through the process of administration, legislation, and adjudication, Oregon's land-use goals and policies became

---

[19] Of course, limited legislative power through the LCDC, and steadily decreasing state-funding for periodic review practices, have allowed local planning decisions in many places to systematically undermine state stipulations maintained in the planning goals, particularly with respect to Goal Ten and the provision of housing (Knaap 1994, 16).

codified into specific and binding administrative rules, land-use statutes, and case law—often at the instigation of state-level interest groups"—and those goals that "attracted the attention of state-level interest groups (e.g. urban growth management, housing, farm and forest land protection) dominated the planning agenda" while those "without an active state constituency (e.g. energy conservation, recreation, natural hazards) received little attention" (Knaap 1994, 11). Policy-making, to a certain extent, was decentralized from Salem to local governments and their associated agencies, and state-wide oversight, review and acknowledgement practices sufficed for LCDC involvement in planning policies. Kenny explains that "this two-level process was intended to acknowledge both the interests of local control and the necessary collective action required for scientific and rational planning in the interests of the state population" (Kenny 1992, 182). What this has meant is that cities like Portland have been forced to adopt planning goals that they have not always had the resources nor political will to provide, and have often looked to the public- and private-sectors to fulfill those goals.

In response to a visibly rising homeless population in downtown Portland, the Clark-Shiels Agreement of 1987, orchestrated between the City of the Portland, the Portland Development Commission, and all but one social service organization, set the precedent, in Portland, for the delegation of public services to the public sector. Concerned about the negative impacts of public vagrancy in Portland's economic core, the Portland Development Commission agreed to provide more low-income and single-room-occupancy housing throughout downtown in return for the commitment by social service agencies to respect a cap on the number of overnight shelter beds in the district and not to oppose public investments in downtown designed to attract private capital to the area. As Abbot explains, the Clark-Shiels Agreement "left downtown planning in the hands of the public and non-profit sector bureaucrats," preventing the existing planning consensus "from breaking down over unmet social needs," and "legitimiz[ing] social service agencies as full participants in setting public land development policy, making insiders out of potential outsiders" (Abbott 1994b, 215-216). In true progressive fashion, Portland's public and private sectors were able to formulate a mutually affirming consensus about how to address the problem of the poor. Through the end of the twentieth century the public-sector would grow enormously, particularly in the public service and health care sectors, and while growth in the last fifteen years has slowed, local governments continue to rely on the public sector to provide for many social services. This trend will be articulated more fully in the following chapter.

Rhetoric about community cohesion and inclusion used to perpetuate Portland's vision as a "good" city by its own civic leaders, activists, and boosters, has not always been consistent with popular understandings of civic participation. In a 2003 *Portland Tribune*

article, former city commissioner Jim Francesconi admits that the form of civic participation in public policy adopted by Metro and its bureaucratic agencies "is not public involvement but public informing," and that civic professionals and planners are "telling the public what we are doing instead of involving them in the decision." After a City Council meeting to discuss the development of a 21-lot subdivision in the Forest Park neighborhood in the same year, resident Colin MacDonald fumed that "[city officials] didn't listen to any of our concerns...[that] this should have been about people, not legalities." Jeff Boly of the Mount Tabor neighborhood association echoes MacDonald's frustration in his own campaign against City Council planning initiatives to cover the Mount Tabor reservoirs—"it was a joke," he complains, and "there was no citizen involvement at all." David Redlich of the Homestead Neighborhood Association sums up common sentiment: "citizens always seem to lose when they go up against a powerful institution." Former Mayor Vera Katz, in response to complaints about the lack of civic involvement, notes that "[City Council] knows what the neighbors are saying... We're elected to make tough decisions...Sometimes people don't like the results [and] instead of simply accepting that they lost, sometimes they say we didn't listen to them." Katz segregates herself from the complaints through bureaucratic buffering and drawing upon the professionalism endowed to her through representative democracy. Paul Leistner, former research director for City Club, perhaps the organization that best epitomizes Progressive Portland and the Portland Way, reframes complaints, suggesting that "if [policy makers and civic participants] can get back on track, we can solve a lot of problems" (Redden 2003). In these responses, what is cited as a failure to truly engage civic participation is reframed into a malfunctioning of the apparatuses supposedly implemented to guarantee just that.

Odell finds similar responses in fieldwork conducted at Portland's 2002 Neighborhood Association Summit. One Summit attendee asserts, "I'm not a fan of the initiative process...I think it forces us to make yes/no decisions on very complex issues...it takes out the opportunity for debate and compromise and (inaudible) the best answer rather than the answer that somebody can get enough signatures on..." (Odell 2004, 123). At the summit, workshops hosted by Metro councilors sought to garner feedback on planning issues, in particular regarding transportation infrastructure, the urban growth boundary, urban density, and social services. One councilor, referring to citizen input, explains:

> ...We take all this and we're gonna use this to help me and help my fellow counselors make a decision...It's a balancing act that we have to do, that you guys will be doing around tables today...and your input is really important...we have some good assistance out there in terms of technical expertise, but...still the questions are choices. And it doesn't matter how good your technical support is, you still have to make a decision what are we going to do next, and it's more of a moral

> political decision...you'll be asked to vote on a package project given a fixed dollar amount and the question is whether you prefer to see more regional projects funded or more community or neighborhood [projects funded]. I'm going to give you some examples of what those mean so that you can vote on those. (Odell 2004, 156)

Civic activists' input, Odell asserts, was "managed as a rational choice process in which public opinion was measured by aggregating personal preferences on pre-established rational technical choices through voting," and "these aggregated individual preferences were interpreted as representing a community consensus, which would be used in an advisory capacity to inform the final decisions that the Metro Council would be responsible for making" (Odell 2004, 156). At the Summit and in the experiences of activists interviewed by Redden, civic participation, and ultimately consent, was mediated through established technocratic channels that implicitly legitimized the very political ideologies and publics underpinning Portland's public policy structure. In limiting discourse to bureaucratic problem-solving, ideologies of governance in Portland "conflate the political with the bureaucratic," and any conflicting ideology of governance or citizenship is to be mediated, through existing political structures and ideologies that sustain civic leadership, as problems to overcome (Odell 2004, 77, 81). Nohad Toulan asserts that city planning "did not concern itself with activities as much as with land-use categories, and housing was no exception" and was addressed only in the "context of what it mean[t] to the urban pattern, economic development, transportation networks, or urban aesthetics" and rarely as "a separate element with independently significant social and economic merits" (Toulan 1994, 93-94). This sort of rationality, a "rationality of goal-setting," is precisely what Abbott characterizes the "successful bureaucratization of implementation," success defined as the "processes that regularly produce 'good' planning results in accord with national professional standards, that respond to informed community consensus, and that seek to avoid the inequitable accumulation of the costs of growth and change" (Abbott 1994b, 214). The LCDC system, Abbott explains, treats Oregonians as "economic persons," and planning is part of a "bureaucratic routine"—"that operate[s] fairly rather than arbitrarily"—"rather than an active contributor to livability" (Abbott 1994c, xxi). Political debate of different ideological positions is often shifted into discussions of bureaucratic functioning, with appointed task forces and research commissions, ultimately removes politicians from direct accountability to particular issues, and translates meaningful political conversations between civic actors and public representatives into questions of process for trained professionals to answer and solve. It is the reverse of what Innes means when she suggests that "what ordinary people know is at least as relevant as what is found through systematic professional inquiry...[despite that] we have no professional standards to evaluate what ordinary people

know" (Innes 1995, 185). Lawyer Jeff Boly of Portland puts it simply: "All you have to do is involve citizens before you make decisions. It's not brain surgery" (Redden 2003).

Technical bureaucratic political systems, like Portland's urban planning apparatus, condition the very premise of citizenship, fashioning the technological, discursive, and practical processes. Urban planning is fundamentally performative, discursive in that it prescribes a field of knowledge and possibility and practical in that it inscribes that discursive world into the urban environment with concrete, steel, and rebar, and with bureaucratic agencies, professional disciplines, and political incumbents. Portland's metropolitan government, and its associated commissions and agencies, and its constitutive urban planning doctrine could not exist without each other, because they are both constituted and continually remade by the underlying political ideologies and consensus that are the foundation for understanding the city as a cohesive whole.

IN CLOSURE: MAKING IDEOLOGY WORK

The comaturity of Portland's present urban design discipline and a publicly transparent and civically engaged political apparatus has discursively legitimated the Portland Way as a highly democratic and socially conscious political framework. Over the course of the twentieth century, Portland's city bureaus, nongovernmental organizations, and public citizens have adopted urban planning as *the* way of addressing the problems of urban life, questions of poverty, overdevelopment, housing, diversity, food security, and many other social phenomena.

Since very early on in its history, beginning with the initial departure from the City Beautiful to the City Practical, urban planning had been a project for the societal and business elite to facilitate their economic and political enterprises, often at the expense of formal political process or popular opinion. The Lewis and Clark Exposition laid the foundations for what would become a coherent urban planning program, a unified and collective commitment within Portland's business class. Those relationships were carried through to the Cheney years, where moral and idealistic visioning for the future was slowly supplanted by technocratic solutions to practical urban problems warranting fixing. The business community contributed heavily to the planning processes during both World Wars, effectively transforming the planning discipline from a discursive practice to a very real management of people. The provision of wartime housing, in particularly the Vanport projects, presaged the increasing reliance on the private sector for the provision of public services where political bureaucracy was incapable. However, this would come to the fore during the urban renewal programs of the postwar years, galvanizing significant civic resistance to what had become a highly untransparent, exclusive, elite planning caucus.

Urban design was primarily a conservative discipline that was instrumental in politicizing and incorporating the responsibility for urban ills into the purview of the city's most influential actors, political in the sense that the technocratic solutions for urban concerns became intentionally socially constructive and ideological. The practices of road planning, neighborhood uplift, housing provision, and general civic caretaking that were implemented for much of the twentieth century, and the ways planners wrote and spoke about their work, robustly reflected the conservative ideologies held by urban planning's foremost expert practitioners and their employers within Portland's elite.

The urban planning decisions of the 1970s were a comparatively radical intervention in what had become a conservatively entrenched and incumbent professional discipline, and returned considerable effective power to neighborhood associations, civic action groups, small businesses, and a generally active public. Senate Bill 100 and its provisions and amendments were a drastic ideological reentry into the ways in which social issues were to be confronted. Expectations of civic representation, a general mistrust of speculative or socially abusive development, and the nationwide fallout of government spending on public services transformed urban planning into a fundamentally public practice. In Portland, the establishment of an Urban Growth Boundary, the institutionalization of affordable housing and other poverty amelioration statutes, and extraordinary growth in the non-profit service provision sector introduced a new way of characterizing the city. During the final decades of the twentieth century, Portland *became* a politically "progressive" city, ideologically and practically. In the ensuing years, the discursive techniques employed in speaking and writing about the city and its issues—planning discourse, that is—changed radically, introducing a new kind of public consensus, about how the city should be built, physically and socially, in which the entrenched political elite were no longer the only ones implicated.

This chapter has traced the establishment of formative political ideologies in the discursive practices of Portland's century-old urban planning discipline. Planning has meant different things since it first became part of the public mission at the turn of the twentieth century, and since then has transformed into the source of a regional progressive identity and ideology. That ideology is produced, reproduced, and transformed in the changing discursive practices of urban management and governance, and has acquired the legitimacy to define the public sphere and the tenets of public citizenship.

The following chapter will continue this discussion, focusing the analysis within one sector of urban planning: housing. Housing, and the lack of housing, has been an important issue for planners since planning's inception as a discipline. In Portland, homelessness and urban poverty are ubiquitous in the downtown neighborhoods, and the City of Portland's efforts to curb these trends are manifold. The next chapter will interrogate the techniques

employed by planners, service workers, bureaucrats, and concerned citizens, to solve housing issues, keeping in mind how discursive practice engages with political ideology and authority.

2 THE POVERTY OF DIAGNOSIS

> *Writing to a public helps to make a world, insofar as the object of address is brought into being partly by postulating and characterizing it. This performative ability depends, however, on that object's being not entirely fictitious—not postulated merely, but recognized as a real path for the circulation of discourse. That path is then treated as the social entity. (Warner 2002, 64)*

> *The extent to which homelessness is an injustice of both distribution and recognition is manifest strikingly in the double-meaning attached to the word 'address,' which indicates both a spatial location and a mode of intersubjective recognition. To have an address means to have a place of residence, and to be addressed means to be spoken to, recognized as a human subject in dialogue. To be homeless is to risk being addressless in both senses. First, it is to lack a socially recognized and legally protected place in the world from which one has the right to exclude others. Second, in media discourse, in legal discourse, and in encounters on the street, the homeless are often simply not addressed but ignored, treated as objects blocking the free movement of the proper public citizen, denied identification in media reports. (Feldman 2004, 91)*

The discursive and ideological practices of planning have in Portland set the tone and horizons for potential political action, limiting the possibilities for social change within the bureaucratic and institutional capabilities of the Portland Way. In the treatment of the urban poor, this has taken the form of a discipline of address. A discipline of address, in this sense, is both an ideological horizon of acknowledgement, positing a world and its occupants, and the discursive tools through which that world can be created. Address is both performative and intersubjective, elaborating the materiality of a public while simultaneously constituting it, producing common experience while at the same moment articulating the character of it. Having address is to belong within the boundaries of public consensus, to be recognized as having voice, to exist in relation, and to give address is to interiorize the Other, to make out a shared territory of representation, and to sacrifice complete alterity. At a fundamental level, governmental and nongovernmental programs to eradicate homelessness are engaged in such a discipline, and they share the task of endowing or prohibiting address to those without address. The following pages will articulate just how address is manufactured and reoriented into new kinds of urban citizenship.

The first half of this chapter will consider how discourses of homelessness circulate through the spheres of politics, government, non-profit service providers, and the public. Discursive characterizations of the poor as criminal or deviant are enacted to confront the perceived anxieties and threats to social and economic order induced by visible homeless populations. The clinical reduction of the homeless that reframes the poor as inferior and

underdeveloped persons has enabled a new kind of civic governance, and new techniques of manufacturing urban citizenship.

The latter portion of the chapter will trace how this dominant rhetoric of homelessness has permeated Portland's political bureaus and service providers, like Central City Concern, in their commitment to end homelessness by 2015. As one of Portland's most visible homeless service providers, Central City Concern wields significant discursive power in defining dominant and legitimate characterizations of the homeless and, implicitly, the normative identity of the Portland public. In their mission to help people suffering from homelessness, addiction, and mental illness, techniques employed by Central City Concern do much to define the margins of the public sphere, and reify boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable occupants of urban space. The relationship between service providers, the City of Portland, and the homeless clientele remains suspended within a structural, and increasingly narrow, apparatus of public financing and support that is politically moderate and systemically entrenched, and as will be demonstrated in the third chapter, often does little to curb what has been in Portland a steadily intensifying crisis of poverty and housing.

PORTRAYING THE HOMELESS: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE POOR IN THE MISSION TO ELIMINATE HOMELESS(NESS)

Much of the recent scholarship on the homeless (Gubrium 1992; Wolch and Dear 1993; Feldman 2004; Lyon-Callo 2004; Glasser and Bridgman 1999; Marvasti 2003; Cruikshank 1999; Wright and Vermud 1996; Western Regional Advocacy Project 2008; Parker and Fopp 2004; Passaro 1996) has sought to clarify how homeless populations are identified and constructed within public discourse, and how that discourse, in turn, enables certain policies designed to ameliorate urban poverty and homelessness and excludes others. Within the last decade, rampant criminalization of the homeless nationwide has slowly been displaced as the primary solution to homelessness, and more holistic, service-oriented programming has become the standard for lifting the poor from abjection. Poverty advocates have had a certain degree of success in implicating structural inequalities, particularly the unaffordability of housing for the class subsisting on minimum-wage employment, as important considerations in understanding the homeless condition. As a result, welfare programs and homeless services have begun to adopt, and have adopted in many cities like Portland, what the Clinton-era Department of Housing and Urban Development director Henry Cisneros called a "continuum of care" model that emphasizes clinical impediments to subsistence, the skill development of the homeless through job training, education, and employment, and a new commitment to providing affordable

housing for the poorest class (Lyon-Callo 2004, 12). As a result, the "continuum of care" standard has often carried with it new public conceptions of the homeless, many of which cast the homeless as incomplete, underdeveloped, and incapable persons in need of intervention and reeducation in the ways of acceptable citizenship. Welfare programs for the homeless, shelters, and legal opinions regarding the rights of the homeless have transformed the homeless individual from a criminal to a pathological deviant, and in the process have clarified new modes for governing the poor. Drawing from theories of citizenship developed predominantly by Agamben, Foucault, and Cruikshank, and scholarship on the politics of homelessness forwarded by Lyon-Callo, Feldman, and Marvasti, the following will argue that the "continuum of care" methodologies have enabled the production of a new form of neoliberal, (self-)governance. Homeless subjects have been adopted by a professional class of welfare and service-provision experts that, despite their good intentions, are unable to radically change the fundamental problems of structural homelessness. Central City Concern's poverty work is no exception.

"We the People": Bare Life and the Public of Exclusion

Contemporary politics, Giorgio Agamben explains, are characterized by a "biopolitics" that predicates the political sovereignty of modern democratic states on the ability to entirely subsume social life into a form of political subscription, or citizenship. Fundamental to what enables modern liberal—and neoliberal—governance is the constitution of an ideologically-comprehensive, homogenous public, the making of apolitical individuals into politically relevant, and governable, citizens.

Drawing from the Greek distinction between the concepts of *zoe*—"life" as the "simple fact of living common to all living beings"—and *bios*—"life" as the "form or way of living *proper* to an individual or a group"—Agamben understands what he terms "bare life" as not the classical liberal state of nature, *zoe*, but rather the state of political exclusion from *bios* (Agamben 1995, 1). The state of exception embodied by the notion of "bare life" fundamentally disrupts contemporary models of liberal-democratic sovereignty, which erects political legitimacy on the stability of *the people* beneath the modern nation-state. There exists a peculiar fact within contemporary European languages, Agamben finds, that *the people* is always doubly referential, at once indicating an "integral body politic" of sovereign citizens "without remainder," and, at the same time, "the poor, the underprivileged, and the excluded," the "banishment of the wretched, the oppressed, and the vanquished." The "biopolitical fracture" of *the people* caused by the idea of "bare life"—*the people* is "what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a part as well as what cannot belong to the whole in which it is always already included"—is precisely what causes the modern

democratic state apparatus to go to such great lengths of surveillance, policing, institutionalization, and other forms of social control to produce a "people without fracture" (Agamben 2000, 28-33). As Agamben understands, there exists a paradox of inclusion: how can fundamental social heterogeneity be appropriately accommodated into an ideologically consistent public?—Feldman explains that contemporary distinctions between "people-as-citizens" and "people-as-excluded-poor" is none but a modern manifestation of this tension (Feldman 2004, 18). According to Agamben, the solution lies in that "bare life" and the political are mutually constitutive, that "bare life" is necessarily political and politicized—read, brought into the realm of *bios*—by its very *exclusion* from "proper" political citizenship (Agamben 1995, 9). The violence of "our time," Agamben concludes, is marked by none other than the "methodical and implacable attempt to fill the split that divides the people by radically eliminating the people of the excluded" (Agamben 2000, 32). The anxiety-inducing fiction of "the people," then, is accomplished in producing a "proper" class of citizenship and assigning second-class citizenship to the rest on the grounds of their exclusion from the former. In this sense, populations like the urban poor, the homeless, and the vagrant can be understood as constituting a kind of "bare life" within Portland's public sphere, amalgamated into a single, denigrated class to be characteristically excluded from the dominant public form through second-class citizenship. Feldman writes that "not only does the state (through laws and institutions of governance) carve out a second-class political exclusion of bare life, but citizenship as full membership is constituted as the exclusion of bare life, and homeless persons figure in legal and political discourse as the embodiments of that bare life" (Feldman 2004, 18).

The reduction of bodies to "bare life" must also have spatial parameters. As Warner argues, the public—that is, the substance of citizenship—is constituted by the extent of its circulation. Modern notions of citizenship are inextricable from the territorialized monopoly of the nation-state, and, on a smaller scale, the city. When mapped onto the urban landscape, Agamben and Feldman's politics of exclusion, and the exclusion of the homeless as second-class citizens, becomes embodied in the local practices of city governance. Local authorities engage de Certeau's strategies to both "postulate a *place*" for ideological expression and employ discursive techniques to establish relations of "exteriority." It is through the process of discursive circulation about second-class citizenship that a public gains legitimacy, and ultimately how the ideological horizon of citizenship is extended over the city. Public ideology is fundamentally exclusionary, and the discursive tools employed rejecting or assimilating ideological exteriority are not unlike those, in Agamben's theorization, that ground public membership in the defying of acceptable norms and expectations. Andrew Mair suggests that the "very nature of the post-industrial city *demands*

the removal of the homeless." Post-industrial space, like that of Portland, Feldman elaborates, is a middle-class consumptive space, "marked by the absence of production and poverty, a space where office workers live, work, consume, and are entertained," and, as Mair concludes, "the very presence of the homeless provokes a significant crisis in the ideological security of the space" (Feldman 2004, 40). As spaces of commerce, urban zones are also necessarily voluntary spaces, where city actors can, and are encouraged to, move through webs of consumption. Those who challenge that voluntary right to the city, who bring their private life into the public purview, threatening to undermine both the rights of the dominant public and the understandings of the acceptable use of urban space, are to be excluded, either through criminalization or through cultural assimilation. As a result of the delimitation of what constitutes public space, the homeless are at once reduced to bare life, excluded from public legitimacy, and banned from occupying the public realm.

BRIDGING A POLITICS OF COMPASSION AND A POLITICS OF COMPASSION FATIGUE

Historically, responses to mass-homelessness have been varied, and have produced diverse and sometimes conflicting portraits of the homeless condition. Since the rise of homelessness in the 1980s, many cities have adopted harsh programs to eliminate the poor from the streets, criminalizing them in the form of strict anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances and swift incarceration of perpetrators. Recently, however, programs to address urban poverty and homelessness have adopted more holistic policies, reflecting a more compassionate approach, and embracing welfare measures and social service provision as a way to ameliorate structural poverty.

Feldman describes the paradigmatic constructions of the homeless individual as existing within a discursive field bound by two axes, the voluntary/involuntary and the sacred/profane. He argues that the homeless exist within the popular imagination predominantly as either profanely voluntary—that is, homeless by choice yet a threatening and dangerous class, and justly criminalized—and sacredly involuntary—helpless sufferers of structural inequality, begging of sympathy and saving, and, importantly, justifying charity and shelter (Feldman 2004, 6-7). Ending homeless(ness) and the homeless problem, as a result, is generally understood as a tension between a politics of distribution and a politics of recognition, whether the homeless circumstance is one of political economy or one of identity politics, whether solutions to homelessness are fundamentally economic or whether they are predicated on the recognition or exclusion of the homeless as legitimate public actors. The solutions employed by anti-poverty organizations, activists, and government

programs are instrumental in both determining and reifying how the poor is constituted within or in contrast to the public.

Because recognition of the deviant homeless as citizens, albeit second-class citizens, is the only way the democratic state can understand "the people" as a homogenous governable body, criminalization approaches construct the homeless as a dangerous, illicit class, and constitute the homeless as within the confines of the law yet deny their right to the kind of first-class citizenship afforded the dominant public. The City of Portland's 2008 Sit-Lie Ordinance, for instance, prohibited persons from sitting, lying, or setting objects on the sidewalk to ensure clear sidewalks for passersby. Enthusiastically supported by the Portland Business Alliance and other business advocates—and vehemently opposed by the homeless and homeless allies—the Ordinance was designed to remove vagrancy and homelessness from the visible public sphere. As Samira Kawash writes, vengeful homeless policies like Portland's Sit-Lie Ordinance comprise a "war on the homeless [that] must also be seen as a mechanism for constituting and securing a public, establishing the boundaries of inclusion, and producing an abject body against which the proper, public body of the citizen can stand" (Feldman 2004, 4).

Public welfare programs, on the other hand, construct the homeless as clinical deviants, involuntary recipients of poor education, violent upbringings, underdeveloped social skills, or any host of other individual inadequacies that, given proper care, can be relearned and refashion homeless individuals into acceptable citizens. As Vincent Lyon-Callo articulates, "On this view, the very bodies of poor people need to be regulated and reformed, leading to the development of government institutions, trained experts, and professional reformers like social workers, and police to 'manage' and 'regulate' the lives of 'the poor' in the interest of 'normalizing' them" (Lyon-Callo 2004, 18). Homelessness, when cast as a discrete condition warranting amelioration, becomes pathogenic and endogenous to homeless individuals. Feldman suggests that "policy discussions of 'redistribution not recognition' in the case of homelessness evince a neglect of the political, of state power and a specifically political dimension of injustice," and that it is precisely this "displacement of politics" that "*underlies* and *enables* the very assertion of a conflict between helping the homeless off the street and recognizing their legal right to exist in public space" (Feldman 2004, 85). Programs that seek to refashion the poor in the image of the public simultaneously reaffirm notions of acceptable and unacceptable citizenship.

In this sense, both the criminalization and the pathologization of the poor are highly politicized practices. As Cruikshank duly cautions, "any claim to know what is best for poor people, to know what it takes to get out of poverty and what needs must be met in order to be fully human, is also a claim to power" (Cruikshank 1999, 38). Foucault suggests that

society's "threshold of modernity" has been reached when "the life of the [human] species is wagered on its own political strategies," and that we might speak of a "bio-power" to designate what "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation" (Foucault 1980, 143). The discursive and practical production—indicative of Foucault's "knowledge-power"—of the homeless as second-class citizens, criminalized and outlawed yet persecuted through the juridical system, and pathological subjects warranting treatment, is precisely the kind of "political strategy" (de Certeau 1984) that has brought human life into the management practices of the state. The life and death of homeless rests on the "threshold of modernity," their existence threatening to public order yet inexcusable from public order, and is thus necessarily the territory of governance. Bio-power, as Cruikshank asserts, "renders life itself governable, making it possible to act not only upon the body, by force, but also upon the subjectivity (soul) of human being," and enacts "through the administration and regulation of life and its needs...the good of all society upon the antisocial bodies of the poor, deviant, and unhealthy." As a result, the health, education, welfare, safety, and way-of-life of the poor "constitute a territory upon which it is possible to act," and the very providing for "the needs and interests of [the poor] to fulfill their human potential is a mode of governing people" (Cruikshank 1999, 39-40).

While blatant criminalization of the homeless has become less common, due in no small part to philanthropic claims about the "involuntary" yet "sacred" homeless individual, both criminalization and the sheltering industry remain part of a unified strategy to end homeless(ness). Constructed as clinical deviance, homelessness reformers develop programs to treat the symptoms understood to lead to homelessness, yet continue to practice the "tough love"—read, policing—needed to encourage otherwise resistant individuals to confront their own conditions of homelessness (Feldman 2004, 83; Lyon-Callo 2004, 51). Other solutions to homelessness, such as legal recognition or city support of homeless persons and encampments, are understood as philosophically "in opposition to therapeutic interventions by social service agencies" (Feldman 2004, 83). Former Portland Mayor Vera Katz explained the predicament in a speech she gave: "I can't see spending millions of dollars to make sure the homeless are housed and at the same time see them camp in our streets" (Feldman 2004, 83).

THE ART OF CITIZENSHIP: SHELTERS, SELF-HELP, AND THE UNMAKING OF THE HOMELESS

The homeless shelter is perhaps the most ubiquitous site of governmental and nongovernmental urban poverty relief in the United States. As a result, the shelter is also the

site where homeless deviance is pathologized, qualified, and institutionalized. Discourses about the homeless and causes of homelessness are systematically reproduced in the case reports, job trainings, mental health groups, and other practices within shelters designed to put the homeless back on their feet and into mainstream society, to make citizens of them.

The foundational mission of many contemporary transitional shelters, including many in Portland like those operated by Central City Concern, falls within the rubric of self-empowerment and self-help. Shelters philosophically assume the "naturalness" of the individual-bodied self, and instruct clients to look within their own bodies for the causes of their poverty and their homelessness (Lyon-Callo 2004, 63). Barbara Cruikshank suggests that this logic of empowerment from the very start "dichotomize[s] power and powerlessness," and understands empowerment itself as simply a "quantitative increase in the amount of power possessed by an individual" (Cruikshank 1999, 70-71). Lyon-Callo echoes Cruikshank, arguing that "with the desire to reform 'the poor' through governing, 'the poor' have been constituted as subjects suffering from disorders of the self and in need of training and education to reform the characteristics and behaviors making them poor" (Lyon-Callo 2004, 18). Shelters employ what Foucault calls "technologies of the self" (Lemke 2001, 201) and Cruikshank terms "technologies of citizenship," that "do not cancel out the autonomy and independence of citizens but are modes of governance that work upon and through the capacities of citizens to act on their own" (Cruikshank 1999, 4). "When we say today," Cruikshank continues, "that someone is subject, acquiescent, dependent, or apathetic, we are measuring that person against a normative ideal of citizenship," and as a result, "the discourses of democratic citizenship tend to foreclose the ways in which it is possible to be a citizen rather than seeking to place the question of citizenship within the reach of ordinary citizens" (Cruikshank 1999, 24). "Self-help, self-fulfillment, and self-esteem programs," Lyon-Callo explains, "are technologies that produce certain kinds of selves and marginalize the possibilities of producing alternative kinds of subjectivities" (Lyon-Callo 2004, 63).

The homeless are treated as "damaged," "subjects-in-the-making," and, as a result, the solution in many shelters is the "overt control exerted over every aspect of life, including the scheduling of waking, sleeping, eating, showering, restrictions on personal habits, and demands to be enrolled in required programs to continue to receive shelter." Feldman argues that the shelter complex misrecognizes the homeless and the affiliations and networks that exist within the homeless population, and through the "individualizing logic" of intake interviews, continual case management and needs monitoring and assessment and the grouping of homeless individuals "according to shared disability or dependency" (Feldman 2004, 95-97). Marvasti explains, following Foucault's notion of the "gaze," that at the most

basic, "biographical particulars are likely to be suffused with the prevailing institutional discourse, which organizes the way…the client is constructed" (Marvasti 2003, 110), and the way the client is to be remade.

According to Cruikshank, the self-empowerment model of service provision—which, she suggests, surfaced within the welfare and voluntary sectors during President Johnson's War on Poverty—introduced three important phenomena. First, "'the poor' were isolated as a target of government intervention and their capacities calculated and inscribed into a policy for their 'empowerment.'" Second, the Community Action Programs designed as community-based solutions to poverty legislated the "decentralization of power relationships and the multiplication of power relations between constituencies—the poor and juvenile delinquents, social scientists, social service vendors, the executive branch of government—which otherwise could not exercise power over one another." And third, a class of professional reformers and service providers "emerged as *the* instruments for applying technologies of citizenship and new theories of power and powerlessness" (Cruikshank 1999, 75-76).

The discursive practices that constitute "the poor" as a deviant class needing intervention at once destroys informal networks and communities of impoverished populations and allows for the reconstitution of those same individuals into new formulations that are governable and "serviceworthy"—Marvasti explains that within the shelter, the "response to the client and his or her needs is mediated by an organizationally based horizon of meaning, which constitutes the client as an object of charity who must comply with a set of conditions to be considered serviceworthy" (Marvasti 2003, 95). Malcolm Williams writes that "there is no such thing as homelessness, but instead a range of heterogenous characteristics that give rise to a wide range of [complex] symptoms that we term 'homelessness,' symptoms whose "emergent properties are very much "real" (Williams 2001, 1-2). To a certain extent, those heterogenous characteristics are codified in many anti-poverty programs run by institutions or individuals endowed with the authority to determine. The practices of rhetorically grouping-as-one, of categorically segregating human populations, cannot be understood as definitive and natural—distinct social groupings make different groupings-as-one of Williams' "heterogenous characteristics." However, plural understandings are not all endowed with discursive authority and power. That public officials, service providers, and politicians, have the authority to codify homelessness—and the "chronically homeless," the addicted homeless, the mentally ill homeless, etc.—into lawbooks, police manuals, program criteria ignores the diversity within homeless

populations, divisions that span categories of mentally ill and sane, addicted and sober, licit and illicit, male and female,[20] and, to be sure, homeless and houseless.

Nikolas Rose argues that due to the neoliberal penetration into social and political life, individuals are made into self-governing bodies through their "affiliations" and commitments to particular communities of morality and identity," self-managing as "responsible" and "contributing" community members. The marginalized, on the other hand, are constituted by their affiliation to "some kind of 'anti-community' whose morality, lifestyle, or component is considered a threat or reproach to public contentment and political order" (Rose 1996, 340). Lyon-Callo explains that "there is no guarantee of any degree of social welfare or social well-being for those failing in their responsibility as community members," and that the marginalized "can only access previously 'social' benefits through their ability to function in a competitive market." Social workers and social reformers, then, are precisely those experts trained to "help people help themselves" in becoming "self-responsible" community members (Lyon-Callo 2004, 110). What this means, however, is that "empowerment"—that is, access to the social and material benefits of communities—"is a relationship established"—and mediated—"by expertise," governed by the class of specialized professionals trained in "solving" the "special issues of veterans, drug abusers, homeless teens, homeless women, the elderly, the mentally ill, victims of post-traumatic stress, domestic violence survivors, homeless families, the undereducated, and those in need of job training (Cruikshank 1999, 72; Lyon-Callo 2004, 111).

The shelter itself exists in the awkward nexus of the direct needs of the poor, the distinguishing expectations of foundations, donors, and federal bureaus, and the simple fact of providing employment for social workers. The shelter mediates between the "legitimate needs" of their clients and what counts as an "abuse of services" (Marvasti 2003, 64). Marvasti writes that "the tension between helping and enabling...an unproductive lifestyle is at the heart of the shelter's preoccupation with a seemingly endless list of policies to regulate its clients," policies designed to "reinforce the notion of self-help and to convey to the general public that the shelter is," in the words of a shelter director, "making good use of the charitable dollars" (Marvasti 2003, 92). As a result, the homeless client is "intricately and unmistakably linked with the public relations matters that surround charity work." And, as Marvasti concludes, the "resulting organizational embeddedness of need suggests that the statistics of homelessness, as far as shelters are concerned, are as much about organization survival and processing as they are about homelessness in its own right" (Marvasti 2003, 96).

---

[20] For an analysis of gender in New York City's shelter system, see Passaro (1996) and Susser (1993).

Proposed solutions to homelessness, then, often reflect institutional prerogative more than they do the actual parameters of need, and even despite the intentions of social workers and poverty and homeless activists.

The institutional embeddedness of social work often precludes, even forbids, radical analyses of poverty, and forecloses possible solutions due to a conflict of interest. Lyon-Callo, in his work at a shelter in Northampton, MA, found that despite the political radicalism of shelter staff, funding constraints effectively prohibited a systemic analysis of homelessness. Frustrated by the embedded inequality within the shelter, between the needy and the provider, the damaged and the healer, the houseless and the housed, etc., he and his colleagues found that political activism, such as organizing factory workers in hopes of bargaining for more livable wages—directly compromised the shelter's reputation as a service provider. Many of the largest donors to the Grove Street Inn were, in fact, employers of many of the shelter's residents. Ruth Wilson Gilmore explains that "non-profits providing direct services have become highly professionalized," and they "do not want to lose the contracts to provide services because they truly care about clients who otherwise would have nowhere to go" (Gilmore 2007, 45).

The homelessness reform industry, in large part, has emerged in the last few decades in the form of what Jennifer Wolch terms the "voluntary sector *shadow state*," a "para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control" (Wolch 1990, xvi). While shadow state activities, like many of the activities and services provided by Central City Concern, remain formally autonomous from state governance and accountability, they remain "enabled, regulated, and subsidized" by state programs, surveillance, and other fiscal constraints (Wolch 1990, 41). Dylan Rodriguez implicates what he calls the "non-profit industrial complex" as the "set of symbiotic relationships that link[s] political and financial technologies of the state and owning class proctorship with surveillance over political intercourse," suggesting that the essence of the non-profit system is one that "blur[s] the boundaries between the state and society, between the civil and the political," and, as a result of the state penetration of the civil, that "narrow[s] and tam[es] the potential for broad dissent" (Rodríguez 2007, 21, 30). This has meant that the management and provision of public housing has similarly been shifting into the ill-defined space between the public and private sectors, heavily funded and supported by city government yet independent and, to a large extent, free of direct oversight and accountability. What this means for tenants will be discussed in the third chapter.

From takers to taxpayers: Central City Concern and the end of homelessness

Central City Concern exists precisely within this blurring boundary between the civic and the private, working closely with civic government yet autonomous within the non-profit voluntary sector. Central City Concern's public image reflects a sincere interest in combating homelessness, yet the organization's service provision is predicated on the "technologies of citizenship" designed to recenter homeless subjectivities. Discourses circulated about the homeless are highly congruent with city agendas and programs to address the problems of urban poverty. As a result, Central City Concern's reputation as a service provider is highly regarded within the city's liberal-progressive establishment, and even among other, more radical portions of the political Left.

A healthy partnership: constituting the City's "funding arena" and Portland's 10-Year Plan To End Homelessness

In 1979, Central City Concern (then named the Burnside Consortium) was created to administer a National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA) Public Inebriate grant with Multnomah County and the City of Portland. Through the 1980s, Central City Concern worked closely with the City of Portland, in particular, to address rampant crack cocaine and heroin dealing and use in the downtown, in addition to building their affordable housing portfolio (Central City Concern 2009a). Central City Concern, thus, has had an extended relationship with the City of Portland, and as Housing Commissioner Nick Fish acknowledged at the City Council recognition of the stimulus award, Central City Concern is "among the best of the best in the non-profit world that [the City of Portland] contract[s] with and that we partner with" (Portland City Council 2009).

In the 2007 fiscal year, Central City Concern earned nearly $24 million dollars in revenue, more than half of which consisted of contributions in the form of gifts and grants from federal, state, and local governments and governmental agencies, and from private donors—as one of the largest downtown service providers, city government contracts more than $1.2 million dollars annually to Central City Concern for their programs. The other half, approximately $11.7 million, was earned through program service revenues including government fees and contracts, and interest accrual from existing assets (Central City Concern 2007; Portland City Council 2009).

Sociologist Carl Milofsky characterizes the types of relationships like that between the City of Portland and Central City Concern as constituting a "funding arena" which not only has "a distinctive set of norms to govern the process of applying for grants or resources, a distinctive process for making funding decisions," but also "a specialized

network of people who exchange information and influence" (Milofsky 1987, 285). Funding relationships between city government and the public sector have defined the legitimate horizon for addressing homelessness and poverty. Central City Concern's programs have, over the last few decades, become essential pieces of the City political agenda, and both City Council and Central City administrators have significant political power in shaping the way public welfare services are fashioned and distributed. Recently, the partnership between local government and Blackburn's organization has manifested itself most prominently in the City of Portland's, and, more widely, Multnomah County's, 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness, begun in 2004 at the end of Vera Katz's mayoralty.

The 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness was introduced partly in response to the national fallout of welfare spending due to Reagan-era public financing, and to the resulting growth in homeless populations in cities across the country. The Plan was compiled by a Citizens' Commission on Homelessness (CCOH) made up of citizens and interested parties—which, in effect, means neighborhood business leaders and executives, representatives from the police department and Housing Authority of Portland, then-Housing-Commissioner Erik Sten, and one formerly homeless individual, Keith Vann, a representative of Sisters of the Road/Crossroads[21]—and a Plan To End Homelessness Coordinating Committee (PTEHCC) of non-profit service provider and governmental agency representatives, including many Central City Concern administrators (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004b). Now in its sixth year, the 10-Year Plan attempts to reduce the number of people *becoming* homeless, the frequency and duration of periods of homelessness, and to increase the number of individuals and families moving into stable, permanent housing by focusing on the most chronically homeless populations within the city, facilitating access to already existent services dedicated to preventing and reducing homelessness, and concentrating on programs that can offer quantitative, measurable results (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 1). The plan seeks to address the causes of homelessness, rather than its symptoms, and understands that the underlying, structural

---

[21] Located on the first floor of the Butte Building in downtown Portland, the Sisters of the Road Café "exists to build authentic relationships and alleviate the hunger of isolation in an atmosphere of nonviolence and gentle personalism that nurtures the whole individual, while seeking systemic solutions that reach the roots of homelessness and poverty to end them forever." In practice, the Café serves warm meals on a barter/worktrade system, and is the base for a community organizing program rooted in empowerment and community-building within Portland's homeless community that seeks to realize authentic, immediate, and concrete improvements in the lives of people dealing with homelessness and their communities." Crossroads is a people's research organization affiliated with Sisters of the Road that focuses on issues of homelessness and poverty (http://www.sistersoftheroad.org, accessed April 25, 2010).

housing impediment rests in the disproportionate gap between the cost of housing and what people can afford to pay for it.

According to recent statistics published in Street Roots, one in two Oregonians live on incomes 20% below the federal family poverty line, one in four Oregonians spend more than half of their income on rent, and 64% of Portland residents living in poverty work full time (Zuhl 2009, 1). According to the Census Bureau, median home values in Portland rose from $61,800 in 1990 to $157,900 in 2000, while the median family income only increased to $41,278 from $26,928 over the same time period (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 13). Since affordable housing standards are set at 30 percent of median family income, they have not kept pace with housing inflation. Other studies conducted in 2004 indicate that nearly one third of Portland's homeless population at the beginning of the 10-Year Plan had chemical addiction, and just under one fifth of the population were reported to suffer from some kind of mental illness. As it is, the homeless are statistically construed as a mentally-ill population, and the economic circumstances for Portland's poorest are no more optimistic.

In addressing chronic homelessness, the Plan begins from the understanding that the target population is one that is primarily constituted by single adults, many of which have drug and alcohol addiction, histories of crime, untreated mental illness or other disabilities, and little or no income. The Commission explains that the existing haphazard and uncoordinated network of service providers has been inadequate in serving those people with multiple barriers to stable housing. As a result, the 10-Year Plan is, in no small part, a commitment to coordinating service provision through new and existing service organizations, and concentrating on programs within those agencies that can indicate very specific, measurable results. It follows nine prescribed action steps: (1) "move people into housing first"; (2) "stop discharging people into homelessness"; (3) "improve outreach to homeless people"; (4) "emphasize permanent solutions"; (5) "increase supply of permanent supportive housing; (6) "create innovative new partnerships to end homelessness"; (7) "make the rent assistance program more effective"; (8) increase economic opportunity for homeless people"; and (9) "implement new data collection technology throughout the homeless system" (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a). In effect, it is a plan for governmental and service agencies to solve homelessness, constituted by achievable goals in service provision, for social service professionals to take it upon themselves to solve the problems of urban poverty. The $13.7 million that the Portland Housing Bureau of City Council apportioned to the 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness in the 2009 fiscal year, was received, almost exclusively, by service providers, affordable housing landlords, medical

programs, and other members of the class of professional poverty workers (Portland Housing Bureau 2010).

The 10-Year Plan explains that "a large population of homeless people is not healthy...not healthy for those who are homeless, and not healthy for the rest of the community" (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 1). Not unlike the tropes of infection employed during the 1970s to justify urban renewal programs that would uproot and displace resident communities, Portland's present commitment to ending homelessness casts homeless populations as pathogenic to the health of the city and to themselves, locating concerns about public health upon the bodies of the homeless and the poor. Discursively isolated as pathological deviants, the homeless are then available to the class of medical, counseling, philanthropic, and social work professionals trained in "normalizing" them and refashioning them into public citizens. Implicit in each of the "action steps" is a something that can be accomplished and measured, bureaucratized and contracted, isolated and depoliticized. The poor become the subjects of a mobilized institutional apparatus.

This is not to say that proponents of the Plan and its contracted programs have deliberately or slyly manufactured their own employment on the bodies of the poor, despite that that may be the case. Rather, advocates of the 10-Year Plan take great pride in the process through which the Plan was adopted, a process that is quintessential of the Portland Way of working for social change. From the very beginning, it has been touted as an admirably inclusive, engaged document. "The CCOH was intentionally set up without representation of government or non-profit agency staff," the document explains, "to allow for an external process that would help develop broad community support for a plan" (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 6). The Plan is designed to encompass a public consensus about the issue of homelessness, to mediate conflicting interests and produce a program that does the greatest good for the greatest number, as in the political process Odell documents in her Portland fieldwork. In truth, the Commission is hardly representative of the homeless population, let alone the chronically homeless, and the advisory coordinating committees and working groups, enlisted to design feasible courses of action within the nine action steps, are made up, almost exclusively, by experts and professionals in the field of civic politics and service provision. The metrics of measuring the success or failure of projects to end homeless(ness) exist within the horizon of knowledge and possibility that inheres in the disciplines of address represented by the Coordinating Committee, and the success or failure of the 10-Year Plan is, thus, considered in terms of the success or failure of those goals. The draft of program goals for the 2009 fiscal year, for instance, reads like a prescription list for a variety of Portland's non-profit social service providers: JOIN, a housing service provider located in southeast Portland,

commits to move 25 chronically homeless individuals into permanent housing; the Northwest Pilot Project, an organization devoted to needs of the homeless elderly, pledges to assess 40 individuals ready for hospital discharge yet with medical needs which make them inappropriate for the established shelter system; the Housing Authority of Portland ensures that it will maintain at least 95 percent utilization of its Shelter Plus Care program, a rental assistance program; and Central City Concern assures that it will develop its Community Service Corporation to provide employment training for homeless individuals in recovery (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2009). Implicitly, what working together to find the best solutions for the greatest number has meant has been incorporating the needs and offerings of institutions into deciding how best to treat the poor. In mediation, following Cruikshank, the Plan has discursively made a "claim to power" (1999, 38) in determining the legitimate needs of the poor and the ways to provide them. "Consumers of services"—read, the homeless—the report explains, "can hold the homeless system accountable by providing systematic feedback on how they access services and how they are treated while receiving those services" (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 38). It continues, "social service organizations, funders, and policy-makers' willingness-to-listen stems from the understanding that consumer feedback enhances the system." By its very structure, the 10-Year Plan privileges service providers as *the* means to achieve homelessness, and leaves the only option to the homeless a course of systematic approval, or in all likelihood, complaint. Moreover, the homeless become the raw material for program success or failure, and ultimate success or failure of the entire enterprise. The homeless are, thus, produced as a class of numbers who, depending on whether the programs are fulfilling their goals, are either decreasing or increasing. And despite the numbers, the public service provision industry remains a growing industry.

Joanne Zuhl writes in the 2008 Special Edition on Affordable Housing that "there is no mandate, federal, state, or otherwise, that says we will house our citizens—only an economic reality" (Zuhl 2008, 11)—despite the fact that Goal Ten of Oregon's Senate Bill 100 claims to "provide for the housing needs of the citizens of the state."[22] Since the social

---

[22] Goal Ten requires that counties and municipalities maintain "adequate land supply" for twenty years' growth for all types of housing, including affordable and government-assisted housing, and for the removal of regulatory barriers to affordable housing under the "clear and objective" clause. Obligations to Goal Ten in the Portland metropolitan region fall on Metro, which has further stipulations for residential development within the UGB. Of course, Goal Ten only stipulates that provisions for land be made, leaving out any obligation for construction—Richard Whitman of the LCDC admits that planners "need to make sure land planning provides affordable housing, not just land" (Whitman et al. 2009), but to this day affordable housing is framed in legislative discourse less as an activity and more as what Toulan (1994, 93-94) refers to as a "land-use category."

welfare pullout of the 1980s, housing has slipped from the public fiscal agenda, and the limited federal spending that is devoted to poverty assistance is highly qualified. Jennifer Wolch explains that federal spending on programs dedicated to the poor were cut $57 billion between 1982 and 1986, a 35 percent reduction, *except* for spending on health insurance—that is, Medicare and Medicaid—and income assistance (Wolch 1990, 70). According to the Western Regional Advocacy Project, the federal government effectively created the crisis of mass-homelessness that still persists today in the elimination of billions of dollars apportioned to the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for affordable housing in the early 1980s (Western Regional Advocacy Project 2008, 1). While state and local governments have replaced the public financing for cut programs, much has been left to what Wolch calls the "voluntary sector," the tax-exempt, non-profit service provision sector. As it is, a 2007 study conducted by Oregon Housing and Community Services found that 25 percent of the 121 reporting projects in the Portland metropolitan region were losing money, many of them drawing from reserves of their non-profit sponsors (Zuhl 2008, 10-11). While some funding for the 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness is drawn from the Portland City Council general fund—between $13 and $15 million annually, since 2007 (Portland Housing Bureau 2010)—many programs are funded through federal grants to individual voluntary sector organizations. The Housing Authority of Portland, the organization who foots the bill for all Section 8 vouchers and rental assistance programs in Portland, is funded exclusively through HUD. Zuhl explains that the "cash-strapped [Multnomah] county relies on federal funding," funding "which prioritizes those cases that meet Medicare and Medicaid criteria, such as programs for mental health and the elderly," as well as addiction and recovery programs, veterans health services, and family services (Zuhl 2008, 10). "And those benefits," Zuhl continues, "stay with the individual, not the building." In Portland, public service contracts operate year-to-year, and every two years in rare cases, and unpredictable funding streams provide little incentive for housing programs that do not also meet federal grant criteria. City-mandated funding regulations require housing providers to keep units designated as affordable housing for sixty years at the very least, and as a result, housing providers in the voluntary sector tend to develop housing projects coupled with more specialized services, rather than merely affordable housing.

Portland's "funding arena" further limits the capacity for action about ending homelessness, privileging certain solutions over others. The fiscal needs of social work organizations condition the kinds of services that they are able to provide, and because much the available funding is contingent, particular understandings of the poor emerge in

accordance with those sources. Portland's social service industry has widely adopted the "Housing First"[23] and "continuum of care" philosophies to solving homelessness, and as a result, the programs offered to the poor generally link housing with clinical and counseling programs. Because poverty is categorically constructed as endogenous to the bodies of the poor, structural analyses of poverty that extend beyond tropes of illness are generally ignored. While many people experiencing homelessness do indeed suffer from severe medical problems, substance addiction, and mental illness, and may be very well served by these programs, homelessness as a general category is discursively framed within medical taxonomy, encompassing all of those living on the street, shelters, or in transitional or public housing, many of whom may not share the same life history. The diversity of homelessness, mediated through a multi-layered institutional apparatus of public-, private-, and government-sector organizations, becomes invisible, reduced to notion of a pathologically deviant poor, in contrast to normative expectations of healthy, participant citizenship, and no room is allowed for alternative constructions of the body of the poor beyond the medical diagnosis or possible solutions for the kinds of circumstances or conditions that leave them in poverty. In short, anti-poverty organizations are unable to cure what they cannot see with their own disciplinary tools of diagnosis, and those that do not conform within that discursive horizon are either incorporated into existing programs for curing poverty or are excluded and neglected. The latter will be the subjects of the final chapter, to be understood in contrast to Central City Concern's construction of the poor elaborated in the following section.

Care by the numbers

The content of an online promotional video published by Central City Concern in December of 2009 carries like most of their public documentation, newsletters, and fundraising brochures. The opening vignette follows a man shuffling through leaves beneath a gray sky, head canted to the ground, narrating a story of addiction, depression, and hopelessness. "I thought that I would live and die a dope fiend," the man recalls, "that those were just the cards I was dealt and that was who I was supposed to be…that that was my role in life." Dionne, in a different scene, explains, "I was a derelict, I was homeless, I was prostituting, I had lost a massive amount of weight, I had no morals, no self-esteem…I was using to live and living to use." Fading to black, the video claims that in 2008, 13,346

---

[23] "Housing First" methodologies understand the lack of housing as the "most critical issue facing all homeless people," and suggest that "addressing other life issues in the context of permanent housing is the best way to affect permanent change in the lives of homeless people" (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a, 2, 20).

people received some sort of housing, job support, medical treatment, and healthcare through Central City Concern programs, and that Central City Concern was in the business of "ending homelessness by attacking its root causes: addiction, mental illness, and poverty." Coupled with images of smiling people, the text asserts that Central City Concern's programs resulted in "214 babies born drug free," "2,200 people housed, not homeless," and "462 people in jobs" (Central City Concern 2009d).

Central City Concern operates five healthcare and recovery facilities in the downtown and inner east side neighborhoods, from which they provide outpatient drug and alcohol services, mental health and emotional counseling, rapid-response sobering and substance detoxification, primary medical care—including acupuncture, naturopathy, and psychiatric healthcare—and post-hospitalization assisted-housing for low-income or homeless men, women, and children, in addition to special programming for Spanish speakers. Central City Concern's addiction and rehabilitation programs have served as a model for programs across the nation, and, according to a recent study by the Regional Research Institute for Human Services at Portland State University, Central City Concern medical programs have resulted in a 95% reduction in drug use and a 93% reduction in criminal activity—usually related to drug use—among individuals who successfully completed treatment[24] (Herinckx 2008, 21). Their housing portfolio includes twenty-one buildings in the Portland metropolitan area, extending as far as Clackamas town center, serving affordable housing and Section 8 voucher tenants. As of the end of the 2007 fiscal year, 640 of the 1,458 housing units have been designated drug and alcohol free domiciles, and many of those, as well as some of the "wet" buildings, have additional support services for families, veterans, people living with HIV/AIDS, mental health concerns, and employment assistance provided by Central City Concern programs (Central City Concern 2009b). In addition to providing housing and medical support, the Central City Concern-operated Employment Access Center houses several employment assistance and vocational training programs, in addition to Central City Concern's Business Enterprises, businesses owned by Central City Concern that provide jobs to individuals who face extraordinary

---

[24] The reliability of this study, admittedly, is questionable. The study was performed "in collaboration with Central City Concern," and the 87 participants included only individuals who had completed Central City Concern programs, and tended to be older (the average age was 42). "Those who agreed to participate," the study explains, "were likely the program participants who were doing well and hand not relapsed, returned to the street or were incarcerated." The temporal aspects of the study are unclear, but results do not extend beyond two years, including treatment (Herinckx 2008).

barriers to employment, such as drug histories and felony convictions[25] (Central City Concern 2009b).

How to love your community: Central City Concern's rhetoric of "transformation"

To a certain extent, it is no surprise that Central City Concern's drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, in addition to their mental health facilities and public clinics, are very well received within the Portland community. Central City Concern's programs have indeed helped many people suffering from chronic homelessness and addiction and alcoholism. In 2002, Sisters of the Road published a searchable database of interviews conducted with people experiencing homelessness about those experiences in the Portland Old Town neighborhood. A brief search of those interviews yields numerous testimonials of Central City Concern's medical and employment programs, considerably fewer of their role as affordable housing landlords. "I went through the whole program at CCC, they helped me, those people are wonderful," a formerly homeless pipe fitter and Navy veteran explains. "I think one of the best services I've ever gotten is the project one step over at Central City Concern," another comments (Sisters of the Road 2008).

Executive Director Ed Blackburn explains that the Central City approach to addressing addiction, homelessness, and poverty is about the "possibility of transformation" within people's lives, "that transformation when a person says 'I am worth it' and 'I love my community'" (Central City Concern 2009d). Central City Concern's programs facilitate "personal change" about what their website calls four "transformational dimensions": (1) "housing that is supportive of recovery from alcohol and drug addiction," (2) "positive peer relationships fostered through involvement in a community of people in recovery," (3) "attainment of legitimate income, through meaningful employment or accessing available benefits," and (4) "transformation of world view and self image from a negative to a positive outlook, enabling people to become productive citizens who want to 'give something back' to the community" (Central City Concern 2009a). Central City Concern is more than a landlord or a doctor or a counselor, but a holistic service provider that is greater than the sum of its parts. Blackburn explains that his organization "believe[s] that [the] process [of recovery] starts with the building of a community for people by introducing them into a community where they develop a set of peer relationships that are positive and where people

---

[25] Central City Concern's Business Enterprises include: Clean and Safe, a sanitation and private security company that contracts closely with the Portland Business Alliance; Central City Janitorial, a cleaning and pest control service for downtown property owners; Central City Maintenance, a property maintenance service; and Central City Painting, an interior and exterior painting company (Central City Concern 2009b).

get guidance about how to live a new life." Richard Harris, Blackburn's predecessor as executive director at Central City Concern, recalls that,

> a lot of it has to do with providing housing, and providing recovery mentors, on top of what we might call normal outpatient services...what we've learned is that we get very good outcomes with serious heroin addicts when we provide mentors, acupuncture, health care, alcohol and drug treatment and housing, [and] if you took any of those elements out you get less outcomes (Waldroupe 2008: 10).

"It's not about housing people...not just about providing short-term alcohol and drug treatment or medications for their health," Blackburn explains, "it's about that transformation" (Central City Concern 2009d). That transformation, when program participants say "I am worth it" and "I love my community" and "I want to give back to my community," becomes clear later, of course—a spokesperson for Central City Concern proudly declares that "we're turning people into taxpayers."

The discourses Central City Concern circulates about the poor and the homeless in their public materials are very particular in their construction of serviceable bodies. As a major partner in Portland's 10-Year-Plan to End Homelessness, Central City Concern has contributed significantly to the discursive categorization of the poor within the rubrics of the medical and counseling disciplines. While Central City Concern provides and manages hundreds of units of affordable housing to over a thousand Portland residents throughout the city, Central City Concern downplays these services in their self-image. In all of their promotional artifacts, the subjects of their services are individuals battling illness, addiction, or other health issues, who can benefit from the "housing plus care" model Richard Harris claims to have invented—as former executive director Richard Harris explains, "it wasn't really until about ten years into doing this that we figured out that the services needed to match the housing...[and] we sort of invented this supportive housing model" (Central City Concern 2008a).

In a set of interviews conducted by Central City Concern entitled *The Face of Change* (2008b), graduates of recovery and drug treatment programs tell their stories of how they hit bottom:

> Aleka: *Along my path, people would look at me and ask themselves why I was doing what I was doing. I was a heroin addict by fifteen...stealing, selling drugs...why am I here, I'm stuck...I didn't just have a drug problem. I didn't just have an alcohol problem. I had a life problem...*

> Sean: *I had no hope. I thought my life was gonna be drugs, jails, institutions, and death...*

> Brian: *I obviously didn't make good decisions…All I really cared about was what came in a bottle or a can…*
>
> Ron: *My real estate career had been, you know, destroyed…I was down to a hundred and thirty pounds…with sores, you know, on my arms, and on my face. I didn't know how to stop it…*
>
> Robert: *No place of my own, no bed of my own, no roof of my own, and just, suffering…*
>
> (anonymous): *I was a cocaine addict…the only thing I had to change was everything.*

Each of these individuals, save Robert, is the image of the clinical patient, ravaged by poor decisions and the disease of addiction. They are all without hope, suffering, the material of the blighted urban sphere, their humanity reduced to their illness or affliction. The insinuation for all of them is, of course, that the only thing that they need to change about their lives is everything about their lives. Central City Concern's presentation of people like Aleka, Sean, Brian, Ron, and Robert, entextualizes the normative understandings of the poor and the homeless into their promotional material, mission statements, program protocols, and other literature, the artifacts of circulation, which then serve to define the horizon of meaning about the poor and justify their proposed solutions to the problems posed by the poor. In this sense, Central City Concern's reputation authorizes the clinical production of deviant individuals, inversely reifying a public sphere that exists in contrast to those communities, and setting the stage for those subjects to embrace what Blackburn calls the four "transformational dimensions" of "personal change" and empowerment facilitated by organizations like Central City Concern. I return to their stories, quoting at length:

> Aleka: *Central City Concern and the mentor program were able to see that I was more than just a drug addict…I was offered a chance to figure out what my potential was…Now my life is completely different, I'm a second year medical-student at OHSU, class of 2011…I will be able to go on and do whatever I want to do, if I want to do family medicine, or surgery. I will be able to have a family. I will be able to have healthy kids. I will be able to instill my kids with hopefully some of the self-worth that I have…I'm participating. I'm not one of the living dead anymore. Finally, I'm back to where I should be…I'm not sure what they saw in me, but they saw something, a dream was reawakened in me and I realized that I could possibly do it. Finally I'm back to where I know I should be…*
>
> Sean: *I actually sat in my cell and I drew a picture of what I wanted, and there was a house and two stick-figures of a guy and a wife and a couple kids, and a car and a truck and a computer, and, you know, a smiley face because I wanted to be happy. And I ran with it. I wanted it. I just bought a brand new car, I've got my own house…[Central City Concern] gave me a dream, showed me it could be done. I*

love my job, I never would have saw myself having a job like this in a million years. I mean, I have a career…

Brian: *For me, it was down to one thing: me making a decision…I am now in recovery for almost two years. I'm back to work, paying taxes. I'm working in the production department, and I can see where I'll have room to advance in this company. And now I'm feeling very confident. I feel that I can do anything that I set my mind to do…I will actually be living in my own apartment again, renting or buying a house…I'm going on to a career in business management, and Central City Concern was there to support me and they were in my corner, but I had to make it happen…*

Ron: *I remember when I went into the Hooper Center on October 23, 1990, and they said, 'you are responsible for you. This isn't anybody's fault but yours. Now what are you willing to do about it'…You come out of this stupor and you find that you've caused so much destruction, so you have to systematically go back and fix everything. You know, little by little you start to gain something, some kind of self-respect…In 2003 I was named realtor of the year for Portland, which was a big honor. Today, I am happily married, I've been married seventeen years now, our children are all grown, and my youngest is now a junior in college. We have two grandsons, and my wife and I see them constantly, you know, they're a real joy. And then my youngest daughter, who grew up going to meetings with me, is now going to have her first set of twins with her husband. This coming October 23rd, a little later this month, I'll have eighteen years…I made amends to the IRS, I made amends to the court system…We're planning for our retirement, I don't have any real complaints. Things are going well…*

Robert: *Learning to face life on life's terms is a big thing for me. I'm working, believe it or not, as a carpenter's apprentice for Walsh Construction. I've been there a little over four months. It's great, to sit here and be a part of society, not just watching society, I'm not on the sideline anymore, I'm actually in there doing things that, I come to find out, I like doing. It's a way of rediscovering Robert. Somewhere in this life I've lost him, but now, he's a great guy (laughing)…I'm alright with myself, you know, I like myself today. I'm pretty with which way life is headed…*

Pervading all of these "transformation" narratives is the adherence of problems upon the selves of those entering treatment or support programs. Responsibility and fault are overtly located in the decisions, life-choices, capacities, and wills of the individuals who make use of Central City Concern's services, reducing and reconstituting their diverse personal histories into the clinical history of a disease. Central City Concern's patients, tenants, and other clients are recontextualized within a teleology of transformation that removes people like Robert and Aleka and the rest from the "sideline," from the ranks of the "living dead," and allows them to rediscover themselves and refashion themselves as meaningful participants in society. What that means for these people is joining the workforce, starting families, accumulating possessions that mark social stability, and recovering debts, precisely the kinds of normative values that mark acceptable contemporary citizenship. In these transformation

stories, refashioned subjects have been "made to act" in new capacities, performing public citizenship in ways they were previously unable. Central City Concern prides itself in instilling community consciousness in its clients, acknowledging that peer relationships are perhaps the most important tools in learning to live a new life. Transformation often means reconstituting individuals who are not "worth it," who do not "love [their] community," into "proper" public citizens who love not just any community, but *the* community of the projected public, of which they have become a part.

Perhaps the most revealing instance of this public becoming can be read in the recurring trope of "giving back" that pervades Central City Concern's public rhetoric. John Means, a career counselor with one of Central City Concern's partners, explains that Central City Concern's social programs are designed so that program participants can have the self-sufficiency to be able to "stop being takers from society and start being givers to society" (Central City Concern 2008c). Most of Central City Concern's clients "develop a passion to give back to the community," Blackburn suggests, "and the reason for that is that it's about self-healing, about acknowledging the trauma and disruption they caused to themselves and to the community at large" (Central City Concern 2009c). Inherent in the practices of "transformation" and "giving back" is the internalization of the "trauma" they have wrought on themselves and the public. Once again, causality and blame for poverty, illness, and other affliction is rendered endogenous to the bodies of Central City Concern's clients, and effectively justifying the treatment of people in housing programs as incomplete citizens. Community service, paying taxes, and making amends to the courts are construed as productive practices for reentering the public sphere—in a very real sense, they are the training rituals for public involvement in Portland's political sphere.

The discursive practices designed to end homeless(ness) of organizations like Central City Concern has done much to delegitimize homeless communities, or to recast and diagnose them as communities of particular deviance, clinical or otherwise. In the diagnosis, treatment, and "transformation" of the bodies of the poor, Central City Concern reifies normative publics while refashioning and assimilating deviance into *the* community. *The* community, the Central City Concern spokesperson indicates, is that of the taxpayer, and Central City Concern's recovery and housing services are instrumental in reintegrating and assimilating deviants into the logic of the social contract. After all, public space is taxpayer's space, and eliminating homeless(ness) is both a strategy of reaffirming the *public* but also reaffirming proper use of public *space.* Eliminating homeless(ness) is fundamentally a matter of reducing the anxieties of the public, by either reducing the poor to "bare life" or incorporating them within the governable rubrics of citizenship.

IN CLOSURE: THE NEOLIBERAL SUBJECT

The privatization of welfare services is but one of many aspects scholars have identified in characterizing the ongoing shift from a liberal to a *neo*liberal politico-economic policy (Brown 2005; Lemke 2001; Lyon-Callo 2004; Cruikshank 1999). The shift from the criminalization of the homeless to the "continuum of care" for the homeless has also facilitated a shift from a liberal understanding of urban citizenship—in which one could expect the "relative autonomy" and protection of public institutions such as law, elections, the police, the public sphere, and welfare, from one another and from economic territorialization (Brown 2005, 45-46)—to a neoliberal understanding of citizenship and governmentality. Lyon-Callo writes that neoliberalism, at its very essence "works to displace attention from structural violence and onto the individualized bodies of homeless people," so that, as Marvasti finds, welfare services are supplied only with an ideological "obligation on the part of the client to make progress toward 'independence,'" an independence to assimilate into the post-industrial marketplace of urban space, and to celebrate the freedom of paying taxes without institutional assistance. And perhaps more paradoxical, when coupled with the pathologization of the poor, the privatization of social service provision, in its awkward perversity, creates a professional class whose only sense of financial security is dependent on the existence of the very population it purports to eliminate—Lyon-Callo follows that neoliberalism "works to produce not only homelessness within wealth, but also the rhetorical support for such conditions" (Lyon-Callo 2004, 172-173; Marvasti 2003, 94) And it is precisely knowledge of that kind of rhetorical support that is fundamental to any sort of reimagining of urban poverty, and of Portland's neoliberal landscape.

3 THE LIMINALITY OF ADDRESS

Art, a tenant in Central City Concern's Butte Building, recounted the following story at a February 21 meeting of the Tenant Rights Project. On an evening during March 2009, the fire alarm went off in the Butte Building, a "wet" single-room-occupancy hotel managed by Central City Concern to provide low-income housing and located on NW 8th Avenue in Old Town. It was after 9pm, so the daytime supervisor had already gone home and the building office was locked and empty. When the Portland Fire Department knocked on the door of the NW 8th Avenue entrance to the building, they were let in to learn two things. First, there was no emergency, and the alarm had gone off either because someone pulled the switch or that the system had tripped inadvertently. Second, they learned that the alarm circuit was located inside the building office. Taped to the door of all the offices and buildings managed by Central City Concern, the Butte included, is a list of telephone numbers and email addresses for various concerns, emergencies, and questions. Of the several on-call numbers, only the call to the Richard L. Harris Building was answered, and the operator there told the fire sergeant that nothing could be done and that he should just "let the tenants deal with it" until the morning. After kicking in the door to the office and resetting the alarm system, the fire sergeant turned to one tenant and asked, "What's wrong with Central City Concern?" "That's just it," the tenant responded, "Central City Concern." "How can you deal with this shit?" the sergeant followed. The tenant, in tired resignation, replied, "I guess it's not as bad as some of the tenants in this building."[26]

This and other accounts narrated by tenants illustrate an enduring gap that exists between Central City Concern's public face and the experiences of many of their tenants. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that urban homelessness and poverty have been constructed as tokens of clinical deviance, counterposed against ideological expectations about the use of public space and the parameters of urban citizenship. The "continuum of care" model of addressing structural problems has facilitated the rise in comprehensive, holistic solutions that are designed to put the marginalized back on their feet, to be

---

[26] This, and other anecdotes from tenants of Central City Concern buildings, were gathered in meetings of the Tenants Rights Project that I attended between the months of January and May in the spring of 2010. The Tenants Rights Project is a group of approximately ten, predominantly white, male residents in downtown affordable and Section-8 housing buildings and single-room-occupancy hotels. The TRP has met every Sunday evening in the first-floor lobby of the Biltmore Building on NW Everett Street in Old Town. The group meets to discuss livability concerns and issues in public housing buildings, particularly those managed by Central City Concern, and how best to address those problems.

reincorporated into mainstream society. Central City Concern has played an important part of that mission within Portland's service provision sector, and has worked closely with the City to provide important services to the poor and to the homeless.

This chapter stems from accounts I gathered from residents of the Butte and Biltmore buildings, owned and managed by Central City Concern, during Tenant Rights Project meetings. The experience of many tenants in Central City Concern buildings has not reflected the kinds of holistic care and admired charity about which Central City Concern has earned its reputation. The actual tenant experience in the Butte and Biltmore buildings is a grave departure from the transformative communities that Blackburn and Central City Concern representatives tout as the undergirding of successful work to end homelessness and urban poverty. Thus, the first half of this chapter will characterize this departure, in the flaking paint, the encroaching mold, the bedbug infestations, and the incessant violence and drug use and trafficking that mark living in Central City Concern's public housing buildings.

Many of the tenants in the Butte and the Biltmore buildings, neither of which are "program buildings,"[27] are the anomalies of Central City Concern's projection of the homeless. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Central City Concern has taken great pains to render incomplete and diseased the bodies of the poor, and they have defined the normative categories of the poor and the homeless as a form of abject[28] bare life in contrast to and constitutive of an exclusionary public. Many residents of the Butte and Biltmore buildings, rather, have resisted the pathologizations of the "continuum of care" methodology, taking residence in Central City Concern buildings not because of addiction or illness or criminal problems, but because they are unable to afford anywhere else. These individuals have neither internalized poverty nor availed themselves for transformation, and as a result have become suspended in an institutional process that expects them to rediscover themselves so as to leave the sidelines and rejoin society. The second half of this chapter, then, will articulate how Central City Concern's housing practices effectively depoliticize their tenants as meaningful social actors. Considering the "transformation" as a ritual of becoming, a *rite de passage* for the poor, I argue that Central City Concern's

---

[27] "Program buildings" are those that, in addition to housing, provide medical, counseling, recovery, or other services, and they generally have stricter and more comprehensive rules and requirements of their tenants.

[28] I refer briefly here to Butler's (1993, 3) theorization of the abject, as "those who are not yet 'subjects,' but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject," who indicates "precisely those 'unlivable' and 'uninhabitable' zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the 'unlivable' is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject." Though bare life and the abject are related, the abject in this sense refers more explicitly to the constitution of excluded selves, while Agamben's term designates a form of biopolitical citizenship under the state apparatus.

transitional housing practices effectively fix the bodies of the poor within what Turner (1967) calls a "liminal," "interstructural situation," reducing them to both structural and physical invisibility within the city—the homeless, thus, are both removed from the streets and from the public imagination of citizenship. As a result, Central City Concern has managed to defer accountability for problems in their buildings, refuting the tenants' claims to legitimacy, and reinscribing a second-class citizenship and subject-position within the poor.

Following Ferguson's theoretical arc, the question of the truth or falsity of discourses about public housing is not the principal focus of this chapter—despite that it is, indeed, true that much of the public discourse circulated by Central City Concern is a misrepresentation of the lived experiences of their tenants. Rather, the goal of this chapter is to demonstrate, paraphrasing Ferguson, that "the institutionalized production of certain kinds of ideas about [affordable housing and voluntary-sector anti-poverty work] has important effects, and that the production of such ideas plays an important role in the production of certain kinds of structural change." Presuming that "thinking is as 'real' an activity as any other," and that " ideas and discourses have important and very real social consequences," we are concerned here, as in the earlier chapters, not with "an abstract set of philosophical or scientific propositions" that can be verified or denied, but rather "an elaborate contraption that *does* something" (Ferguson 1994, xv).

Unclean and Unsafe: Behind the Façade of Central City Concern's Single-Room-Occupancy Hotels

Affordable housing is rarely part of Central City Concern's public self-representation, but when it is, it is particular. A promotional video lauds Central City Concern's contributions to providing affordable housing within Portland's metropolitan area—"23 buildings provide 1,400 units of affordable housing," it reads—the camera panning through the courtyard of Sunrise Place. Located in northeast Portland, Sunrise Place is an immaculate 10-unit rowhouse, replete with staffed medical and support services, that serves women recovering from alcohol and drug abuse. As the scene changes, images of the Butte and Biltmore buildings, Central City Concern's downtown "wet" buildings, are projected as Howard Weiner, the Old Town/Chinatown Neighborhood Association chairman and the owner of Old Town's Cal State Skateboards company, praises the work of Blackburn's organization. "The neighborhood is so much better," Weiner remarks, "and so much has been done to improve this neighborhood, in particular the efforts of Central City Concern, not only in their programming but in their restoration of so many buildings and the restoration of people's lives (Central City Concern 2009d)." In this instance, and in others,

CCC constructs the image of affordable housing as either an integrated program that exists only in concert with their work as medical service providers, or, as in the case of Central City Concern's single-room-occupancy (SRO) residential buildings like the Butte and the Biltmore, fulfilling an important mission to preserve the iconic spirit of the downtown neighborhood and to control the auspices of urban blight. Residents of the Butte and Biltmore buildings are rhetorically likened to downtown Portland's infrastructural renewal and accelerating gentrification, cast once again cast as the blighted objects of "restoration," the normative subjects-in-the-making thanks to the extended charitable hand of Central City Concern. Behind the brick façades and within the walls of those buildings, Weiner's community transformation is not quite as complete.

The meaning of temporary housing

It is an unfortunate fact that there are more homeless people, or people unable to afford private-sector housing rents, than there are institutional units to house those people (Citizens Commission on Homelessness 2004a; Western Regional Advocacy Project 2008). "There isn't enough service money out there, or subsidized rental units to serve everybody," Ed Blackburn explains in an interview, "so it's important from a practical standpoint that we can move people along, but therapeutically, when a person is able to attain that ability to contribute to their own development and to that of the community" (Central City Concern 2009d). While most of Central City Concern's public image is, indeed, representative of programs that couple housing with additional services, their affordable housing mantra, as articulated by Blackburn, corresponds well with the "holistic," "continuum of care" model employed in the rest of their programming. In describing Central City Concern's commitment to providing affordable housing, Blackburn reaffirms the construction of the homeless as pathologically deviant subjects needing therapy, subjects that are teleologically fixed within a narrative that sees the poor through authorized services in becoming legitimate citizens who want to make amends and give back to the community.

Transitional housing, in theory, is, by nature of its name, *transitional*, temporary and stabilizing, and is understood as part of the "tough love" required to end homelessness and to force individuals to confront the problems within themselves that are prohibiting them from accessing or keeping permanent housing (Feldman 2004, 83; Lyon-Callo 2004, 51). By mediating between the expectations and demands of a public or donor pool that expects homelessness to be successfully eradicated and the needs—albeit institutionally-determined *legitimate* needs—of homeless clients, transitional housing is the solution to what one shelter director explains is the "hurt" done to the very people that shelters profess to serve by allowing them to "lead [a] desolate life and contribute to their lethargy" (Marvasti 2003, 92).

KBOO host Jo Ann Bowman, in a radio interview with tenants of the Biltmore Building articulates the dominant understanding of Central City Concern's affordable housing vision: "I don't think anyone thinks that SROs should be permanent housing for anyone, so supposedly it's a transitional opportunity for people to move from homelessness, from crisis, into some ability to stabilize their lives and then move on to something that's more permanent" (Mazza and Bowman 2009).

As Tenant Rights Project organizer Lew Church explains, this common perception of Central City Concern is inappropriate. "[The experience of] some of the tenants in this particular building, the Biltmore, and in some of the other Central City buildings, is different than the marketing image that Central City projects," Church notes. "This is permanent housing for a lot of low-income people," he explains, and while "some of them are paid through third parties, some people have jobs and pay all or most of their rent" (Mazza and Bowman 2009). Some tenants in Central City Concern's single-room-occupancy hotels have, indeed, lived in the same building for more than a decade, and one former organizer with the Tenant Rights Project was approaching his twentieth year in the Biltmore Building before he passed away at the end of 2009 (Church 2009). "This is kind of the way that Central City Concern says they don't have to be accountable to tenants," Church concludes, "because it's low-income housing and these people should be glad that they're there" (Mazza and Bowman 2009).

And it is not for a lack of trying to leave. Imploring City Council to take responsibility for crime and drug use in the Butte Building, tenant Randy Toole—a former lawyer—articulated his situation. "I'm not [in Central City Concern housing] because of alcoholism, or drug addiction," he told the councilors, "I'm there because of the economy, I can't find a job, I'm stuck here, I'm trying to do something about it" (Portland City Council 2010). Toole and many other tenants of the Central City Concern's affordable housing are explicit in characterizing the reasons for their tenancy in public housing. Economic troubles, usually stemming from the loss or forced relocation of employment, have placed many individuals unable to afford housing onto the streets, onto housing placement waiting lists, or if they are lucky, into one of several thousand subsidized housing units throughout the city. Because many tenants' rents are subsidized through Housing Authority grants or through Section 8 housing vouchers, their leaving public housing is contingent on the ability to afford the steadily increasing housing prices in the private sector, or to find landlords willing to accept Section 8 tenants. As it is, public housing tenants and the homeless face significant obstacles in finding either employment or stable housing. Landlords and potential employers often mistrust applicants with addresses at shelters or public housing projects, and most jobs available consist of night shifts or swing shifts unfeasible to the

homeless—"if I get a swing shift or a night shift job," one homeless man explains, "where do I sleep…and if I lay down, are [the police] going to leave me alone long enough to get some rest?" (Yanke and Shannon 2009). For those inside public housing buildings, safety and health concerns are prohibitive to establishing the supportive community that Blackburn and other Central City Concern advocates assert is so important to ending homelessness within individuals. Public housing advocates like those in the Tenant Rights Project have expressed their concerns about livability in public housing buildings, concerns that will be elaborated in the next section, but those have fallen on deaf, bureaucratic ears. Whereas Church and other tenants argue that, "under landlord-tenant law, along with some other things, like Multnomah County health regulations and HUD regulations, there's an important requirement to provide livable and habitable housing that's free from things like pest infestation…and [is] safe and secure," Blackburn holds, following the very essence of *transitional* housing, that tenants should just "be glad that they're inside and not outside during the cold weather (Church, paraphrasing Blackburn)" (Mazza and Bowman 2009). Because housing is fundamentally transitional, it is not meant to be permanently livable, and as a result is not accountable to permanent housing standards. Unfortunately for many tenants, the standards to which their homes have been held have become, to a great extent, permanently unlivable.

Walls of Neglect

On the wall immediately to the left of the office in the Butte Building, a painted area larger than a sheet of letter paper has flaked off, revealing torn and cracked drywall, discolored and stained from neglect. In the center of the damaged section of wall, someone has written in marker the words "FIX ME." According to one tenant, the writing, not to mention the hole in the wall, has been there for several months.

Building neglect is, for many tenants of Central City Concern's buildings, an understatement. The halls of the Butte are a mosaic of chipped plaster, peeling or nonexistent paint, brown stains from leaking water, cracked molding, and filthy carpets. The walls are punctuated with open, exposed wiring, often directly below apparent water damage, and every foot of molding carries a layer of dust and grime. Residents of each floor share a single bathroom—in the Butte, the thirty-eight rooms are split between two floors—which is perpetually unkempt and dirty. The tile floors are lined with black grout, the toilet is stained with human feces, and, as elsewhere, the walls are a patchwork of dirty brown stains. Colonies of black mold can be found growing on the ceiling, as well as on ceiling sections of the hallways. And the toilet seat has been broken for over a month—"some people are handicapped in this building…," one resident explains. Inside individual rooms, wall and

ceiling damage is just as it is in the hallways and bathrooms. The carpeting in private rooms ranges from splotchy brown to completely black—one tenant recalls that earlier in 2009, the room of a different tenant was used as a staging area for maintenance work, and because the room was never cleaned after the repairs were completed, the rug in that room is nearly black from dirt. Each room is outfitted with a kitchenette unit, with two stove burners, a sink with hot and cold water, and a few cabinets, in addition to a separate miniature refrigerator. One tenant mentioned that it took a few months to have a broken refrigerator replaced, and another said the same of a malfunctioning stovetop. Of course, even for those tenants willing to make repairs themselves, they are not reimbursed under "repair and deduct" protocol because they live in subsidized housing, nor are they allowed to do most repairs even on their own budget.

Pest infestation has also been a large problem in Central City Concern Buildings. Dennis Priebe, a tenant of the Biltmore Building, said in the April 2 issue of the *Portland Mercury* that he has needed to discard most of his belongings because they were crawling with mice, cockroaches, lice, bedbugs, and other insects. "You'd rather live underneath the bridge," he adds (Thomas 2009). In a Tenant Rights Project Meeting on January 19, 2010, two tenants of the Butte Building explained that it took several months for Central City Concern to respond to complaints made earlier in 2009. Ed Blackburn does admit that in the past Central City Concern has fallen behind in addressing pest infestation (Thomas 2009), yet—in response to the Thomas editorial one week later—"that Central City Concern has done nothing about bedbugs that infested a number of rooms at the Biltmore Hotel is *false*," and that "a comprehensive treatment of the whole building, including free laundry, free disposal of unwanted property, and spraying was done several weeks before" (Blackburn 2009). Tenants, on the other hand, claim that they had submitted complaint paperwork months before Thomas' article went to print, and that Central City Concern didn't provide adequate treatment to completely eradicate bedbugs from the building.

Drugs and Safety

By far the greatest concern for the Central City Concern tenants attending Tenant Rights Project meetings is the lack of security they feel in the buildings, mostly because of the rampant drug use and dealing that they claim plagues almost every Central City Concern building. "There are times I really wonder [if I feel safe here]," one tenant explains, "like Tuesday morning I went out to eat, I came back and my room smelled like crack cocaine, and I don't smoke crack cocaine." "And when I first moved in," he continues, "you'd find blood in the hallways, after somebody came in, a drug dealer, to get somebody when a deal went sour or wrong" (Mazza and Bowman 2009). Another tenant recounts times when he's

witnessed fights in the hallways or overheard violent threats in adjacent rooms. And another tenant indicated that he has had to draw his knife to protect himself after being violently threatened by a building guest—one who had already been trespassed from the building—on numerous occasions. "If he makes one move," the man asserts, "I will hold CCC liable for any retaliation that I make, and I *will* retaliate." The other tenants are also very clear about their knowledge of drug use and crime in their buildings, and much of TRP meetings consists of grievances about recent encounters. Because TRP meetings are held by the front door of the Biltmore Building, other residents of the buildings come in and out, and tenants identify drug dealers as they sign their clients in on the guest list upon entering and sign them out when they leave. Residents of the Butte Building express similar significant concerns about the crowds that gather outside of the Sisters of the Road Café, directly below their windows. Drug use is common on the corner of NW Davis Street and NW Sixth Avenue—and throughout the northwest bus mall—tenants claim, and fights often break out late into the night. "It's pretty pathetic," another tenant notes, "when you can't go out the front door without getting harassed."

Many of the complaints borne by tenants in the Butte and Biltmore Buildings are in response to events that occur after the building desk workers have left for the night. As it is, the policy regarding guest and visitor check-in is hardly enforced, and people knowingly use fake aliases, false host names, and deliberately illegible handwriting, if they check-in at all. After 9pm, when the day monitor's shift ends, it becomes even worse. Tenants have repeatedly asked Central City Concern to hire a permanent night monitor to police rampant abuse of visitor rules, but they have been met with the same response each time, that Central City Concern is unable to afford a full-time position.

Of course, other tenants and their guests are not the only problems. According to one tenant, a set of janitorial keys went missing early in the year 2009, yet it took until the end of the year for Central City Concern to change the locks in the Biltmore. The tenant explains over the course of several months, his identification card, truck deed, passport, and other important documents went missing from his locked room. "Somebody's got the keys," he says annoyedly, "and that's not okay." He blames Central City Concern for neglecting to change the locks when they knowingly lost the keys. Of course, in sad irony, when he went to report the loss of his truck deed, they required his personal identification to prove that it was actually his. Even certain employees of Central City Concern acknowledge that something needs to be done about security in the Butte and Biltmore buildings. In response to a tenant's complaint, one employee remarked, gesticulating in the direction of the Central City Concern administrative offices on NW Sixth Avenue, "It's not us that's the problem, it's them."

"Everybody is here to make things better": The craft of public consensus

Frustrations about Central City Concern's lack of responsibility towards its tenants came to a head on January 10, 2010, when Central City Concern organized a community forum among Central City Concern, the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, the Portland Police Department, Sisters of the Road, and tenants of Central City Concern buildings. Besides members of the Tenant Rights Project, only Brian Lee, a lawyer hired by Ed Blackburn—for the purpose of, among other things, addressing issues held by the Tenant Rights Project—and Mike Boyer, the Crime Prevention Program Coordinator of the Office Neighborhood Involvement for the Downtown and Old Town/Chinatown neighborhoods, were in attendance. The meeting, they suggested, marked the beginning of collaboration between Central City Concern and the Office of Neighborhood Involvement to address problems in the Butte and Biltmore Buildings.

Lee indicated that, as part of their joint commitment to crack down in the buildings, they were in the process of implementing a periodic knock-and-talk regimen with the Portland police, with officers going door-to-door at the end of visitation times to check on suspicious rooms. Responding to tenants' concerns about police incursions on privacy—"how many false knockings will it take," one tenant asked, "before CCC is at fault for imprudent policing"—Lee implored tenants to think about the situation in terms of cost-benefit. He explained that "this is not a problem that can be solved overnight, but it's meant to elevate the overall standard of living in the buildings," and that the benefits of such a policy outweigh the "small hassle" of police knocking on the door or a more enforced sign-in policy. While tenants understood the problem as one that could be ameliorated with the establishment of a 24-hour monitor in the buildings, Central City Concern approached the problem of safety and drugs in the buildings as one better solved by random policing. "We don't have the money," Lee admits in response to tenants' demands for a night attendant." "All the time we hear about deals where the City gives $1 million here to Blackburn and another $3 million there," a tenant responds, disbelievingly, "and you're telling me there's no money?...You need to understand, safety is the bottom line, it's just the bottom line." Another tenant even suggests that "if someone were at that desk all day, there wouldn't be any problems" in the buildings. As part of formulating a collaborative solution to safety concerns, Boyer and Lee translated tenants concerns into their own cost-benefit analysis, mobilizing Portland's progressive political process which understood cooperation between Central City Concern, the police, and tenants as a more cost-effective and broadly inclusive

resolution, and as more effective in fostering a public consensus about the issue than hiring a new position within Central City Concern.

The forum, for the most part, consisted of tenants forcefully explaining that Central City Concern's efforts at addressing problems thus far had been gravely inadequate. "What are you actually doing to help the problem?" they repeatedly ask Boyer and Lee, asserting that the self-policing protocols like Neighborhood Watch and "Guardian Angels," drug education programming, and cooperative organizing amongst tenants that the two administrators suggested have either failed or been discouraged by Central City Concern management in the past. Boyer and Lee suggested that cooperation with the Central City Concern, the Police Bureau, and the Office of Neighborhood Involvement is the kind of work which will "set a new tone" in the building. "I want you to all to know that it's my job to do community organizing," Boyer tells concernedly, "and I really want to figure something out here, that's my passion." He continues, "everybody is here to make things better, I'm coming off a 60-hour workweek, missing the Blazers game and dinner with my son, to work with you because I believe in it." Lee, too, speaks to his own sincerity: "you have to realize," he entreats, "this is me trying to help you guys." In the spirit of working together, Boyer's take-home message for the tenants is that "there is no end to problems in the city," as if they weren't familiar already with them, and "I need you all to do your part so that I can do my job." "Please work *with* the City and with Central City Concern to make things better," he begs, "give us some patience, I know you've already given a lot of patience, but a little more, we're really working to make this better." Boyer told the assembled tenants that the "very best" thing to do is to report everything that happens in the buildings to him or to the building office, especially because written documentation better enables the police to attain a Hayden Warrant that enables officers to conduct searches and arrests. He explains that if he has documentation of complaints, he can go to the police bureau and more effectively argue that the downtown neighborhoods are worthy of attention, and particularly the Central City Concern buildings.

After just over an hour, the meeting ended, and Lee and Boyer packed up their things and filed out as tenants reached for packs of cigarettes concealed in the breast pockets of their shirts or climbed the stairs to their rooms to catch the final quarter of the Blazers' game.

The Incommensurability of Liberal Practice and Ideology and the Violence of "Working Together"

The following week, tenants expressed their disappointment with the community forum—it was "a complete joke," one tenant recalled. Since the forum, crime has persisted

in the buildings, and the police have yet to perform their drop-ins. Despite the intentions of Boyer and Lee, which were, indeed, sincere, little has changed for tenants.

The forum revealed the ideological authority of the political process that dominates the public debate about the poor and the appropriate recourses to address blight and poverty in the downtown neighborhoods. "Since Kant," Povinelli writes, "great faith and store has been placed in public reason as a means of diluting the glue that binds people unreflectively to moral or epistemological obligations and, at the same time, as a means of fusing, defusing and refusing deontological and epistemological horizons" (Povinelli 2001, 326). Liberal public reason, as a "form of communication in which free and equal citizens present truth claims to other free and equal citizens who accept or reject these claims on the basis of their truth, sincerity, and legitimacy," is part of the foundation of Portland's embrace of civic engagement, and it has been granted "the power of refashioning social institutions by continually opening them to the current consensus about what constitutes the most legitimate form(s) of public life" (Povinelli 2001, 326). The forum's emphasis on working together reflects the discursive tools that are put into play in formulating and reformulating the ideological underpinnings of the Portland progressivism. Public debate and dialogue around issues, particularly issues that stem from ideological difference, attempt to determine and manufacture what Povinelli calls shared "social epistemologies and moral obligations," and in the process, "moral obligation and its conditioning of freedom opens to a broader moral horizon, the I-you dyad to a we-horizon" (Povinelli 2001, 326). Boyer and Lee are community organizers, and in a very true sense, they are interested in consensual solutions to the enduring problems within the Butte and Biltmore Buildings, among others. However, both men, as employees of the City of Portland and of Central City Concern, respectively, inhabit subject positions that necessarily conceive of solutions to problems within the framework of the public vision and purpose of the City. As a result, institutional prerogative—that is, concerns about economic solvency, political diplomacy, and future possibility—is held with equal, if not greater, weight as are the claims for livability maintained by tenants. "In liberal democracies," Povinelli explains, " the corrective function of public reason is not merely located in the give and take of discourse, but in the give and take of formal and informal institutions…between the public sphere, civil society, [and] various formal institutions of government" (Povinelli 2001, 327). As argued before, many of those institutions are founded upon a conception of an urban public as a stable homogeneity, and alterity, like that of the homeless and the poor, threatens the political legitimacy of those institutions. As a result, solutions to the problems like those raised by tenants are reframed into possibilities for collective action between tenants, city officials, and Central City Concern, that glosses inequality and structural constraints. Public reason, as *the*

foundational process of contemporary politicking in Portland, manufactures ideological consent through the discursive give and take between people and institutions with differing legitimacy and authority. Public reason is highly discursive, and the discursive tools employed in the will-to-truth of public reason are the sites of contestation between different public actors with different ideological subject positions and varying degrees of public legitimacy. From this standpoint, as Povinelli suggests, the gaps between reasoned public debate and severe forms of governmental and nongovernmental control can be seen as "always already allowing repressive acts," rather than "edging toward a horizon of shared epistemic and moral values" that public reason asserts to do (Povinelli 2001, 327). Moments like the forum illustrate how radically different worlds can be construed as —and discursively coerced into—"moving torward a nonviolent shared horizon," as the "peaceful proceduralism of communicative reason, rather than as violent intolerance"(Povinelli 2001, 327). Ideologies of social change are discursively reified in the form of a publicly consensual visioning and planning in concert, effectively eliminating the possibility of any sort of radical or systemic critique of structural inequalities such as urban poverty.

"Central City Unconcerned": Neglect, Accountability, and the Right to Truth in the Butte and Biltmore Buildings

At a February 24, 2010, City Council meeting, tenant Randy Toole told Councilors Leonard, Fish, and Saltzman the following:

> I live in a CCC building, this stuff [the drugs and violence] has filtered into my building to where it's bringing my standard of living down...I've brought it to property management, I want people to start taking some accountability for their position on, you know, you're providing housing, you got to be accountable for what you're providing. You're allowing it to happen. There should be a line drawn, and I'm asking the city to really step in and make these business accountable, you know they're accepting federal money, there's federal grants out there that are accepting these, they should be held to a standard on what you can, you know, *do*. If you're going to be accepting that money, you got to be policing your own property, to police the action that's happening here. You can't allow this stuff to happen no more. Basically, I'm asking the city to step in on that, you know, to investigate some of this stuff. (Portland City Council 2010)

Tenants in Central City Concern's single-room-occupancy hotels have not been silent about their grievances about livability in their buildings. Members of the Tenant Rights Project and other organizers have submitted dozens of complaint forms to Central City Concern management, testified before City Council, and have submitted articles to the *Portland Mercury, The Oregonian,* the *Willamette Week*, and *Street Roots*, among others. Regardless, they

have seen little feedback from Central City Concern or the City of Portland. In many cases, complaints by tenants and other public advocates have been disregarded on the grounds of "alleged" hearsay and undue slander. Central City Concern provides many welfare services where the City of Portland is unable, and has a very good reputation within the liberal-progressive community in Portland; as a result, they are not easily incriminated. As suggested earlier, Central City Concern's discursive control of a large part of Portland's service-provision voluntary sector has little room for truth claims made by public housing tenants, and generally has the discursive authority to determine the credence of those claims. Frequently, that has meant simple denial of problems raised by tenants like those in the Tenant Rights Project.

Lost in transition(al) housing

Transitional housing tenants, particularly those who have remained in transitory housing for several years, have become neglected within a "continuum of care" program that contends to usher the poor and the homeless into new roles as urban citizens. Residents of the Butte and Biltmore Buildings present a significant problem for the anti-poverty practices employed by Central City Concern's programs. The Butte and Biltmore are "wet" buildings, where alcohol and legal drugs are permitted, and they do not have the clinical, counseling, family support, or other services associated with many of Central City Concern's other properties. As a result, techniques of internalizing poverty within the bodies of the poor, especially clinical techniques of pathologizing homelessness as mental illness, have been partly ineffective in accomplishing the kinds of self-governance that Foucault, Cruikshank, Feldman, and Lyon-Callo identify as the formative practices of remaking liberal subjectivities. One tenant attests that "[CCC] wants to treat us like homeless program scum—no, we're smarter than that, we are not scum." "They want to discard us as the homeless, helpless, who will just bend over and kiss their asses," he continues, sharply, "no one should have to bend over and kiss someone's ass." Tenants' resistance to what Blackburn calls the "possibility of transformation" strips them of the possibility of becoming the "productive citizens who want to 'give something back' to the community." Unlike those to whom belonged the transformation narratives of the previous chapter, the tenants of the Butte and Biltmore are not becoming the "taxpayers" that mark the urban citizen as a legitimate occupier of public space, and as a result, they remain within the instability of bare life, incorporated into the state's purview as outlaws, controlled and reduced by the violence, illness, and crime engendered by affordable housing neglect, and yet withheld and forbidden the rights of full citizens. They are reduced to bare life, both forbidden legitimacy within the discursive field of public circulation and persecuted because of their exclusion from it.

In a particular sense, Central City Concern's affordable housing projects begin to resemble what Agamben calls the *camp*, the "most biopolitical space that has ever been realized," where "naked life and political life enter a zone of absolute indeterminacy" and "the state of exception starts to become the rule." The Butte and the Biltmore Buildings are, to a certain extent, the zones of exception where the self-determinacy, rights, and legitimacy of tenants is put into question. This thesis has sought to answer, following Agamben, the question not of how the kinds of neglect, deligitimation, and diminution that tenants of the Butte and Biltmore experience daily is permitted in today's juridico-democratic political sphere, but rather how "human beings could have been so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives to the point that committing any act toward them would no longer appear as a crime" (Agamben 2000, 38-41). The filth, disrepair, and violence that residents of the buildings endure daily primarily reflects not the intentions of Central City Concern, but rather the discursive field that produces the poor as second-class and not worthy of full citizenship and its associated rights. In the public consensus manufactured in the practice of a progressive politics, a public is reified at the exclusion or reduction of alterity.

While Agamben's understanding the camp is primarily exclusionary, I wish to suggest that the Butte and Biltmore Buildings comprise a state of exception within a national teleology that is both exclusionary and pedagogical, and that attempts to reconstitute bare life into meaningful, productive national citizenship. The camp, or the transitional housing project, serves as both the location of anxieties about the heterogeneity of territorial populations and precisely the site of refashioning a national homogeneity. Drawing from Turner's theorization of liminal ritual and Douglas' conception of "matter out of place," Central City Concern's transitional housing programs can be understood, in theory, as liminal camps that are designed not to maintain bare life but rather to mediate the transformation *from* criminality *through* liminal bare life *to* full citizenship.

Turner characterizes *rites de passage*, or transition rituals, as marked by three distinct states: separation, margin or *limen*, and aggregation. The ritual subject first detaches from fixed structural conditions and recognition, entering into a state of ambiguity in which "he passes through a realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state," until he or she is consummated and reconstituted within a stable state once more, endowed with clearly defined rights, obligations, ethics, and "structural type" (Turner 1967, 94). Central City Concern's rhetoric of transformation places their subjects within a similar kind of teleology, in which the homeless and the poor are expected to self-diagnose and detach themselves from their communities to be reconstituted post-treatment and post-transformation as refashioned, normative subjects. Tenancy in transitional housing, then, can be understood as a kind of liminal state of bare life, in which subjects are neither

threatening to the ideological public stability nor within the proper parameters of normative citizenship. Turner explains that the "subject of passage ritual is, in the liminal period, structurally, if not physically, 'invisible,'" essentially "unstructured," which is "at once destructured and prestructured" (Turner 1967, 95, 98). Liminal subjects are "betwixt and between all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification," stripped of "rights over property, goods, and services," and any "status...insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship, position, [with] nothing to demarcate them structurally from their fellows" (Turner 1967, 97-99). In the liminality of public housing projects, the poor are pragmatically reduced to their illnesses or afflictions, constituted solely by their incompleteness or their segregation from the public. The poor are constructed in buildings like the Butte and Biltmore in the image of Agamben's second reading of *the people*, as the "banishment of the wretched, the oppressed, and the vanquished." Borrowing from Douglas' analysis of cleanliness and purity, Turner suggests that liminal subjects are "ritually unclean," culturally polluting, and structurally threatening. As "neither one thing or another," liminal subjects "confuse or contradict cherished cultural classifications" (Douglas 1966, 45). As Douglas acknowledges, the very existence of polluting elements in cultural systems "is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, insofar as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements" (Douglas 1966, 44). Rendered a kind of cultural "dirt" or "matter out of place" (Douglas 1966, 50), transitional housing tenants are thus removed from the structures, protections, and obligations of the public purview, withdrawn behind the façades of public housing buildings with pathological diagnoses that excuse the denial of full citizenship to them. Their liminality is similarly justified upon the grounds that those individuals will ultimately reconsummate themselves within the society that their exclusion inversely constitutes, and return from the state of exception to a state of inclusion and participation, to a state of transformation.

In practice, the liminality of transitional housing for long-term tenants reifies the permanent unsettling of the poor, whether on the street or within public housing projects, and the reduction of those communities to bare life. Tenants like those in the Butte and Biltmore Buildings have little intention of transformation or reconsummating themselves, and thus will not complete the liminal ritual. As a technique of ending homelessness, housing projects permanently remove the homeless from the streets and bridge overpasses, relieving the ideological anxieties prompted by the homeless' occupation of public space while simultaneously eliciting the message that poverty is essentially a temporary, illegitimate way-of-life—Blackburn contends that tenants should "be glad that they're inside," effectively glossing any right-to-exist otherwise and reframing the question of poverty into a matter of transition. As fundamentally transitional, liminal states, these solutions to poverty are

rendered upon individual subjects, whose failure to transform themselves is translated through institutional discourse as a failure of those individuals to desire to live a better life, belying questions about the efficacy of the programs designed to enable self-empowerment. Unlike overt criminalizations of the poor and homeless embodied by camping bans, quality-of-life policing, and public vagrancy statutes like the Sit/Lie Ordinance of 2008, transitional public housing programs like those in the Butte and Biltmore relocate the poor into artificially stable communities that are fraught with problems of their own. The removal of the poor from the public sphere makes invisible overt social problems like poverty and homeless, effectively reaffirming the legitimacy and durability of enduring structural orders and hierarchies. Behind the façades of the single-room-occupancy and other rent-subsidized buildings, public housing tenants assume the subject-positions of people-in-transition, refugees of the streets, partial-citizens. The ideological monopoly over urban space excludes the poor by making them invisible, where they can be ignored.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF

When pressed by Thomas about apparent neglect in Central City Concern-operated buildings like the Butte and the Biltmore, Blackburn explained that he was taking issues of building maintenance "very seriously." The Biltmore Building, says Blackburn, is a particularly difficult property to manage because it houses tenants who wouldn't be housed anywhere else, and that, as a policy, Central City Concern errs on the side of keeping tenants in buildings even when they may have hygiene or other behavior problems, because evicting them may make them homeless. "I'm not going to say that we've never had drug dealing in one of our buildings," Blackburn adds. (Thomas 2009). Implicitly, Blackburn translates issues of neglect, crime, drug use, and the difficulty of managing buildings like the Butte and the Biltmore into questions of client hygiene and behavior, and reaffirms his organization's mission to extend a helping hand, even in difficult situations. The burden of housing maintenance is explained as a matter of doing one's best with a problematic clientele. Despite that Blackburn stresses that most tenants in the Biltmore are "good people" and is concerned that the actions of a few troublemakers will stigmatize the rest (Thomas 2009), Blackburn has shown little effort to either vindicate those who have followed the rules or to persecute those who have not, and has categorically marginalized residents of those buildings.

Paradoxically, the burden of truth for complaints about livability in Central City Concern buildings falls on the tenants themselves. Stacks of paperwork for filing complaint reports sit outside the building offices, yet in the dozens of reports submitted by members of the Tenant Rights Project, little has been done to address the implicated problems. One

tenant, admits cautiously that while "CCC has done a wonderful job with rehab…a lot of time complaint calls from other [non-program] buildings fall on deaf ears." Time and time again, tenants complain, their reports have been returned to them on the grounds that there was not sufficient proof for the assertion. One tenant even received a report he had submitted weeks before, exactly as he had turned it in, with the line for indicating the date it was processed blank—the secretary later admitted that she had never looked at it. For those that are examined, photographic or videographic evidence is the unspoken expectation in providing proof, yet to this end, Central City Concern has resisted tenants requests for the installation of video cameras at entrances to the Butte Building. At one meeting, one tenant pulled up a website with the exact same closed circuit camera system installed in the Biltmore selling for about $300. "Where is all of CCC's money going?" he asks, rhetorically, "if they can't afford a freaking $300 camera system."

The expectation of tenants to self-report problems is complicated. Public housing tenants, like the homeless discussed in the previous chapter, are already a stigmatized population with little political or economic clout. Church explains that "the homeless, the bus riders, the CCC tenants, are not the glamorous victims of inequality, they do not have the political caché of racial minorities or gays or other more unacceptable forms of oppression." Constructed, like the homeless, as second-class citizens, public housing tenants lack the authority to speak truth to problems, especially against an organization like Central City Concern. Though one tenant has, indeed, won a lawsuit against Central City Concern, victories like that are very rare. Usually, Central City Concern administration denies tenants' claims about cleanliness, crime, drug use, or pests, as unfactual, or discards them on account of insufficient evidence to properly verify the assertion.

The reporting of problems, itself, can be dangerous. In a March 11, 2009, interview between KBOO hosts Joann Bowman and Dave Mazza and a tenant of the Biltmore Building, the tenant explains the difficulty of self-reporting:

> Bowman: *What are the rules that you were told when you moved in[to the Biltmore Building]?*
>
> Ron: *Behave yourself, no visitors after 9pm, no visitors before 9am.*
>
> Bowman: *What are the consequences for those tenants who don't follow the rules?*
>
> Ron: *We're supposed to do writeups…*
>
> Bowman: *So it's up to the tenants to do writeups on other tenants?*
>
> Ron: *Correct.*
>
> Bowman: *That doesn't sound good.*
>
> Mazza: *That seems like a bad arrangement right there.*
>
> Ron: *It's not very fruitful as far as getting any real results.*

> Bowman: *Right, because I would think that that would be a rather unsafe thing to do, to complain against someone else in the building.*
>
> Ron: *Yeah, especially as clannish as they tend to be.*

Another tenant similarly alludes to the safety risks that accompany making a complaint. "Remember," he says to two administrators, "we live in this neighborhood, and sometimes it's better to stay uninvolved than to get involved." The tone within buildings is already steeped in violence, and reporting neighbors only elevates one's risk of being targeting or assaulted. And despite the risks involved in making a complaint, there is little to suggest that they have much effect." As in the conversation between Lee, Boyer, and the Tenant Rights Project, Central City Concern's strategic position between the City and its clients can be understood in the expectations for self-reporting. Boyer and Lee articulate a protocol of self-government that shifts accountability for problems onto tenants, who are expected to compile evidence and submit grievance forms. While Central City Concern and other administrators do quietly admit that there are problems of the buildings, solutions to those problems are untenable without the vigilance of tenants, themselves, over their peers. This is precisely the kind of "technology of citizenship" that Cruikshank suggests fundamentally undergirds welfare programs that embrace rubrics of self-help and self-empowerment. In self-reporting concerns, tenants are "made to act," at once reaffirming—as autonomous individuals—their right as citizens to self-government, and appealing—as powerless, second-class individuals in need of saving—to the helping hands of Central City Concern and the police. Where discursive and material power is unequal, self-government regimens like that employed in the Butte and Biltmore buildings succeed in reifying tenants as incomplete, inferior citizens and Central City Concern as a generous and noble service-provider.

ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM?

The imperative for cooperation that is the kind of discursive claim to power that assimilates ideological differences between City bureaucrats and professionals and the urban poor, incorporating legitimate concerns held by tenants into a professional agenda of things that can be done through existing practices. Tenants' grievances are effectively translated into a question of how administrators can do their jobs, and those solutions are drawn not from tenants' suggestions but rather from the expertise of bureaucrats like Lee and Boyer. The expectation of tenants to work *with* the City is effectively an expectation of tenants to work *for* the city, at the cost of nothing being done about problems in the buildings. Recall the kind of symbiotic relationships that constitute what Rodríguez calls the non-profit industrial complex, that "link political and financial technologies of state and owning class proctorship with surveillance over public political intercourse" (Rodríguez 2007, 21). These

relationships constitute the "channeling mechanisms" which maintain the "structural isomorphism, orthodox tactics, and moderate goals" pursued by "much collective action in modern America," a more "subtle from of state social control of social movements" (Rodríguez 2007, 29). The only mode through which tenants can appeal for change is through institutionally mandated and institutionally determined pathways, pathways that fundamentally belie larger issues of accountability between Central City Concern and its tenants and maintain control over the poor.

And in this, a larger issue is raised. As Church articulates, "do landlords that get money through not just the city but in this case HUD and the Housing Authority of Portland, among other government sources, have a responsibility under Oregon's landlord-tenant law to provide habitable and livable conditions?"(Mazza and Bowman 2009). Simply put, to whom are service providers like Central City Concern accountable? Instead of understanding buildings like the Butte and Biltmore as temporary transitional housing, which obviously they are not, Church and other tenants suggest that there is a fundamental obligation on both the part of Central City Concern and of the City of Portland to provide "livable and habitable" housing that is free from infestation, health hazards, disrepair and neglect, and drugs and violence, but this has not been the case.

As Church explains, "CCC's got this system set up to not be accountable." Tenants are unable to attend Central City Concern board meetings, and minutes from those meetings are kept secret—according to Portland's Community Alliance of Tenants (Church 2009), the inaccessibility of board meetings violates Oregon's Open Meetings Law (ORS 192.630). Because Central City Concern is a non-profit public service provider, they have thus far managed to evade being legally categorized as a "public body," and thus required to open their meetings to the public audience. The effective privatization of public services, and of poor and homeless populations, has mobilized a "shadow state" apparatus that weighs accountability amongst city government, taxpayers, foundations and donor organizations, federal and local housing agencies, and ultimately, the poor. Coupled with the increasing political sovereignty afforded incorporations, business-as-usual for organizations like Central City Concern means mediating between federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental bodies and the so-called problem of homelessness, virtually displacing the role of standard government operations as the site of civic politics. As a non-profit service provider, Central City Concern translates problems of urban poverty into a problem about which something can be *done*, and something for which the City and other funding agencies can *pay for*. In the process of determining the best solutions for the problems of homeless(ness), Portland's "shadow state" stakes an ideological claim to the public, manufacturing the values and ethics of public civics about a crafted public consensus, often

at the expense of those excluded within public housing projects. Central City Concern interprets problems raised by tenants about security and safety into professional roles for the Police Bureau, the Office of Neighborhood Involvement, and Central City Concern, yet ultimately does little to efface the fact that these are neglected buildings and neglected tenants. Tenants' concerns are only meaningful if something can be done about them, and when they are not, there is no recourse, nor any sort of outside accountability. The discursive formation of the public, then, has mobilized a widening bureaucratic state apparatus in which resistant tenants like those in the Butte and Biltmore buildings are enveloped and reduced to invisibility.

IN CLOSURE: THE FLOOD

When I approached the Biltmore Building on the evening of February 21, 2010, the lobby where the Tenant Rights Project usually meets was dark, and the furniture had all been removed. It was only until I ran into one of the tenant organizers outside on the sidewalk that I was told that the building had flooded earlier in the week. The tenant told me that Central City Concern had delivered an eviction notice to a tenant on the second floor of the Biltmore Building, and in retaliation, that tenant had tripped the building's sprinkler system, dumping thousands of gallons of water into the hallways of the building. Another tenant, half-smiling, recounts watching the stream of dirty water gushing through the gaping hole in the ceiling and into the first floor lobby.

The following week, the meeting returned to the lobby of the Biltmore. On the ceiling were unpainted patches of plaster patchwork. Where a cheap chandelier had hung two weeks earlier, a few exposed wires dangled vertically from the open fixture. Otherwise, it was as if nothing had changed. I was told that Central City Concern had decided to patch the hole where the water had broken through the ceiling, leaving the remaining, albeit saturated, drywall to remain in place in hopes of drying out. Every tenant in the room expressed concern about mold growth in the ceilings, yet few knew if anything could be done about it. For them, it was another instance of typical maintenance.

CONCLUSION

In the fall of 2009, the United Nations appointed Brazilian urban studies professor Raquel Rolnik as a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing to investigate the ongoing housing crisis in the United States. During Rolnik's travels, she visited six major cities across the country, documenting people's experiences with the foreclosure crisis, growing homelessness, and the severe lack of affordable housing nationwide. In her report, she writes:

> A new face of homelessness is appearing, with increasing numbers of working families and individuals finding themselves on the streets, or living in shelters or in transitional housing arrangements with friends and family. Federal funding for low-income housing has been cut over the past decades, leading to a reduced stock and quality of subsidized housing...The subprime mortgage crisis has increased an already large gap between the supply and demand of affordable housing, and the economic crisis which followed has led to increased unemployment and an even greater need for affordable housing. (Rolnik 2010, para. 79)

Rolnik explains that there is a "long-standing commitment to provide housing within their means for all Americans" (Rolnik 2010, para. 80), but that there is presently a "crisis in affordable housing" that must be addressed by the revitalization of public housing (Rolnik 2010, para. 87), the decorruption of Section 8 voucher programs, the development of "constructive alternatives to the criminalization of homelessness in full consultation with members of civil society" (Rolnik 2010, para. 95), and the "direct, active, and effective participation" of public housing tenants in the "planning and decision-making process affecting their access to housing. Public housing, she concludes, needs to be utterly "transform[ed]" (Rolnik 2010, para. 105). "Transformation," of course, can mean many things.

As the current economic crisis deepens, exacerbated by speculative financial strategies and corporatist market control, the access to housing for middle- and working-class people has become increasingly uncertain, forcing growing numbers into the ill-defined and institutionally-unsupportive space between housed and houseless. The very definition of homelessness is changing, as is the paradigmatic image of the homeless, and a new conceptual framework for understanding poverty is emergent. The ideological weight of preeminent conceptions of a middle-class public is becoming more and more destabilized, as many people now occupying public or subsidized housing have very recently fulfilled the parameters of acceptable urban citizenship—many, like Randy Toole, have held well-paying

jobs for many years, yet have recently lost them, with little recourse. The anxieties about the purity and homogeneity of the public sphere, moreover, are becoming more and more fragile with new growth in homeless and poor populations. In a very different, non-discursive, non-ideological sense, Povinelli's radical worlds—the public and the anti-public, the normal and the pathological, the political and the apolitical, the clean and safe and the unclean and unsafe—are becoming commensurate (Povinelli 2001, 328).

To be sure, the homeless and homeless advocates agree that the housing crisis must be addressed by putting the homeless and the poor into housing. A writer from San Francisco's Western Regional Advocacy Project (WRAP), an organization made up primarily of homeless and formerly homeless individuals dedicated to exposing and fighting the criminalization of poverty and homelessness, writes that "affordable housing is the number one most important solution to ending homelessness" (Western Regional Advocacy Project 2009: 12). Yet, WRAP continues,

> the obvious necessity of this solution is obscured by the ways that policy-makers continue to divide and subdivide homeless people: we now have programs for 'chronically homeless' people, for homeless families, for homeless school children, for homeless youth, for homeless domestic violence survivors, for homeless veterans and on and on and on...Each time we break people apart by irrelevant characteristics, it clouds our ability to recognize the common denominator shared by all: the inability to afford housing (Western Regional Advocacy Project 2009: 13).

Techniques employed by the government, service agencies, concerned citizens, and tenants themselves to embody poverty within the individual selves of the poor are precisely the kinds governmentalities that undergird fragile public ideologies of order and control. As Vincent Lyon-Callo articulates, "by failing to address systemic and discursive inequities...[the] education, life-skills training, and self-improvement efforts are of little real value without collective political movements making existing jobs pay living wages," and "efforts to create more affordable housing, while possibly being a solution to homelessness, will do nothing to eliminate poverty without social movements aimed at decentralizing current dominant discourses about the 'rights' of capital and redistributing the nation's wealth in a more equitable fashion" (Lyon-Callo 2004, 155). The non-profit and voluntary sector is structurally unequipped to accomplish the systemic changes that will legitimize the poor as full-citizens capable of meaningful political action, entangled with public-sector surveillance, foundational financial streams, and political neutrality clauses that serve to limit the possibilities of action. Because they are ideologically and practically counterposed to more radical understandings of poverty, the discursive solutions proposed by these organizations reify the reduction of the poor to second-class citizenship, denied full rights to

the city. In Portland, this has taken the form of a politically progressive Portland Way that values civic engagement and the crafting of a public consensus. Civic engagement has become translated into expectations of a kind of neoliberal self-governance that is structurally compatible with dominant ideologies of how urban space is to be occupied, by whom, and how social change is possible. The urban poor have historically, and remain today, threatening to the ideological stability of cities like Portland. Overt criminalization has in the last two decades has been supplanted by a social service industry that recognizes the structural circumstances of poverty and is designed to help the poor get back on their feet. What this has meant, however, is that approaches to homelessness have pathologized problems within the bodies of the poor, and has legitimized a professional class of service workers, doctors, counselors, and law enforcement officers whose mission is to help ameliorate those inadequacies so as to reassimilate into society as full citizens. This internalization of structural problems, and the subsequent reproduction of the poor as culturally appropriate liberal citizens, marks the neoliberal moment in approaches to urban poverty, even within progressive political climates like that of Portland. As Lyon-Callo concludes, "neoliberalism works to produce not only homelessness [and poverty] within wealth, but also the rhetorical support for such conditions" (Lyon-Callo 2004, 173). Discourse, ideology, and power make the incommensurable gap, between what Portland's anti-poverty programs say and what they do, commensurable.

Holston and Appadarai suggest that the spaces of cities "engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship," their crowds "catalyz[ing] processes that decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practices of citizenship" (Holston and Appadurai 1999, 2). Urban politics has of late exacerbated a "crisis of national membership," in which "formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship"(Holston and Appadurai 1999, 16, 4). The rubrics of that define the civic, political, and cultural rights, privileges, and protections of national citizenship have substantively vanished for many urban populations—we see this in the slums, the *barrios,* the transit stations, sidewalks, public parks, and bridge overpasses. There exists a "city-specific violence of citizenship," Holston and Appadurai assert," and as "people use violence to make claims about the city and use the city to make violent claims," they "appropriate a space to which they then declare that they own…violat[ing] a space that others claim" (Holston and Appadurai 1999, 16). Conceptions of the public sphere, or the *public*, are thus fundamentally destabilized, and public space becomes not the playground of the polity but rather a conflict-ridden territory of the substantiation of citizenship.

I close, then, with a final proposition, borrowing once again from Holston and Appadurai. They write that there may be "something irreducible and nontransferable,

necessary but not quite sufficient, about the city's *public* street and square for the revitalization of a meaningful democratic citizenship." "If we support the latter," they continue, "we may have to do much more to defend the former" (Holston and Appadurai 1999, 16). This is to say, that if we are to truly embrace the modernist project of democratic politics that we have built into our cities—that is, that the state "is the only legitimate source of citizenship, rights, meanings and practices" (Holston 1999, 157)—then we must take very seriously the concept of the public, how ideological discourses circulate amidst and create the public sphere, and how the material practices of social work, civic engagement, affirm, reject, and reaffirm what we mean when we say "Portland." If we cannot, we may need to abandon the faith that the capacities of a democratic liberalism can accommodate the extraordinary heterogeneity of urban spaces within a homogenous political apparatus without elaborating new forms and technologies of social violence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott, Carl. 1983. *Portland : planning, politics, and growth in a twentieth-century city.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

———. 1994a. Oregon's Statewide Planning Goals. In *Planning The Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation (ed. Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler)*, 299-304. Corvallis: Oregon State University Press.

———. 1994b. The Oregon Planning Style. In *Planning The Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation (ed. Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler)*, 205-226. Corvallis: Oregon State University Press.

———. 1994c. Introduction. In *Planning The Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation (ed. Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler)*, ix-xxiii. Corvallis: Oregon State University Press.

———. 1997. The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other--And Often Agree. *Housing Policy Debate* 8, no. 1: 11-51.

———. 2001. *Greater Portland : urban life and landscape in the Pacific Northwest.* Metropolitan portraits. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

———. 2002. Planning a sustainable city : the promise and performance of Portland's urban growth boundary. In *Urban Sprawl: causes, consequences, and policy responses*, 207-236. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press.

Agamben, Giorgio. 1995. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

———. 2000. *Means Without End: Notes on politics (trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino).* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Blackburn, Ed. 2009. Bugged Out. *Portland Mercury*, April 16, sec. Letters to the Editor. http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/letters-to-the-editor/Content?oid=1315317.

Brown, Wendy. 2005. Neoliberalism And The End of Liberal Democracy. In *Edgework: Critical Essays On Knowledge And Politics*, 37-59. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Butler, Judith. 1993. *Bodies That Matter: On the discursive limits of "sex".* New York: Routledge.

Callon, Michel. 2007. What Does It Mean To Say That Economics Is Performative? In *Do*

Economists Make Markets? On The Performativity of Economics (eds. D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa, and L. Siu), 311-357. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Central City Concern. 2007. Return Of Organization Exempt From Income Tax (Form 990): Central City Concern. Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury, June 30.

———. 2008a. *Improving Neighborhoods: Building Communities.* Portland, Oregon. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0c1RKo4EHc.

———. 2008b. *The Face of Change.* Portland, Oregon. http://www.centralcityconcern.org/media.htm?vic_id=h1.

———. 2008c. *From Takers to Givers: Not only getting a job, but succeeding at it.* Portland, Oregon. http://www.centralcityconcern.org/media.htm?vid_id=h1.

———. 2009a. About Central City Concern. http://www.centralcityconcern.org/ccc.htm.

———. 2009b. Central City Concern: Changing Lives, Building Communities, Creating Opportunities.

———. 2009c. *Working Our Way Home.* Portland, Oregon. http://www.youtube.com/user/kappyor#p/u/5/MPmqjgoGGyA.

———. 2009d. *About Central City Concern.* Portland, Oregon, November 10. http://www.youtube.com/user/kappyor#p/a/u/2/DDcvKReKk0o.

de Certeau, Michel. 1984. *The Practice of Everyday Life.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Church, Lew. 2009. Downtown Landlord To Increase Police Presence. *Portland Indymedia.* December 18. http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2009/12/396218.shtml.

Citizens Commission on Homelessness. 2004a. Home Again: A 10-year plan to end homelessness in Portland and Multnomah County. Portland Bureau of Housing and Community Development.

———. 2004b. Participants in Planning Process. Portland Bureau of Housing and Community Development. http://www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=168101.

———. 2009. Working Draft 2009 Goals: Portland's 10-Year Plan To End Homelessness. Portland Bureau of Housing and Community Development. http://www.portlandonline.com/phb/index.cfm?c=44318&a=236572.

City of Portland Bureau of Transportation. 2010. *Portland Bicycle Plan for 2030.* Portland, Oregon.

City Planning Bureau of the City Club of Portland. 1921. *City plan of the west side flat of Portland: Its street system structure and traffic facilities.* Portland, Oregon: City Club of Portland.

Coalition for a Livable Future. 2007. *The regional equity atlas: Metropolitan Portland's geography of opportunity.* Portland, Oregon: Coalition for a Livable Future.

Cruikshank, Barbara. 1999. *The Will To Empower: Democratic citizens and other subjects.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

van Dijk, Teun A. 2001. Discourse, Ideology And Context. *Folia Linguistica* XXX, no. 1-2: 11-40.

———. 2006. Ideology And Discourse Analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, no. 2: 115-140.

Douglas, Mary. 1966. *Purity and Danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo.* London: Routledge.

Entrix. 2009. *Ecosystem Benefits of the Grey to Green Initiative [draft].* Portland, Oregon: City of Portland Bureau of Environmental Services.

Feldman, Leonard C. 2004. *Citizens Without Shelter: Homelessness, democracy, and political exclusion.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ferguson, James. 1994. *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1973. "The Order of Discourse": Inaugural Lecture at the College de France, 2 December 1970 (trans. Ian McLeod). In *Untying The Text (ed. Robert Young)*, 48-78. Boston: Routledge.

———. 1977. *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 1980. *The History of Sexuality: Volume One, An Introduction.* New York: Vintage Books.

Friesen, Sarah. 2009. Central City Concern's Blackburn honored by Dalai Lama. *The Oregonian*, May 20. http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2009/05/central_city_concerns_blackburn.html.

Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. 2007. In the shadow of the shadow state. In *The Revolution Will Not Be Funded: Beyond the non-profit industrial complex (ed. Incite! Women of Color Against Violence)*, 41-52. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Glasser, Irene, and Rae Bridgman. 1999. *Braving The Street: The Anthropology of Homelessness.* New York: Berghahn Books.

Gubrium, Jaber. 1992. *Out of Control: Family therapy and domestic disorder.* Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Herinckx, Heidi. 2008. *Criminal Activity and Substance Abuse Report: Central City Concern: Mentor and ADFC programs.* Portland, Oregon: Regional Research Institute for Human Services of Portland State University, January 7.

Holston, James. 1989. *The Modernist City: An anthropological critique of Brasília.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1999. Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship. In *Cities and Citizenship (ed. James Holston)*, 155-173. Durham: Duke University Press.

Holston, James, and Arjun Appadurai. 1999. Cities and Citizenship. In *Cities and Citizenship (ed. James Holston)*, 1-18. Durham: Duke University Press.

Innes, Judith E. 1995. Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 14, no. 3: 183-189.

Joerges, Bernward. 1999. Do Politics Have Artefacts? *Social Studies of Science* 29, no. 3: 411-431.

Kenny, Judith. 1992. Portland's Comprehensive Plan As Text: The Fred Meyer case and the politics of reading. In *Writing Worlds: Discourse, text & metaphor in the representation of landscape (ed. Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan)*, 176-192. New York: Routledge.

Knaap, Gerrit. 1994. Land Use Politics In Oregon. In *Planning The Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation (ed. Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler)*, 3-23. Corvallis: Oregon State University Press.

Latour, Bruno. 1987. *Science In Action.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lay, Tim., Judy. Richardson, Charles. Scott, John. De Lancey, Jeremy. Leach, Northern Light Productions., and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 2009. *Portland: Quest for the livable city.* Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lemke, Thomas. 2001. 'The birth of bio-politics': Michel Foucault's lecture at the Colle ge de France on neo-liberal governmentality. *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2: 190-207.

Lyon-Callo, Vincent. 2004. *Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance: Activist ethnography in the homeless sheltering industry.* Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press.

Maben, Manly. 1987. *Vanport.* Portland, Oregon: Oregon Historical Society.

Macpherson, and Hallock. 1973. *Senate Bill 100.*

Marvasti, Amir B. 2003. *Being Homeless: Textual and narrative constructions.* New York: Oxford Books.

Mazza, Dave, and Jo Ann Bowman. 2009. Concerned Over Central City Concern. *Voices From The Edge.* KBOO Community Radio, March 11.

McCall, Tom. 1973. *Message to Oregon's 57th Legislative Assembly.* January 8.

Milofsky, Carl. 1987. Neighborhood-Based Organizations: A market analogy. In *The Non-Profit Sector: A research handbook (ed. W.W. Powell)*, 277-295. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nelson, Arthur C. 1994. Oregon's Urban Growth Boundary Policy As A Landmark Planning Tool. In *Planning The Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation (ed. Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler)*, 25-47. Corvallis: Oregon State University Press.

Odell, Julie B. 2004. Constructing Public Dialogue: A critical discourse analysis of the discourse practices that shape civic engagement in Portland, Oregon. Portland State University.

Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. President Obama Announces Recovery Act Awards To Build, Renovate Community Health Centers In More Than 30 States. *The White House,* December 9. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recovery-act-awards-build-renovate-community-health-cente.

Park, Robert Ezra, E. W. Burgess, and Roderick Duncan McKenzie. 1967. *The City.* The Heritage of sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Parker, Stephen, and Rodney Fopp. 2004. 'I'm the Slice of the Pie that's Ostracised ...'. Foucault's Technologies, and Personal Agency, in the Voice of Women who are Homeless, Adelaide, South Australia. *Housing, Theory and Society* 21: 145-154.

Passaro, Joanne. 1996. *The Unequal Homeless: Men on the streets, women in their place.* New York: Routledge.

Portland City Council. 2009. *Portland City Council: AM session.* Portland, Oregon, December 16. http://www.portlandonline.com/index.cfm?c=49508&a=277620.

———. 2010. *Portland City Council: AM session.* Portland, Oregon, February 24. http://www.portlandonline.com/index.cfm?c=49508&a=288383.

Portland City Planning Commission. 1919. *Zoning and city planning for Portland, Oregon.* Portland, Oregon.

———. 1967. *Community Renewal Program: A recommended program for Portland, Oregon.* Portland,

Oregon: Portland City Planning Commission.

Portland City Planning Commission, Edward H. Bennett, and Marshall N. Dana. 1912. *The Greater Portland Plan of Edward H. Bennett.* Portland, Oregon: Wells.

Portland Housing Bureau. 2010. FY 2010-2011 Requested Budget. February 1.

Povinelli, Elizabeth A. 2001. Radical Worlds: The anthropology of incommensurability and inconceivability. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 30: 319-334.

Redden, Jim. 2003. The people vs. the process. *Portland Tribune*, April 15. http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=17487.

Rodríguez, Dylan. 2007. The political logic of the non-profit industrial complex. In *The Revolution Will Not Be Funded: Beyond the non-profit industrial complex (ed. Incite! Women of Color Against Violence)*, 21-40. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Rolnik, Raquel. 2010. *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development.* Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-descrimination in this context, Raquel Rolnik, on her mission to the United States of America. New York: Human Rights Council of the United Nations, February 12.

Rose, Nikolas. 1996. The Death Of The Social: Re-figuring the territories of government. *Economy and Society* 25, no. 3: 327-356.

Silverstein, Michael, and Greg Urban. 1996. The Natural History of Discourse. In *The Natural History of Discourse*, 1-17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sisters of the Road. 2008. Voices of Homelessness: A qualitative database from Sisters of the Road. http://www.sistersoftheroad.org/voices/.

Susser, Ida. 1993. Creating Family Forms: The exclusion of men and teenage boys from families in the New York City shelter system, 1987-1991. *Critique of Anthropology* 13: 267-283.

Thomas, Jake. 2009. Don't Let The Bedbugs Bite: Tenants unionize over poor living conditions. *Portland Mercury*, April 2. http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/dont-let-the-bedbugs-bite/Content?oid=1302360.

Toulan, Nohad A. 1994. Housing As A State Planning Goal. In *Planning The Oregon Way: A Twenty-Year Evaluation (ed. Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe, and Sy Adler)*, 91-120. Corvallis:

Oregon State University Press.

Tsalbins, Sarah Demetria. 2007. Rising Anxieties, Rising Waters: Interpreting the politics of race and housing in Vanport City. Reed College.

Turner, Victor. 1967. *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Waldroupe, Amanda. 2008. Mental Health Solutions: Central City Concern's former Executive Director Richard Harris takes over the reins at the Addictions and Mental Health Division. *Street Roots*, October 3, sec. News.

Warner, Michael. 2002. Publics and Counterpublics. *Public Culture* 14, no. 1: 49-90.

Western Regional Advocacy Project. 2008. *Without Housing: Decades of Federal Housing Cutbacks, Massive Homelessness, and Policy Failures.* San Francisco: Western Regional Advocacy Project.

———. 2009. Mobilizing For Real Change Begins In Your Own Community. *Street Roots*, December 11, sec. News.

Whitman, Richard, Mary Kyle McCurdy, Greg Winterowd, and Ed Sullivan. 2009. Sustainability: Bridging the Divide presented at the "Seeing Beyond Green: Building Sustainable, Affordable, and Diverse Communities, September 25, Gresham City Hall.

Williams, Malcolm. 2001. Complexity, Probability, and Causation: implications for homelessness research. *Journal of Social Issues* 1, no. 2. http://www.whb.co.uk/socialissues/mw.htm.

Wilson, William H. 1989. *The City Beautiful Movement.* Creating the North American landscape. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Winner, Langdon. 1986. Do Artifacts Have Politics. In *The Whale And The Reactor: a search for limits in an age of high technology*, 19-39. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wolch, Jennifer R. 1990. *The Shadow State: Government and voluntary sector in transition.* New York: Foundation Center.

Wolch, Jennifer R., and M. J. Dear. 1993. *Malign Neglect: homelessness in an American city.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Wright, Talmadge, and Anita Vermud. 1996. "Suburban Homelessness and Social Space: Strategies of authority and local resistance in Orange County, California. In *There's No Place Like Home: Anthropological perspectives on housing and homelessness in the United*

States (ed. Anna Lou Dehavenon). Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.

Yanke, Erin, and Trillium Shannon. 2009. Homelessness In Portland. *Circle A Radio.* KBOO Community Radio, September 2.

Zuhl, Joanne. 2008. In Need of a New Deal: As the financial crisis ripples through the nonprofit world, affordable housing corporations are not questioning just if, but when, the sky will fall. *Street Roots*, December 12, Special Edition: Affordable Housing edition, sec. News.

———. 2009. Man Of The Hour: Nick Fish gets his dream job as housing commissioner--just in time for the market to collapse. *Street Roots*, December 11, sec. News.

(4)

PORTLAND CITY COUNCIL
COMMUNICATION REQUEST
Wednesday Council Meeting 9:30 AM

Council Meeting Date: 6-2-10

Today's Date 4-28-10

Name Lew Church

AUDITOR 04/26/10 AM11:54

Address PO Box 40011, Portland, Oregon 97240

Telephone 503-222-2974 Email lewchurch@gmail.com

Reason for the request:

ACTIVISM + SOCIAL JUSTICE

Lew Church
(signed)

- Give your request to the Council Clerk's office by Thursday at 5:00 pm to sign up for the following Wednesday Meeting. Holiday deadline schedule is Wednesday at 5:00 pm. (See contact information below.)

- You will be placed on the Wednesday Agenda as a "Communication." Communications are the first item on the Agenda and are taken promptly at 9:30 a.m. A total of five Communications may be scheduled. Individuals must schedule their own Communication.

- You will have 3 minutes to speak and may also submit written testimony before or at the meeting.

Thank you for being an active participant in your City government.

Contact Information:

Karla Moore-Love, City Council Clerk
1221 SW 4th Ave, Room 140
Portland, OR 97204-1900
(503) 823-4086 Fax (503) 823-4571
email: **kmoore-love@ci.portland.or.us**

Sue Parsons, Council Clerk Assistant
1221 SW 4th Ave., Room 140
Portland, OR 97204-1900
(503) 823-4085 Fax (503) 823-4571
email: **sparsons@ci.portland.or.us**

784

Request of Lew Church to address Council regarding activism and social justice (Communication)

JUN 02 2010

PLACED ON FILE

Filed MAY 27 2010

LaVonne Griffin-Valade
Auditor of the City of Portland

By Susan Parsons

COMMISSIONERS VOTED AS FOLLOWS:		
	YEAS	NAYS
1. Fritz		
2. Fish		
3. Saltzman		
4. Leonard		
Adams		